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THREE WORLDS OF WESTERN PUNISHMENT: A REGIME THEORY OF CROSSNATIONAL INCARCERATION RATE VARIATION, 1960-2002
This dissertation offers an explanation of cross national incarceration rate
variation for 17 industrialized countries for the second half of the 20th century. Both
historical case studies and time-series cross-section analyses are used to provide an
institutional explanation of incarceration rate differences. Borrowing from Weber’s
Sociology of Law and comparative legal scholarship, it is suggested that three types of
legal thinking exist among western democracies—Common, Romano-Germanic, and
Nordic law. A regime approach commonly applied in political economic explanations of
welfare state development is used to quantify the legal and criminal justice institutional
differences between 1960 and 2002 to assert that there are ‘three worlds of western
punishment’ in the post-War period. The countries used in this analysis are similar in
numerous ways, but historically embedded legal differences have resulted in different
trial structures, judge-attorney relationships, rules of criminal evidence, and lay
participation that influence the amount of incarceration in each country. The historical
case studies demonstrate how important events set countries on particular developmental
paths such as the power of defense attorneys in common law, despite their original
exclusion from trials; the choice of scientific legal principles as a basis for an objective
law blending Roman and Germanic legal principles; and the Nordic’s amalgamation of
common and Romano-Germanic legal principles. These legal institutions are
complimented by political economic variables that suggest that the presence of more left
leaning political parties, centralization of wage bargaining, and labor organization
provide a further break on the drive to incarcerate. The quantitative findings support the
legal regime approach as well as political economic variables while controlling for crime
and homicide rates.
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Chapter One: Introduction
There is little known about the similarities and differences between the operation
of the Common law, Romano-Germanic, and Nordic criminal justice systems. This gap
in knowledge leaves many important questions unanswered. What accounts for the US
system having between seven and ten times greater incarceration rate than Germany and
Sweden, respectively (Nilsson, 2003; Oberwittler and Hofer, 2005)? Why does Germany
have nearly 30 percent more incarceration than Sweden, and almost double other Nordic
countries? Is it the amount of homicide? Is it the relative number of police (Kent and
Jacobs, 2005)? Are structural inequalities to blame (Wacquant, 2000, 2005)?
This dissertation uses comparative-historical methods to explain variations in the
use of incarceration in the west during the latter half of the 20th century. It begins with
Weber’s Sociology of Law and then extends his types of legal thinking to suggest that
they foster specific legal and criminal justice institutions that can be grouped into three
distinct regime types of contemporary crime control. Other researchers (Cavadino and
Dignan, 2006) have applied welfare state regime types to explain differences in criminal
justice outcomes. This is the first time that punishment regime variables have been
constructed and analyzed to reflect the durable yet dynamic nature of institutions.
Weber suggested that the western world was governed by two types of legal
thinking, one formally rational and one substantively rational. The former was developed
through legal research dating back to the Roman Emperor Justinian I, adapted by
Napoleon, and reached its pinnacle with the development of the German Basic Law of
1900 (Dubber, 2005, 2006; Eser, 1995; Merryman, 1985). The latter type of legal
thinking was founded in England and first established following the Norman Conquest of
1066 by William the Conqueror, and relies upon case law (Hogue, 1985; Kantor, 1997).
Weber’s Sociology of Law demonstrated how these two rather different legal traditions
resulted in a similar economic outcome—industrial capitalism. These ideal types of legal
thinking are used to explain differences in the amount of formal punishment, which opens
up the possibility of a Nordic type of legal thinking. The Nordic legal type is a mixture
of civil and common law characteristics with a culturally specifically Nordic tone that
uses the law to ameliorate social inequalities (Husa, Nuotio, and Pihlajamaki, 2007;
Lappi-Seppala, 2007; Pihlajamaki, 2004; Takala, 2004; Zweigert and Kotz, 1998). The
three legal regimes are:
1) Common Law Regime: The common law is founded on legal principles
favoring non-academic approaches that limit judicial power in favor of
prosecutors and defense attorneys. As lawyers became a common feature of
trials, prosecutorial power and more complicated forms of criminal
evidentiary rules emerged as a way to compensate for allowing non-legally
trained individuals to pass judgment. Relative to the other regimes, common
law judges are passive until the sentencing phase of a criminal trial.
2) Romano-Germanic Legal Regime: Roman-based legal practices are rooted in
academic legal approaches. The law is considered a science in which the
chief scientists are legally trained judges. The broad judicial power given to
Romanic judges decreases the power of lay and defense participation, and
prosecutors are closely tied to the judiciary. This produces highly
bureaucratized forms of justice in which contextual features have little
influence over legal decisions as Romanic law was developed by and for those
1

with formal legal training.
3) Nordic Legal Regime: This regime is an amalgamation of both common and
Romanic legal principles, but it is infused with unique Nordic culture. The
collectivist nature of Nordic social policies is well-documented as attached to
the cumulative power of left political parties that drive up union density and
governmental economic intervention to reduce social inequality. The Nordic
legal regime uses punishment as a way toward social integration, not
segregation.
This approach suggests that macro criminal justice outcomes are created by the
often overlooked practitioners within the system. Central to this analysis is the
distribution of discretionary power among judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
laymen. Essentially, there is only so much discretion to go around, so to speak, and
these roles are enacted differently across the countries in this analysis. These roles come
with different expectations for what it means to be a “good” prosecutor or a “successful”
defense attorney. Judges are not measured on the same criteria in Germany, Sweden, or
the US. Does it not mean something different to suggest that lay participation should be
yielded through unanimous jury decisions as mixed courts with weak lay participation?
These role expectations did not emerge as natural phenomenon. Instead, multiple social
interactions took place in specific historical contexts to place each regime along a certain
developmental course.
There is limited comparative-historical research and theory explaining criminal
justice outcomes (Cavadino and Dignon, 2006; Sutton, 2004). Measures of criminal
justice regimes are tested among 17 industrialized nations using a mixed method
approach that combines historical, cross-sectional, and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS)
analyses. Historical case studies of one country from each of the regimes are used to
trace the historical trajectory underlying contemporary crime control practices within
each regime (i.e., US, Germany, and Sweden). Investigating specific aspects of different
types of legal thinking 1— Common Law, Romano-Germanic, and Nordic law—provides
a way to uncover differences in criminal justice institutions. These criminal justice
institutions are operationalized and included in models to explain the variation in
incarceration rates.
Weber’s types of legal thinking and historical-institutionalist theories are used to
develop three worlds of punishment, similar to Esping-Anderson’s (1990) explanation of
welfare state differences as “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.” It is argued that each
of these types of legal thinking foster unique criminal justice institutional clusters that
form specific punishment regimes. The punishment regimes are statistically related to
incarceration rates. In fact, the quantitative analyses reveal significant and robust
coefficients demonstrating that the Common law incarceration regime exacerbates
incarceration and the election of judges is a specific institution increasing incarceration
rates in the US. The Nordic and Romano-Germanic regimes are inversely related to
incarceration, and union density significantly reduces the reliance on incarceration.
These findings are significant, robust, and in expected directions while controlling for
homicide rates.
Macro-Explanations of Incarceration
A defining feature of the modern nation-state is its monopoly over the legitimate
use and threatened use of force to control the citizenry. Weber and others have
2

recognized this crucial element for preserving the existing social order (Garland, 1990;
Sutton, 2001). Advanced capitalist societies rely upon the criminal justice and legal
systems to carry out this form of domestic control with police forces apprehending
suspected offenders, courts sentencing those deemed guilty and correctional facilities and
services carrying out punishments, all in the name of enforcing the rule of law. One
socio-political axiom is that laws and the criminal justice system change over time and
space as dominate social definitions of appropriate behaviors and enforcement
mechanisms shift.
The criminal justice and legal system in any society are the manifestation of
dominant institutional practices rooted in traditions, values, and conventions (Garland,
2001). Certain institutional arrangements bring about policy adjustments and procedural
changes that have long lasting effects on the number of individuals apprehended,
sentenced, and incarcerated. The criminal justice system is a central organizational
feature for socializing (and re-socializing) the populace, and yet there is little social
scientific theorizing about the disparities in the use of incarceration among advanced
capitalist nations.
The approach developed here borrows and expands upon Weber’s institutional
analyses to integrate perspectives referred to as “new” institutionalism (Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992). Legal regime variables,
similar to that developed within the welfare state literature (Esping-Anderson, 1990;
Huber and Stephens, 2001), are created to explain the differences in the use of
incarceration in 17 advanced capitalist nations. This effort will bring together insights
from several relatively divergent research traditions including political sociology (e.g.;
Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs and Kleban, 2003; Savelsberg, 1994; Sutton, 2000,
2004), comparative-historical analysis (e.g., Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2002),
criminology (e.g., Sampson and Laub, 2005), and criminal justice studies (e.g., Beckett,
1994; Christie, 2000; Garland, 2001; Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968).
Criminal Justice Systems
Governments rely upon several formal and informal institutions (e.g., schools,
prisons, the family, and so on, see Berger and Luckmann, 1966) to inform citizens of
proper behavior and offer clear punitive mechanisms for failing to abide by the rules
(Burchell, Colin, and Miller, 1991). Many societies have institutions that promote
appropriate socialization, and have crime control agents enforce the laws, courts to decide
on guilt and innocence and make punishment decisions, and places to segregate the law
violators (e.g., correctional system, prison, work camps, etc.). Pierre Bourdieu (1999)
recognized this multivalent system of control as the left and right hands of the state. That
is, the left hand of the state seeks to control the citizenry through less overt forms of
oppression such as the education system, welfare policies, and public health care (Sutton,
2004; Wacquant, 2000). Whereas the right hand of the state is prepared to deliver direct
control through the police, courts, and prisons. This dissertation focuses on the variation
among relatively similar countries’ willingness to use the latter form of control—the right
hand.
Criminal justice research has identified changes in the criminal justice systems in
the western world (Garland, 2001; Tonry, 2007; Tonry and Frase, 2003). One impetus
motivating this dissertation is that the US penal system is said to be the most punitive
within the western world (Wacquant, 1999, 2001, 2005; Whitman, 2003). The US is an
3

outlier in the use of formal penal mechanisms. Ironically, when the prison was first
developed it was seen as an enlightened way of enforcing social rules and ordering the
emergent modern industrial society. Now, the prison is a storage facility for those not
fitting into contemporary social, political, and economic structures (Beckett and Western,
2001; Feeley and Simon, 1992; Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 1999, 2001; Western and
Beckett, 1999). The bulk of incarcerated individuals come from socially disorganized
neighborhoods and they are disproportionately minorities, mentally ill, and substance
addicted (Grattet, Petersilia, and Lin, 2008). Inmates, quite simply, come from the
weakest strata of any society—this is even true within Nordic prisons that are known for
their egalitarianism and normality principle.
Consider the case of the US prison population during the 20th century. It was
marked by stability, no doubt with some fluctuations, but nonetheless, stable (Blumstein
and Beck, 1999). The US penal system has grown from about 110 inmates per 100,000
people in the population between 1925 and 1973 to slightly over 700 per 100,000 in the
population by the end of the twentieth century. This growth places a significant burden
on government budgets as local, state, and federal direct expenditures for criminal justice
services totaled $35.8 billion in 1982 and climbed to nearly $204.1 billion by 2005, a
nearly six-fold increase (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006). When combining both
institutional and community correction figures, it becomes clear that nearly 7 million US
adults or about 3.2 percent of the adult population is under some sort of criminal justice
supervision (Glaze and Bonczar, 2007).
The US criminal justice system stands out from other nations’ crime control
mechanisms. In the US more people are (raw numbers and proportionately) arrested,
convicted (usually through a plea bargaining process), and incarcerated than any other
industrialized western nation (Christie, 2000; Tonry, 2007). Nils Christie (2000) pointed
out that the US faces two serious problems that foster increased crime control policies:
(1) unequal distributions of material resources and (2) unequal access to paid work. In
Crime Control as Industry, Christie argued that US prisons have turned into a place to
store individuals not fitting into the labor market, while creating millions of jobs for
criminal justice system workers and fueling the economies of the mostly rural
communities in which prisons are tucked away (out-of-sight and out-of-mind).
The seriousness of the US penal system incarcerating such large numbers of
adults (and children as well) and the probation and parole apparatuses extending this
control into the community is more evident when considering that of other nations. The
countries characterized by Common law legal thinking are at the opposite end of a
punitive spectrum from those characterized as fitting into a Nordic legal regime. One
Nordic country, Norway, has nearly 3,000 inmates in the entire country—there are more
adults sentenced to life in the US—which is about 70 inmates per 100,000 people in the
population. The three other Nordic countries included in this dissertation also have
similar incarceration rates (Falck, von Hofer, and Storgaard, 2003; Lappi-Seppala, 2007).
Nordic countries may be low-end exceptions compared to their Continental and Common
law counterparts, but it is clear from Table 1.1 that none of the countries included in the
proposed analysis remotely approaches the U.S. incarceration rates.
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Table 1.1: Ten Year Averages of Incarceration Rates per 100,000 population by Country
and Regime, 1960-2002

Country
1960-1969
Common law regime
Australia
75.07
Canada
99.67
Ireland
-New Zealand
72.47
United Kingdom 65.58
United States
179.67
Regime Average: 98.49

1970-1979

1980-1989

1990-1999

2000-2002

71.25
91.92
-87.44
83.55
185.57
103.94

68.12
102.50
46.87
89.97
93.65
307.18
117.71

121.11
118.19
63.84
133.21
102.09
575.76
185.7

149
124
78.8
152
129
690
220.46

Romano-Germanic law regime
Austria
113.28
Belgium
66.42
France
63.10
Germany
94.81
Italy
68.63
Netherlands
25.83
Regime Average: 72.01

105.86
65.13
57.09
79.24
52.35
18.89
63.09

104.09
64.44
73.57
82.60
60.85
30.15
65.85

88.34
74.47
83.07
85.21
74.53
60.56
72.12

88
82
83
94
97
89
88.83

Nordic law regime
Japan
-Denmark
69.99
Finland
145.33
Norway
45.59
Sweden
66.75
Regime Average: -(without Japan) 81.91

-64.18
109.42
45.04
55.80
-68.61

45.28
65.74
92.06
48.18
55.52
65.36
65.37

38.71
66.20
60.22
58.80
63.21
57.43
62.10

50
62
59
58
67
59.2
61. 5
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Why do such stark contrasts exist in these penal approaches? Does the US have
more violent people? Do Americans enjoy inflicting pain upon fellow citizens more than
Swedes or Germans or the French? Is there something inherent or embedded within the
American culture that causes these people to desire punishment? These issues are
explored later, but suffice to say that the US has a moderate comparative crime rate
despite a high homicide rate (Zimring and Hawking, 1997). However, it does seem that
there are specific historically embedded social and cultural arrangements that make it
easier in the US for laws and penal mechanisms to punish more people for longer periods
of time (Whitman, 2003). Specific legal institutional differences allow specific criminal
justice practices that bring about different penal outcomes.
Christie (2000), for one, identified an interesting feature about some Nordic
countries’ penal systems that might shed light on why such regimes have less inclination
to incarcerate. An interesting feature of the Norwegian correctional system is the use of
waiting lists and nearly 4,500 adults are on such an incarceration waiting list. To this
many US citizens may wonder how it is possible to have “offenders,” “deviants,” or
“predators” roaming freely among the “law abiding” without chaos. In the case of prison
waiting lists, these are individuals that have passed through the first two phases of the
criminal justice system (i.e., the police and the courts), found guilty and sentenced to
prison, but there was a lack of prison space. The waiting lists were used to prevent
overcrowding.
That convicted individuals are able to wait to serve their sentence demonstrates
that Nordic legal culture has a fundamentally different perception of crime and criminals.
This raises the possibility that the Nordic type of legal thinking is distinct from that
observed by Weber (1967) in Germany and England. Outside the Nordic countries,
incarceration waiting lists are considered erroneous, dangerous, and potentially even
neglectful on the state’s part as failing to protect society. This suggests that in the
Nordic, unlike most other places, criminals are not viewed as a homogenous group of
monsters, psychopaths, or misfits, but rather as normal people that have violated a legal
code (Christie, 2000: 36). Christie’s analysis goes further to suggest that the use of a
waiting list due to crowded facilities indicates an unwillingness to simply build more
prisons or place more inmates in each cell. 2
The Romano-Germanic regime falls somewhere between the Common law and
Nordic regimes on a punitive continuum. Continental punishment is a bit more nuanced
with the two leading legal models—Germany and France—rooted in Roman legal codes.
Germany and France, not only have this legal tradition in common, but they also have
(along with Italy and Japan) fascist pasts that may potentially affect penal practices. The
German criminal justice system represents a more moderate model. Consider that the
German government sentenced 136,000 adults to prison in 1968 and slightly fewer than
37,000 adults were sentenced to prison in 1996 (Weigend, 2001). This is roughly one
third of the sentenced population of nearly thirty years earlier, something that could be
explained easily if the German public indicated a significant decrease in reported crimes.
Simultaneous to a decline in sentenced offenders, Germany experienced
significant growth in known non-traffic offenses. Weigend (2001: 192) reports that in
1968 there were roughly two million non-traffic offenses recorded by the German police
and by 1996 this figure had climbed more than three-fold to 6.6 million recorded
offenses. 3 Why did Germany experience such a trend of increasing criminality and
6

decreasing punishment? The reform movement that took place in Germany during this
time worked to decrease the number of inmates—a similar reduction of imprisonment is
reported for Finland during the late 1960s through the 1990s (Lappi-Seppala, 2004).
Germany went through something of a loose paradigm shift in criminal justice ideology,
one moving away from a focus on individualistic blame and swift and severe punishment
to one focusing on rehabilitation and relying heavily on day fines, community service,
and shortened prison sentences (German Basic Law, 2000).
German criminal justice policy is once again going through a return toward more
severe prison sentences, not necessarily for homicide convictions which has remained
relatively stable around 600 annually, or rape convictions (remaining around 1,400), or
robbery convictions (remaining around 3,500), but rather enforcing drug offenses which
has more than doubled from about 12,000 convictions in 1986 to nearly 30,000 in 1996
(Weigend, 2001: 194).
Criminal justice policy decisions emanate, much as Durkheim recognized nearly a
century ago, from socio-historic exigencies, political forces, and the public’s and elites’
attitudes toward what are acceptable forms of punishment. The German government has
shifted recently its rehabilitative focus to one more concerned with organized crime and
drug offenses, both of which contribute to the growing numbers of incarcerated adults
with nearly 80,000 or about 97 per 100,000 adults in the population, in 2005.
The use of incarceration is highly variable among the sample of countries included in this
analysis. The intent is not to provide an in-depth study of each country; in fact, some
experts may feel that short shrift was given to a particular country. Contemporary
comparative-historical methods are applied to a Weberian theoretical framework of legal
types to develop three distinct legal and criminal justice regimes to offer an explanation
for the variation in incarceration rates in the western world during the post-WWII era.
Possible Explanations of Incarceration
In the US, the use of formal punishment has more than tripled and the number of
prisoners sentenced to death has grown nearly fivefold since 1980. Caplow and Simon
(1999) explained this shift as the result of three interactive trends: (1) growing use of the
criminal justice system to handle social problems, (2) drug war intensification, and (3)
politicization of criminal justice practices. Christie (2000) suggested that crime control is
growing in the US as a result of bureaucratic efficiency and the need to incapacitate
marginal classes (Feeley and Simon, 1992). Garland (1996, 2000, 2001) argued that as
crime rates—in the US and the UK--rose during the 1960s, the public shifted its
expectations of governmental solutions and demanded harsher punishments. Beckett
(1997) found that the highly televised nature of crime control and drug law enforcement
explain much of the recent growth in punishment. Others used quantitative methods to
test political sociological assumptions and found the presence of right parties and ethnic
or racial threat hypotheses to explain significant portions of prison growth (e.g., Helms
and Jacobs, 2002; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs and Helms, 1996, 2001; Smith,
2004; Yates and Fording, 2005).
Archer and Gartner (1984) commented on the difficulty of finding consistent,
comparable measures of crime, victimization, and justice system practices when creating
their homicide dataset of 110 nations over 70 years. Lynch (1993) expressed a similar
obstacle when making cross-national comparisons of sentence length. The different
administrative and practical nuances between each country’s criminal justice systems
7

shape organizational definitions of “time served.” 4 There are many decisions made at
various administrative levels to determine an inmate’s time served including the point at
which a sentence begins (e.g., arraignment, time awaiting trial), pardon and parole
systems, early release decisions, and social meaning of crime and criminals, which all
shape the administrative definition of length of time served (Farrington, Langan, and
Tonry, 2004).
Jacobs and Kleban (2003: 725) used pooled time-series regression analyses to
compare 13 industrial democracies between 1970 and 1995, and found that political
structure is strongly related to more incarceration in federalist (decentralized)
governments and those with more internal racial threats. Interesting about this research
was not only the strong positive regression coefficients for federalist countries, but also
the consistently significant negative relationship between countries with corporatist
bargaining and incarceration. Kent and Jacobs (2004), with a fixed-effects panel timeseries, compared the law enforcement presence in 11 industrialized nations, and, with the
exception of the US, failed to find support for the racial threat hypothesis. They did find
that income disparities were positively related to law enforcement presence, but they do
not determine the effect of law enforcement presence on incarceration rates.
Sutton (2000) argued that traditional analyses explaining incarceration variation
over time and between countries suffer from narrowly designed model specification
problems, accounting for the inflation of significance tests in favor of business cycle
hypotheses (e.g., Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968). He used time-series cross-section
models to test life-course hypotheses (e.g., proportion of young males 15-24 years old),
“trade-off” effects between the labor market, the military (enlistments), and male school
enrollment in secondary and tertiary institutions, welfare expenditures, public education
expenditures, and right political party power. Sutton’s research focuses on the supply side
of incarceration by looking at a series of alternative life-course paths. He suggested that
being employed, in the military, or in school would steer people away from criminality,
and hence a lower incarceration rate. His analysis concluded that between 1955 and 1985
in five common law countries “prison growth is driven not only by crime rates and
unemployment rates, but also by welfare spending and the power of right parties” (Sutton
2000: 350). These structural effects far outweighed the life-course alternatives, with the
exception of military enlistments, which were found to be a significant positive predictor
of incarceration rates.
Sutton (2004) widened his analysis (N = 15) to incorporate diverse political
regimes with pooled regression techniques between 1960 and 1990. He concluded that
incarceration differences have less to do with labor supply and more to do with
institutional labor market effects among governments with left political parties and strong
unions. Sutton’s findings lend credence to the plausibility of the existence of such
regimes as he found strong support for a diminished use of incarceration in countries with
particular political and economic institutional arrangements (i.e., union density, left party
cabinet dominance, inflation and neocorporatism).
Theoretical Explanations: Classical and Contemporary
Weber’s analysis of rational and substantive legal types is adapted to test
explanations of cross-national differences in incarceration rates. Before moving to
describe Weber’s sociological treatment of western legal thinking, it is important to
briefly mention alternative explanations of legal thinking and behavior. Emile Durkheim
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argued that the use of punishment is central to sociology as he proposed an emotionally
driven, populist form of punishment that serves to legitimize and strengthen the collective
conscience necessary for social solidarity. Marxist accounts of punishment focus more
broadly on economic, political, and ideological oppressions operating through formal law
and utilizing criminal justice mechanisms to support capitalist class structures (Harring,
1983; Lynch and Groves, 1989).
Michele Foucault provides a third explanation of punishment that focused little on
aggregated sensibilities or mentalities, and nearly ignored issues of class conflict. Rather,
Foucault offered, in Discipline and Punish (1977), an historical account of the modern
prison in France, between 1750 and 1820. Modern punishment, according to Foucault,
was fostered through slow moving social changes toward a rationalized, bureaucratic
system of penal rules operating through hierarchical systems of surveillance and
asymmetrical power-knowledge relations. This perspective is insightful, but fails to
consider cross-national differences.
David Garland (1990) synthesized these perspectives when developing his
account of modern punishment. He envisioned punishment as a Bourdieuian-type field,
which brings together criminological theory and philosophy with policing, corrections,
and other practical aspects of administering punishment “as interactive elements in a
structured field of crime control and criminal justice” (Savelsberg, 2002: 686). The crux
of Garland’s (2001) argument was to move the sociology of punishment away from
explanations rooted in conventional accounts that reduce the sole function and origin of
penal policies to responding to crimes. He envisioned the goal of the sociology of
punishment to trace the political, social, and cultural functions and origins of punishment.
Garland suggested that contemporary penal strategies are embedded within deeper
structural changes taking place in the latter part of the twentieth century. 5 These changes,
Garland (2001) argued, provide the cultural preconditions necessary for societies to
develop “cultures of control” characterized by a growing reliance on incarceration, longer
sentences, and the normalization of police presence in new areas of society such as
schools and shopping malls. The penal welfare model (Garland, 1985), emerging in the
latter part of the 19th century, focused on rehabilitation, correction, reentry, and other
attempts to utilize incarceration as a re-socialization process has been replaced with a
more punitive, managerialist model (Simon, 2007). The normalization of high crime
rates, growing polarization and distance between classes, the state’s inability to satisfy
the public’s desire for safety, and other late modern shifts are some of the cultural
preconditions necessary for contemporary forms of punishment in the US and UK
(Garland, 1996). Although these theoretical perspectives offer much in the way of
understanding formal social control mechanisms, they do not provide a systematic
theoretical perspective to explain differences among legal and criminal justice institutions
or their penal outcomes.
Weber: Institutional Variation
Weber investigated several of the world’s religious and economic systems. In
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, he argued that Protestantism,
specifically Calvinism, provided several “this worldly” institutional adaptations (e.g.,
usury) to open the door to a more acquisitive social order and social actor. In fact,
individuals began to see themselves as capitalists as they were to be more industrious and
accumulate wealth for its own sake. Weber also investigated Hinduism, Confucianism,
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and Buddhism, among other religions, to demonstrate the emergence of quite different
economic-religious connections across various parts of the world. However, it is in the
West that he recognized the emergence of a unique character—rationalization—that
ordered society.
Legal and religious thinking are central entities shaping modern society (and the
individuals within these societies) (Kalberg, 1994; Savelsberg, 2004; Treiber, 1985). For
Weber, the law, religion, and economy in the modernizing West could not be separated
completely. 6 These institutions “had the strictly systematic forms of thought, so essential
to a rational jurisprudence, of the Roman law and of the Western law under its influence”
(Weber, 1967, p. 14). Weber was interested in knowing why modern capitalism appeared
in the Occidental world and not other places, with the implicit answer centered on a
specific rationalizing process embedded within Protestantism, the economy, law, and
society (Kalberg 1980; Kronman, 1983).
Rationalization of the West, according to Weber, not only occurred in religious or
economic or legal institutions, but spread throughout all of these spheres of life to create
a canopy of rationalized control structures—potentially forming a dominating “iron cage”
--embedded within humane thinking and shaping social conduct. These rationalization
processes did not happen simultaneously, nor did they produce identical outcomes across
the West. Is Nordic capitalism, for instance, the same as that which exists in Germany,
or, more starkly, that which exists in the Common law world? Similarly, do religious
practices even of the same denomination come in various forms across the western
world? The answers to these questions point to institutional variation across the western
world, as well as over time within a single country.
A brief sketch of Weber’s research is in order to demonstrate the potential relationship
between specific types of Western legal thinking and penal outcomes. This discussion
lays the theoretical groundwork for a historical institutionalist perspective and regime
type approach used to explain cross-national difference in the use of incarceration in the
West during the post-WWII era.
Weber’s Typologies of Legal Thinking
Weber set out to explain the rationalization processes involved in the
modernization of the western world. His research into economic action resulted in
identifying four ideal types of economic action that parallel those he detailed in legal
thinking (Feldman, 1991). These typologies are: formal rational, substantive rational,
formal irrational and substantive irrational. Before discussing each of these types of legal
thinking, it is important to consider how Weber defined a law. A law is an order that “is
externally guaranteed by the probability that coercion (physical or psychological) to bring
about conformity or avenge violation, will be applied by a staff of people holding
themselves specially ready for that purpose” (Weber, 1967, p.5, emphasis in original).
This definition does not mention the inherent rightness or justice of an act. It is
predicated on the modern state’s ability to define, control and order human behavior;
what is essential for the sociologist regarding the study of laws is to identify the ways in
which laws are “actually determinative of conduct” (Weber, 1967, p.4).
That laws shape behavior may appear as a rather taken for granted social fact, but
this became a fundamental characteristic of modern law’s ability to predict human action.
Social actors do not arrange their behaviors according to laws for their own sake; it is the
high probability of a formal response by others that sets laws apart from other types of
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orders. Modernity is characterized by high rationality (Giddens, 1991), which brings
with it a highly trained staff prepared to respond to law violations. Through the
enforcement of law violations, the law’s legitimacy is reinforced in numerous social
spheres (e.g., economy, politics) contributing to the semi-autonomous nature of modern
legal forms.
Rheinstein (1967), in his “Introduction” to Weber’s Sociology of Law, provides a
systematic treatment of Weber’s four types of law. He reworks Weber’s incomplete legal
analysis by first pointing to Weber’s central concerns of a sociological study of legal
systems with two central items: law making and law finding. The first of these issues
focuses on “the establishment of general norms which in the lawyers’ thought assumes
the character of rational rules of law” (Weber, 1967, p. 59). Law making involves
understanding how laws are made, who gets to make laws, and the specific procedures
involved in law making. Law finding, on the other hand, “is the application of such
established norms and the legal propositions deduced therefrom by legal thinking, to
concrete facts which are subsumed under these norms” (Weber, 1967, p. 59). This latter
issue is central to the study at hand, and focuses on the enforcement of laws, the juridical
procedures involved, and the roles and expectations for the various bureaucracies in
charge “of finding the law once created” (Rheinstein, 1967, p. xl).
Law making and law finding fit into either substantive or formal procedures and
they are either rational or irrational. Formally irrational modes of law finding have
official ways or individuals to carry out the task of legal decision making. These
decisions, however, are not made according to any grand scheme of thought or general
rules. An example is the resolution of law violations by oracles, or as was common in the
West in pre-modern times, through an ordeal to determine guilt or innocence.
Substantive irrationality, similarly, allows for legal actions without the guide “of general
norms and proceed either in pure arbitrariness or jump to their conclusions in a
completely…emotional evaluation of every single case” (Rheinstein, 1967, p. xl).
Rheinstein suggests that substantive irrational legal types have “no counterpart in reality”
but is most closely “approximated by the tyrant, as well as khadi justice” because these
systems would lack any specific reference to detailed “rules or norms” used to render a
legal decision. Substantively irrational law is epitomized by legal decisions decided “by
concrete factors in the particular case, without recourse to general rules” in which
“enforcement officials in this type make free decisions from case to case” (Marsh, 2000,
p. 282). Khadi justice, for example, includes Moslem sharia law that Weber argued
involved arbitrary decisions, which were determined according to the merits of each
particular case by adherence to a particular value system.
The increasing rationalization of society can be understood as a greater
opportunity to calculate another’s behavior according to specific means-end relationships.
Weber perceived the western world slipping away from traditional norms that and had
become “disenchanted, growing increasingly secularized; as humans are freed from the
constraints of mysterious forces, they turn to technical mechanisms to understand their
world” (Feldman, 1991, p. 208). Predictability is an essential feature of any rational
economic system, and modern capitalism moved away from status contracts to purposive
contractual law to establish predictable forms of social action through legal thought. This
form of legal order pushed aside patriarchal discretion and established individual rights
for citizens, no doubt rights that disproportionately benefited the economically powerful
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bourgeois class.
Contractual arrangements are ordered by formal legal rationality to allow one
person to predict with some level of certainty the behavior of another person. Modern
capitalism, in essence, depended on rational legal procedures, which is not to say
necessarily formal-rationality, as the substantively-rational legal order found in England
is the place where industrial capitalism first emerged. Rational legal processes can be
formal or substantive and the common law is a type of substantive-rational legal order.
With that said, however, formal-rational law was considered the most rational type of
legal thinking.
A point of clarification is needed regarding common law because at times Weber
referred to common law as substantively-irrational in a juridical sense and substantivelyrational in a sociological one. When analyzing the English common law as an empirical
reality it should be considered as a form of rational law of the substantive type (Ewing,
1987; Kronman, 1983). Common law is rooted in the individual merits of each case, and
civil law is determined through the application of an abstract legal science. Weber
sought to demonstrate the affinities between a particular legal and economic system, and
he argued that modern capitalism was predicated upon a formal-rational legal order. A
problem emerges with his causal ordering because Germanic law was the most logically
formal-rational type of law, but industrial capitalism first arose in England, the original
common law country. How could it be that a substantive legal form fostered (or at least
emerged alongside of) a formally rational economic order? Why is it that England, the
founder of common law, was also the “birthplace” of modern capitalism? Many have
seen this “England problem” as a deviant case refuting Weber’s Sociology of Law
(Habermas, 1984).
Discussing the complete history of modern capitalism is well beyond the scope of
this analysis. Modern capitalism is orchestrated by the bourgeoisie, and the English law
was also established through an imbalance of power in favor of the owners of the means
of production, most notably through the purposive contract, judicial training, and jury
system. For these reasons, England, no less than Germany, fostered a legal system
favorable to the needs, desires, and goals of the bourgeoisie by solidifying (through
precedent) their rights over those of the working classes (Ewing, 1987). The common
law should be understood as juridically irrational as it lacks a “gapless” system of
scripted responses to law finding, but nonetheless it is characterized by rational
administration of justice in practice. The administration of justice in common law
systems represents bureaucratically organized substantively-rational legal systems in the
sociological sense. Ewing (1987, p. 498) summarizes this point: “For Weber, the legal
order that was relevant to the rise of capitalism was not a particular type of legal thought
but a social order in which law facilitated capitalist transactions by contributing to the
predictability of social action.”
Weber explained certain features of the logical formal-rational legal systems
reliance on the purposive contract, displacement of traditional, communitarian based law
with systematic national codes (and rules), and the advancement of a specialist staff of
legal professions (Ewing, 1987; Kronman, 1983; Rheinstein, 1967; Trubek, 1985). The
differences between substantive and formal legal types can be understood as a “tension
between abstract calculability and the satisfaction of ultimate values and needs”
(Feldman, 1991, p. 207). Logical formal-rational law accepts an epistemology that
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eschews values understood in an ethical or political stance, but rather attempts to regulate
law finding through strict application of abstract rules (Kronman, 1983).
The logically formal rational legal type is exemplified by five postulates that are
worth mentioning here:
“first, that every concrete legal decision be the “application” of an abstract legal
proposition to a concrete “fact situation”; second, that it must be possible in every
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of
legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a “gapless”
system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be treated as if it were such a
gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be “construed” legally in rational
terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of human
beings must always be visualized as either an “application” or “execution”
of legal propositions, or as an “infringement” thereof” (Weber, 1967, p. 64).
Typologies provided Weber, and sociologists working in his tradition, with
effective methodological tools to identify the multi-causality of social phenomena. This
approach seeks “…to understand society as resulting from a complex interaction of many
factors, including law, religion, and economy” (Feldman, 1991, p. 210). The bulk of
emphasis in the Sociology of Law centers on the difference between English common law
and that of German civil legal systems. Three central features or differences can be
discerned from these typologies:
1. Procedural justice: certain legal systems emphasize the adherence to a priori
abstract rules (Romano-Germanic and Nordic law), whereas others emphasize
characteristics of the case at hand to continually establish legal rules (common
law);
2. Social justice: certain legal systems ignore social values when making legal
decisions (Romano-Germanic law),while others continually adjust legal rules
according to social values having nothing to do with legal rules per se (Nordic
and common law); and
3. Moral justice: certain legal systems define legal rules by separating morality
and law finding (Romano-Germanic law), but others intentionally blur the
moral and legal spheres (Nordic and common law). (Kronman, 1983, p. 7980; Trubek, 1985, p. 926-927).
Weber differentiated among common law and Romano-Germanic civil law
systems by identifying procedural, social, and moral differences among these legal types.
The former is referred to as an adversarial based system in which the judge lacks the
power to directly question witnesses, but rather “the true facts are expected to emerge
from the allegations and proofs of the parties without the active cooperation of the judge”
(Weber, 1967, p. 225 footnote #7). Inquisitorial procedures, an established part of
Germanic law since the middle Ages, in which “the ascertainment of the facts is regarded
primarily as the task of the judge” (Weber, 1967, p. 225 footnote #7). This is an
important distinction between these types of law finding in which common law affords
the judge tremendous power in the sentencing portion of a trial. This judicial discretion
allows for decisions based upon extra-legal information, not only the application of
abstract legal rules developed beforehand.
Inquisitorial systems involve trials in which the judge has direct control over the
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trial. Lawyers are important actors in this process, but once the prosecutor turns over the
dossier, lawyers are to respond to the judge. Law finding in Germanic law systems is a
matter of compiling the “facts” and locating the relevant code to apply the decision—
morality, ethics, and personal considerations are to be left aside (Dubber, 1997).
It is argued that by concentrating on the two poles of Western legal rationality,
Weber missed a more balanced legal approach found in the Nordic countries. Weber’s
legal typology is adapted to argue that a third type of legal thinking exists. The Nordic
legal regime is described more fully in Chapter 3, but it is argued that the Nordic
countries have blended the civil and common law approaches with their own unique
cultural legal beliefs. This Weberian schema is joined with contemporary historical
institutional theoretical perspectives described below.
Types of Institutional Theories
Historical institutionalists explain political outcomes by analyzing contingencies,
unintended consequences of action, and the path dependency of institutional development
and change (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 952). To date, historical institutional perspectives
have yet to be used to explain variation in cross-national crime control policy outcomes
(for use in legal studies, see Skrentny, 2006). Historical institutionalism is one variant of
the “new institutionalism” that replaced the previous more individualistic and behaviorist
movement throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s. This orientation focused on “the
observed and observable behavior of humans” as the basic datum of social analysis
(Immergut, 1998: 6). New institutionalist theories explain the relations between behavior
and institutions, and the process of institutional development, durability, and change
(Clemens and Cook, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996).
Immergut (1998) critiqued the dominant variants of institutional theory as rational
choice, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism, and she identified
that each variant emerged to form different theoretical assumptions regarding the
complex interaction between (a) institutional forces and (b) human preferences bringing
about (c) policy changes. The argument revolves around the notion of whether social
actors--as individual voters, bureaucrats, citizens--can express their real interests as
opposed to socially constructed ones.
Institutions, according to rational choice theorists, provide rules and norms that
serve to “lower the transaction costs of making deals so as to allow gains from exchange
among legislators that make the passage of stable legislation possible…[and] solve many
of the collective action problems that legislatures habitually confront” (Hall and Taylor,
1996: 943). Rational choice theories recognize the importance of efficiency, transaction
costs, and institutionally enforced observance of rules. These rules make it difficult to
determine the true preferences of individuals. However, political actors have information
regarding these rules and can therefore take actions to maximize their personal interests,
and “manipulate the rules in such a way as to achieve their most-preferred outcome”
(Immergut, 1998: 13). This creates a situation in which political actors make decisions
based upon a strategic calculation of the course of action that will benefit them the most.
Sociological institutionalism focuses on the affect and cognitive impact of various
institutional arrangements such as Zucker’s attention to cultural categories (roles and
hierarchies) or Fligstein’s explanation of changes to management styles, not as rational
outcomes to maximize personal profit (broadly speaking), but as changes in perspective.
DiMaggio and Powell (1991:8) summarized sociological institutionalism as:
14

“a rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent
variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in
properties of supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to
aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives.”
DiMaggio and Powell (1991:11) identified how sociological institutionalism eschews
rational accounts of actors’ solutions to social, political, and economic life for attention to
the process by “which institutions complicate and constitute the paths by which solutions
are sought.” Social life is filled with assumptions that people make regarding “standard
operating procedures”, rules of action, and common sense agreements that allow people
to get on with everyday life. This is similar to Garfinkel’s notion of “socially-sanctionedfacts-of-life-in-society-that-any-bona-fide-member-of-society-knows” through
intersubjective communications.
Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism is most closely attached to the work of Max Weber and
the interpretive framework in sociology. This approach explains the meaning of
everyday practices, and how these meanings shape behavior in different historical times.
A central difference between historical institutionalism and other forms of institutionalist
theories is its emphasis on “themes of power and interests” (Immergut, 1998). Historical
institutionalism emerged out of a dissatisfaction for the lack of macro-structural
perspective in both rational choice and sociological accounts (see Evans, Rueschemeyer,
and Skocpol, 1985), question normative and functionalist accounts (e.g.,
modernization)that skip over the importance of how power is structured and effects
agents.
No longer are individual actions of policy makers, bureaucrats, or voters
translated as the manifestation of autonomous beings putting their interests into practice.
Rather, quite the contrary, social behavior is the manifestation of the myriad of
institutional arrangements characterizing any particular historical time and imbued with
uneven distributions of power and resources. Historical institutionalists identify complex
causal configurations that make it difficult to determine the magnitude of historically
contingent factors that drive particular policy outcomes. Often it is revealed that the
specific arrangements or configurations of variables are influential in shaping policy
outcomes (Ragin, 2000). These points fit nicely with Weber’s sociological framework.
In the case of cross-national crime control, there may be variation across and within cases
in regards to how legal institutions shape policy outcomes such as peculiarities of
Romano-Germanic, Anglo-American common law, and Nordic legal regimes that place
different power in judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, and how these features interact with
other country-specific factors such as plea bargaining structures, the presence of lay
judges vs. the use of juries, the role of attorneys, the use of open prisons, trial structures,
and procedures of criminal evidence.
Historical institutionalists differ from sociological and rational choice
institutionalists in their attention to historical luck, happenstance, and quirks of fate in
shaping institutional development and change, which has a serious effect on social
reality. This last point is similar to what Lieberman (2001) refers to as periodization
when recognizing the significance of historical turning points, which are important or
crucial events that set in place a series of beliefs, values, norms, and logics of appropriate
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action that serve to shape social behavior. For example, felony voting restrictions—a
peculiar US institution—have contributed to placing crime control policies on a particular
path. These restrictions have been found to disproportionately favor the Republican
Party which, in turn, has pushed for more stringent crime control strategies that have
restricted more individuals from voting, not to mention the effect these laws have upon
minority populations (Uggen and Manza, 2002).
These approaches are centered on the idea that social reality is a malleable entity
that is the result of numerous complex interactions, decisions, judgments, and historically
contingent experiences. Institutions are the result of “multiple conjunctural causation”
and it is up to sociologists to research—through history—the possible causal
configurations of institutions shaping crime control policy outcomes (Pierson, 2000a,
2000b, 2004; Ragin, 2000). Huber and Stephens (2001) summarize three interconnected
theoretical mechanisms—policy ratchet effect, structural limitation, and regime
legacies—that are helpful to identify and explain patterns of short- and long-term crime
control strategies.
1. Policy ratchet or legacy effect suggests that once particular policy paths are set
in motion they become increasingly hard to change. This is seen in crime control in the
US by Democratic politicians supporting law and order politics such as the death penalty
(namely Bill Clinton) following several consecutive conservative administrations.
Altering these policies to a less law and order agenda would have appeared soft on crime
as these policy shifts eventually alter the public’s consciousness and preferences—
institutional inertia--regarding punishment policies (Pierson, 1996). One need only
consider how difficult it is for policy makers to voice opposition to stringent drug
enforcement policies, despite that these approaches are not the most effective strategy for
combating drug addiction.
2. Structural limitations are such that certain policy alternatives are ineligible due
to specific power constellations in a country at a given period. As Huber and Stephens
(2001: 29) pointed out in regard to welfare state expansion that “if it is highly probable
that a given [political] party will be returned to power time after time, societal actors will
adjust their expectations about the feasibility of given policy alternatives.” This level of
feasible policy options are needed to explain punishment policies and how certain power
relations can create the context in which others are not able to espouse alternative
policies. This is related to the use of amnesties, prison waiting lists, and widespread use
of day fines and community service in Germany, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and other
countries, which are relatively unthinkable punishment alternatives in many Anglo-Saxon
common law countries.
3. Regime legacies are a theoretical mechanism suggesting that distinctive
patterns of organizing punishment policies exists within specific types of crime control or
legal regimes. Actors become conditioned to certain configurations or policy clusters
within each country, and the regime legacy “affects the distribution of preferences as
each actor takes the current situation as a given, or at least the new starting point, which
forecloses some opportunities and opens others” (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 30; EspingAnderson, 1990). The use of regime types suggests that countries can be grouped by
policy clusters such as the Anglo-Saxon countries fitting into a common law regime,
Continental Europe fitting into Romano-Germanic legal regime, and Nordic countries
fitting into a Nordic legal regime. Grouping countries according to these regime types,
16

for example, one finds relative homogeneity among groups when comparing
incarceration rates (Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe, 1982; Zweigert and Kotz, 1998).
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The common law punishment regime variable characterized by the
presence of jury trials, broad prosecutorial discretion, exclusionary rules, and dual trial
structures have a positive relationship with incarceration rates controlling for crime and
homicide rates.
Hypothesis 2: The Romano-Germanic punishment regime variable characterized by little
prosecutorial discretion, scientific legal approach, and limited lay participation has a
moderate negative relationship with incarceration rates controlling for crime and
homicide rates.
Hypothesis 3: The Nordic punishment regime variable characterized with open prisons
and penal waiting lists has a strong negative relationship with incarceration rates
controlling for crime and homicide rates.
Hypothesis 4: Left party power and union density have strong negative relationships with
incarceration rates net of regime effects.
These hypotheses lend themselves to quantitative testing in both cross-section and
time-series regressions. Further micro-level study is necessary to prove fully the
mechanisms involved within each regime type. The focus of this dissertation is the
differences in regime types and the basic causes of each one as described in hypotheses 1
through 4. The case study chapters focus on the nature of the regime types, and the
underlying mechanisms involved in each one. The explanations of the mechanisms are
highly informed suggestions of how the mechanisms within each regime operate to shape
incarceration rates.
What’s to Come
This dissertation is a comparison of 17 countries’ legal and criminal justice
systems to offer an explanation of incarceration rate variation from 1960 to 2002. The
second chapter details the research plan and methodological strategy. In chapter three the
descriptive statistics, cross-sectional analysis, and time-series cross-sectional analysis for
two datasets (17 countries x 23 years and 15 countries x 43 years) are reported. The
fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters provide a historical case study of the US, Germany, and
Sweden as ideal types of the regimes they fit in. The US is an example of a common law
system; Germany is an exemplar of the Romano-Germanic legal system; and Sweden is
often said to be an example of the Nordic culture and way of life. These chapters provide
brief review of the historical paths of each legal system before discussing the penal trends
in the post-WWII era. Chapter seven concludes the dissertation with some discussion of
the substantive findings, theoretical contributions, directions for future research, and
policy implications.
Copyright © Matthew Todd DeMichele 2010
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Chapter Two: Research Plan and Methodological Strategy
Science is rooted in comparisons, with the scientific method itself a standardized
set of principles necessary to ascertain why certain outcomes occur as opposed to
alternatives. This dissertation contributes to sociological theory and methods by adapting
Weber’s (1967) ideal types of legal thinking to develop and test a regime type theory
(Esping-Anderson, 1990; Huber and Stephens, 2001) to explain the variation in the use of
incarceration in 17 industrialized countries during the post-WWII era.
Comparative-historical research is necessary to develop explanations of why
some countries rely more heavily on incarceration than others (Bennett, 2004; Farrington
and Tonry, 2004; Tonry, 2004a, 2007). The regime approach is used to group countries
according to similar legal histories. Regime type construction goes a step further than
ideal types (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Huber and Stephens, 2001). Weber’s ideal types
point to an exemplar of a specific type of rationalization in law in an abstract way,
whereas regime types systematically measure institutional change. Criminal justice
regime type variables are created by summing the relative presence of regime
characteristics for each country over time (Janoski, McGill, and Tinsley, 1997).
A unique feature of historical-institutional research is that its practitioners
intertwine methodological and theoretical issues. Historical research is a dynamic
process allowing one to interact with historical texts while attempting to trace the process
by which social and political outcomes were instituted by social actors (Mahoney, 2000,
2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2002). The researcher gains perspectives as he or
she interacts with the historical data, and these new findings shape theoretical insights
and guide further analysis. There is a gap in comparative-historical research and theory
explaining criminal justice outcomes (Cavadino and Dignon, 2006; Sutton, 2004). The
regime theory is tested with descriptive, cross-sectional, and time-series cross-sectional
analyses. One country from each of the regime types is selected for an historical case
study—the US, Germany, and Sweden—to identify critical points in history that resulted
in the adoption or rejection of specific institutional arrangements related to penal
outcomes.
Methods
The research strategy is similar to that applied by some welfare state theorists
(Esping-Anderson, 1990; Huber and Stephens, 2001). Welfare state regime types were
created by systematically measuring important welfare institutions that appear with some
level of regularity among countries with similar political-economic structures. The
welfare regimes are the Social Democratic, Corporatist, and Liberal (or wage earner), and
it is argued that underlying politico-economic foundations are reflected in types of
welfare practices. This approach, essentially, argues that despite the similarity among the
west there is unique variance in welfare mechanisms that are supported by historically
embedded political and economic structures (Soskice and Hall, 2001). Although these
policy clusters have been tested empirically in the welfare state literature, there has yet to
be a systematic application of a similar regime method using criminal justice institutions.
Regime Method
The regime method is a technique used to allow for uncovering short- and longterm patterns in social and political phenomenon. Each regime type is composed of
several indicators that will be measured dichotomously. The countries within each
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regime have a similar type of legal thinking. Table 2.1 provides regime characteristics to
demonstrate the measuring process. The incarceration regimes are measured as follows:
1. The Romano-Germanic punishment regime (bureaucratic law) is composed of
two institutions. a. Lay judges: the presence and use of lay judges were
scored to indicate the control placed on lay judges—which is something of the
inverse of judicial power—in which Germanic countries have tight control
over lay participation (scored 1), the common law countries do not have lay
judges (scored 0), and the Nordic countries fit in the middle as lay judges have
more influence than in the former countries but not as much power as in the
latter. b. Lawfinding: the second institution measures the shape of judicial
review to reflect the role of judges as overseers of lawfinding, not lawmaking,
as Weber stressed, the Germanic judge is myopically focused on applying
legal codes to particular fact situations as laid out by the legislative and
executive branches. Therefore, Germanic countries are scored 1 to reflect the
centralization of the judicial role as one of lawfinding. The Nordic countries
are scored .5 and the common law countries have broad judicial review
powers were scored 0. This regime variable ranges from 0 to 2.
2. The Common law incarceration regime (punitive law) is composed of four
institutions and ranges between 0 and 4. a. Juries: presence and use of juries
are scored with a zero for the Germanic countries, with some countries
allowing juries on appeals only or in highly restricted cases (e.g., France).
The Nordic countries also have some minimal use of juries and these countryyears were scored .5. The common law country-years were scored with a 1 to
indicate the power given to juries in such times and places. b. Prosecutorial
discretion: is routinely mentioned as an exceptional characteristic of the
common law. Country-years having high prosecutorial discretion were scored
with a 1, those with almost no discretion were scored 0, and those having
some limited official discretion were scored .5. c. Dual trial: is coded such
that countries having separate guilt and sentencing phases receive a 1 and
those with unitary trial structures receive a 0. d. Exclusionary rules:
countries with rules excluding evidence or hearsay were scored with a 1 and
those without such legal institutions were scored 0. The country-years scores
were summed to yield the Common law incarceration regime ranging from 0
to 4.
3. The Nordic incarceration regime (collective law) is composed of two
institutions and ranges from 0 to 2. a. Anti-prison groups: country-years in
which there was a strong and influential anti-prison group(s) received a 1 and
all other country-years received a zero. b. Open prisons: country-years in
which open prisons are used were scored 1 and zero when they are not used.
The country-year scores were summed to yield a Nordic incarceration regime.
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Table 2.1: Incarceration Regime Scoring Description
Country

Jury

Exclusionary

Common Law Regime:
Australia
1
1
Canada
1
1
Ireland
1
1
New Zealand
1
1
UK
1
1
US
1
1
Romano-Germanic Legal Regime:
Austria
1
0
Belgium
.25
0
France
.25
0
Germany
0
0
Italy
Japan
Netherlands

0
0
0

Nordic Legal Regime:
Denmark
0

Dual
Trial

Prosecutor

Lay
Judges

Review AntiPrison

Open
Prison

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
.5
0

1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
.5

1
1
1
1
.25(75)
1
1
.5
1(83)

1
0
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

0

0

0

.5

0

1

.5

.5 (85)

1 (67)
0 (86)
1
.5 (77)

Finland

0

0

0

0
.5(77)

.5

0

0

Norway

.25

0

0

.5

.5

.5

0

1
1(68)

Sweden

0

0

0

.5

.5

.5

0
1(64)
0(83)

1

Parentheses indicate the year a change took place.
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The goal is to derive theoretically viable and testable aspects of hypothesized
regimes. Each of the items fitting into the index is traced for each of the country-year
dyads, and these items are theoretically related to the outcome variable—incarceration
rate. The jury, in certain contexts, is believed to infuse court processes with the popular
punitivism identified by several criminologists during the latter 20th century. A central
characteristic of the common law system is the use of lay juries that can determine
disposition as well as sentence in some cases. This is not to neglect the lay participation
found in other systems, but rather serves to highlight an embedded latent cultural
characteristic. Consider that all the systems considered here include some lay
participation, but that participation is distributed differently across regimes. The
Romano-Germanic regime is a highly professionalized legal system respecting formal
credentials, training, and diminished lay influence in decisions. The Common law
regime, on the other hand, emphasizes lay jury participation with the use of jury trials.
Common law was founded on the notion of peer-to-peer resolution of law finding, which
does not relegate the judge to some backstage position as much as this solidified a certain
relationship between judge, jury, and accused that structures the common law system.
This may seem to be an insignificant institutional difference of how a regime
incorporates lay participation, but it does point to different training and educational
standards perceived as needed to make legal decisions. The common law legal system is
predicated on the notion of social conscious legal rulings; in such cases the current trends
and thoughts are considered in court cases. This is out of the question in a German trial
that is to be ordered by attention to rules, laws, and formality.
Data
The data in this study come from a variety of sources. Formal data sources
include the United Nations World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems
(1970 to 1997), CIA World Fact Book, US Bureau of Justice Statistics, The European
Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice, World Health Organization, and
International Labor Organization, and other sources. The following data sources were
also used: the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Age setting,
state intervention, and social pacts (Visser, 2009), political variables were retrieved from
Duane Swank’s Codebook for 21-Nation pooled time series data set: Political strength of
political parties by ideological group in capitalist democracies, the Penn World Table
Version 6.2 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009), probation and lawyer rates were found
in Boyle (2000), and incarceration rates for 1960 to 1990 were found in Sutton (2004).
Operationalization of the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a common indicator of the relative use of incarceration,
and is a figure routinely identified as the most accurate measure of relative incarceration
use. These populations will be computed using the common rate figure of the number of
incarcerated adults per every 100,000 people in each population. There is debate whether
to use prison admission rates or incarceration rates to measure the relative use of
incarceration in comparative research. Interestingly, Jacobs and Helms (1996) supported
using admission rates, but they subsequently (Jacobs and Helms, 2001: 178) determined
that analyzing annual prisoners per 100,000 adults in the population “is conceptually
superior to the less comprehensive admission rates.” Incarceration rates are a preferable
indicator of the probability of incarceration than admission rates, as this figure identifies
(as best as possible) the rate by which adults are incarcerated within a nation. This is not
21

to suggest that other figures are not suitable measures of formal punishment, but rather
the focus of this dissertation is to test a criminal justice regime theory using comparativehistorical methods to explain the use of incarceration. Other researchers may wish to use
an alternative criminal justice outcome as a dependent variable to explain broader
relationships operating within the criminal justice systems in these different countries.
Quantitative Approach
Comparative researchers must confront several issues pertaining to small-N
problems (Ragin, 1987) when estimating statistical inference. The time-series crosssection analysis (TSCS) is similar to panel studies in which researchers may have
thousands of units (N) but only a few time periods (T). These are referred to as crosssectionally dominant, and there has been much analytical development for these sorts of
analyses (Stimson, 1985). Panel designs, however, are conceptually much different from
time-series cross-section analysis. Large N panel designs are centrally concerned with
generalizability of the findings, which is not the point of this dissertation. The intentions
are to explain incarceration in the countries included in the analysis.
Comparative social science researchers often compare 10 to 50 countries over 10
to 30 years (Beck and Katz, 1995). This data creates potential for heteroskedasticity and
correlation of errors with independent variables. Ordinary least squares regression (OLS)
assumes that error structures are spherical—homoskedastic and independent. The first of
these assumptions—homoskedasticity--is the presence of constant error variance between
units, as it is an acceptable assumption that within unit error variance is constant. This is
an important methodological point specific to TSCS analyses because this
heteroskedasticity is usually the result of unmeasured unit specific factors that influence
the dependent variable. This could be a political campaign bringing about significant
policy changes in a single country. Correlated error processes, on the other hand, may
arise in two ways. One type of autocorrelation is serial correlation due to correlated
errors within one unit over time, and the other is the correlation of errors at any point in
time between units (i.e., contemporaneous correlation).
TSCS data must be corrected for potential problems. The countries included in
the analysis were selected because of their similarities in economic, political, social, and
other fields. These similarities have the potential to create contemporaneous correlation
in which the error structures of a nation correlate with another unit. These assumptions
are more than a mere nuisance--error structures are important to consider in TSCS (Beck,
2001). Using OLS will lead to inefficient estimation, and most problematically, reduced
standard errors that foster inflated significance tests (Type I error). It is difficult for
comparative scholars to assume that cross-national data will be arranged such that error
variances are constant and that all error processes are independent.
To adjust for these panel error assumptions, Parks (1967) developed an approach
using generalized least squares regression (GLS) that adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. Beck and Katz (1995) proposed a critique and alternative estimator than
the Parks method. In their critique, they describe the Parks-Kmenta method as two
sequential feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) transformations. They point out that
the Parks-Kmenta approach rests on asymptotic properties as T increases, and argued that
T needs to be two or three times larger than N before using the Parks-Kmenta method. It
is argued that the FGLS estimator provides significant underestimates of variability in
finite samples. Beck and Katz (1995), in the end, suggest that researchers utilize panel
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corrected standard errors (PCSE) and OLS estimation (now accessible in common
statistical software, such as STATA).
Following Beck and Katz (1995), comparative researchers incorporated PCSE in
their models. Wilson and Butler (2007: 110) argued that there is more to consider when
using TSCS analysis than standard errors, as many researchers began including PCSEs
but had few other considerations. Their analysis of 195 papers uncovered several
problems with the application of the Beck and Katz (1995) method. They actually found
that several findings in comparative politics were weaker than reported and some even
had a reversal of sign.
A central concern when utilizing the common fixed effects model is that such
models only use within unit variances and they ignore between unit variance (Baltagi,
2001; Hsiao, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). This is especially problematic for comparativehistorical researchers wanting to measure the between unit effects on time-invariant and
slowly-changing variables. A key feature of institutional theory is recognizing that
institutions once established are slow to change. That is, institutions become accepted as
the appropriate way for doing things in different places and times, but for various reasons
these processes can be challenged and altered. The death penalty makes for a good
example as it was considered an acceptable form of punishment in the US nearly since
the founding of the country and remained unchanged until the early 1970s. This is an
example of an institution being firmly entrenched in the thoughts and behaviors of the US
legal system, but the opposition (exogenous forces) upset the legitimacy of the death
penalty causing a rapid transition. No doubt, the death penalty returned shortly after the
moratorium, and it is a relatively engrained form of punishment in the US. The point
here is that institutional variables are often referred to as time-invariant or constants when
they are really slowly changing variables within units and potentially highly variable
across units.
Recently Plumper and Troeger (2007) have developed a new technique that
incorporates both between and within unit variance by separating and considering these
effects separately. This is a three-stage fixed-effects vector decomposition model
(FEVD). The FEVD model is particularly suited to this analysis because it differentiates
between variables with considerable variability, and slowly changing or sometimes
constant variables within each country which then vary more between countries. This is
useful because the central slowly changing institutional variables in this study are the
criminal justice regime variables. The equations for the three-stage FEVD model
adjusting for only one time-invariant variable (z) are:
(1) yit = α + β1 xit + … + βk xkit + γ zit + ui + εit
The first stage estimates a standard fixed effect model with a time-invariant
institutional variable (zit), the fixed effects of the unobserved effects within specific
countries (ui), and the independent and identically distributed error term (εit). Plümper
and Troeger go on to estimate two equations to estimate observed and unobserved unit
effects.
(2) hi = u^i – γ1z1i … γm zmi
The second stage decomposes the unit effects into an unexplained (hi) and
explained part by the slowly changing variable (zi).
(3) yit = α + β1 xit + … + βk xkit + γ zit + δ hi + εit
The third stage reruns the entire model omitting the unit effects (ui) but including the
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unexplained part (hi) of the decomposed unit fixed effect vector obtained in stage two by
estimating a pooled OLS (see Plümper and Troeger for the seven equation process). The
results include δi that indicates unit specific unobserved effects of each country.
Case Studies: US, Germany, and Sweden
One drawback to comparative research is that as the sample size increases, the
level of within case specificity declines. A way to fill some of the gaps missed by the
quantitative analysis is to conduct country specific case studies to delve deeper into the
history for a particular country. Each of the three countries chosen is an ideal type
representing an exemplar of a particular regime type. In this case, the US, Germany, and
Sweden were selected as exemplars of the Common, Romano-Germanic, and Nordic law
regime types. This is not to say that any of these countries is a pure type of the
punishment regime they are placed in, but rather one can see relatively clear differences
in the historical path to bring about divergent contemporary crime control outcomes
among these countries. The data for these case studies is collected through historical
sources, governmental reports, and email exchanges with scholars and justice
professionals from several countries.
The case studies are used to accomplish three main goals. First, they offer a more
in-depth explanation of each regime type by providing details of how legal and criminal
justice practices changed over time. Second, the case studies demonstrate how the
various institutional changes took place in these countries. This allows for exploring the
influence of social changes on legal definitions and practices. For instance, the US case
study demonstrates how the common law trial shifted from a judge-dominated procedure
that excluded lawyers to one that relies on a passive-judge and powerful lawyers in an
adversarial process. Third, the case studies are used to make the mechanisms of the
regime type clearer than the regime type variable that measures each group of countries.
This is the more challenging objective for the case studies. Using history to make causal
statements about contemporary crime control requires understanding what changes
occurred and how these changes came about. The ultimate purpose here is to understand
why it is that the lawyerization of trials and jury presence increase the likelihood for
more incarceration, whereas limited prosecutorial discretion, restricted lay participation,
and open prisons have a dampening effect on incarceration rates.
Expected findings
All social research comes with strengths and weaknesses, and this dissertation is
no different. It is hypothesized that the research findings will identify specific features
embedded within the common law regime (i.e., Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand,
UK, and US) that promotes the use of prison as a way to handle marginal populations,
and, conversely that there are features within the civil law tradition that prevent extensive
use of prisons in countries fitting into a Romano-Germanic (i.e., Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands) incarceration regime, and little reliance on
incarceration as a policy response in the Nordic (i.e., Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden) countries that rely on an amalgamation of the common and civil law with a
particular Nordic culture and politics. Japan is difficult to hypothesize fitting into one of
these regimes, but they appear more akin to the Nordic regime with their low
incarceration and blended civil and common law structures.
It is possible, however, that these expectations may not be supported by the
empirical evidence. It could be that the known historical differences between these
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countries may have little direct influence on criminal justice policy outcomes. It could be
that the hypothesized incarceration regimes are not plausible. That is, there may not be
an underlying type of legal thinking supporting rather coherent crime control responses
over the long-term within the industrialized world that allows for collapsing these
countries into regime types. One possible alternative outcome is that the common law
regime does not exist. Instead, it may be that the US is an outlier, and that while
Australia, UK, and New Zealand have experimented with similar practices (e.g., threestrikes, longer sentences, private prison operation, and prison construction) their
incarceration rates are still much lower. The common law countries, nevertheless, have
consistently higher incarceration rates than those found on the Continent or Scandinavia.
Welfare state literature and political sociological research presented earlier
suggests that contemporary policy decisions are not the manifestation of instantaneous
desires. Policy outcomes instead reflect underlying logics of how the state and individual
relate to one another, and the criminal justice system is used to enforce this relationship.
It is conceded here that no other country resembles the level of punishment used in the
US, but previous actions in these countries suggest that the potential exists within other
common law countries. Or, it is possible that some unknown factor(s) exist that separates
the US legal system from other common law countries (e.g., the election of judicial
actors).
Independent Variables
Politics
Election Year: Election year dummy variables are coded 1 for years in which an election
took place and 0 otherwise. For the US, Congressional and Presidential years are coded,
and in France, Presidential and National Assembly election years are coded. In all other
cases, national elections of lower chamber legislatures were coded as 1 (Swank dataset).
Left Power: (is the factor score combining the following two variables): Left party
legislative seats as a percent of all legislative seats and left party votes as a percent of
total votes. Source (for seats): Mackie and Rose (1974; selected years). (For the United
States, non-southern Democratic seats are reported for Left seats) (Swank dataset).
Bargaining structures and Union Density
Intervention: (is the factor score combining the following two variables): Coordination of
wage bargaining is a variable ranging from 1 to 5 with higher scores indicated more
centralized coordination of wage bargaining and 1 indicating completely fragmented
company level bargaining. The second variable included is the level of government
intervention in wage bargaining is a variable measuring the amount of government
involvement in wage bargaining ranging from 1 to 5. Higher scores are indicative of
more governmental intervention (Visser, 2009).
Union Density: is the net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners in
employment (wsee) NUM*100/wsee, with higher values indicative of more union
density.
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Economic-Wellbeing
GDP-PPP: is Purchasing power parity over GDP. This measures currency units needed
to purchase what can be bought with one unit of the base country. The Penn World
Tables calculate the PPP as a country’s currency value of GDP divided by real value of
GDP in international dollars (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006).
Gini Coefficient: is a common measure of inequality within a country. This coefficient
ranges from 0 (indicating lack of inequality) and 1 (indicating complete inequality).
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.htmlP:L:
Human Development Index: Index is a normalized composite measure of life expectancy,
literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per capita. The United Nations uses a natural
logarithm of GDP per capita, life expectancy at birth, and two measure of education
(literacy rate and an enrollment ratio of primary, secondary, and tertiary schools)
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/).
Welfare
Decommodification: is a measure from Esping-Anderson representing the relative
protection that workers have from shifts in the labor market updated by Kenworthy
(http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/data.html).
Conservative: regime is a measure of Esping-Anderson’s neo-corporatist welfare regime
updated by Kenworthy (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/data.html).
Social Democratic: regime is a measure of Esping-Anderson’s Nordic welfare regime
updated by Kenworthy (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/data.html).
Liberal: regime is a measure of Esping-Anderson’s liberal welfare regime updated by
Kenworthy (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/data.html).
Criminal Justice
Probation is a measure of probationers per 1,000 in each population from Boyle (2000).
Lawyers is a measure of lawyers per 1,000 in each population from Boyle (2000).
Police: is a rate of police officers per 100,000 in each population from Barclay and
Tavares (2003).
Judge election: scored 0 (no elections) or 1 (judicial elections).
Crime
Homicide: rate of homicides per 100,000 in each country (WHO).
Violent crime rate: is a rate of reported violent crimes per 100,000 in each population
from Barclay and Tavares (2003).

26

Crime rate Police: is a rate of all reported crimes per 100,000 in each population from
Barclay and Tavares (2003).
Conclusion
Comparative historical approaches focus on making causal statements that
consider both time and space. This requires data collection and analytic strategies that
also account for temporal and spatial dynamics. The methods described in this chapter
rely on previous research to utilize quantitative and historical data to test the hypotheses
presented. The quantitative analysis uses descriptive and correlational analyses provide
tentative evidence that the 17 countries’ use of punishment cluster around three distinct
legal regimes. Next, cross-sectional regression models are estimated that include social,
economic, and political factors, while controlling for total crime rates, violent crime rates,
and homicide rates. Following the cross-section analysis, the time-series analyses are
presented for the 17 country 23 years and the 15 country 43 years data sets. The
quantitative data allows for testing the plausibility of the influence of legal and criminal
justice institutional variation with newly developed modeling technique to measure the
effects of slowly changing institutional variables. Three historical case studies are
presented to demonstrate the process by which each of the legal regimes was constituted
over time. Reviewing the historical record of three distinct countries provides
information regarding the path or trajectory by which each of these countries formed their
type of punishment.
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Chapter Three: Quantitative Analysis
This chapter reports the quantitative findings. First, descriptive statistics are
provided for key criminal justice and structural variables. Second, cross-sectional
correlations are reviewed. These correlations provide a validity check by measuring the
correlations between the punishment regimes and welfare state measures before reporting
the correlations of incarceration rate and the criminal justice variables. Third, OLS
regressions are presented using cross-sectional data of incarceration rates on regime
variables, while controlling for crime, politics, economics, and labor organization.
Fourth, the correlations and time-series cross-sectional analyses are presented for the 17
country-23year data set and the 15country-43 year data set. The time-series dominant
data set excludes Ireland vii and Japan. viii
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides incarceration rates per 100,000 population for the countries
and regime averages. Table 3.1 demonstrates that the US is not the leader in crime or
violent crime rates despite being the leader in homicide and prison rates. Table 3.1
shows the latest year of data captured for each of the variables. This table makes clear
the regime group differences with the common law regime having nearly 2.5 times the
incarceration rate of the Romano-Germanic regime, and 3.5 times the rate of Nordic law
countries and Japan. Common law countries have more than twice the rate of reported
homicides, nearly identical crime rate with the Romano-Germanic regime, but much
lower rate compared to the Nordic regime and Japan. Average violent crime rates are
close between the Nordic regime and Japan and the Romano-Germanic regime, but the
common law regime has between 33 and 50 percent more reported violent crime. The
Romano-Germanic regime has, on average, greater police presence, but the common law
regime had more probation officers and lawyers than the other regimes. No doubt these
data provide only limited direction as it is difficult to compare crime rates given the
variations in criminal definitions (see Barclay and Tavares, 2003).
The common law regime has nearly one-third more inequality than the Nordic
regime and Japan, and has nearly 25 percent more than the Romano-Germanic regime, on
average. The common law regime has a much lower rate of left party political power and
governmental intervention in economic policies than the Nordic regime and Japan and the
Romano-Germanic regime. The Nordic regime and Japan have more left party power
and intervention than the other regimes. Union density is nearly 60 percent higher in the
Nordic regime and Japan than the other regimes.
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TABLE 3.1: Descriptive statistics for crime and criminal justice variables

Country Prison
Homicide
Crime
Vrate Police
Probation
Lawyer
Common law regime
Australia 151
1.47
7391
990
212
1.61
2.93
Canada
133
4.45
7408
951
182
2.08
2.93
Ireland
78
1.09
2182
173
306
--New Zea 148
1.77
10680
1180
-1.79
2.93
United K 135
.20
9168
1349
241
2.37
1.12
United S 701
6.02
4044
490
230
5.24
2.81
Average: 224.33
2.50
6812.16
855.5 234.2
Romano-Germanic regime
Austria 94
.85
6394
602
337
.29
.38
Belgium 86
1.62
8200
578
360
.78
.55
France
90
.81
6722
462
381
.52
.47
Germany 91
.73
7721
229
289
1.20
.81
Italy
98
.97
3727
128
472
-.76
Nether
94
1.21
7474
620
274
1.39
.37
Average: 92.16
1.03
6706.33
436.5 352.16
.84
.556
Nordic regime
Denmark 64
1.13
8743
296
190
.45
.73
Finland
67
2.56
6925
640
156
-.22
Norway 60
0.86
7038
444
178
.34
.76
Sweden 72
1.12
13236
854
182
.61
.35
Japan
55
.57
21484
572
179
.36
.13
Average:63.6
1.25
11485.2
561.2 177
.44
.44
Prison: for the year 2002, per 100,000 population gathered through country reports.
Homicide: for the year 2002, per 100,000 population from the World Health Organization Mortality Database.
Crime, Vrate, and Police: are for the year 1997, per 100,000 population from Barclay, G. and C. Tavares,
International Comparisons of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001. Statistical Bulletin 12/2003. London: Home Office,
2003(www.homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk/rds).
Probation: found in Boyle (2000) who cites U.N. World Crime Surveys 1992, supplemented by national yearbooks.
Data are probation officers per 1,000 population, with added constant to eliminate zeros, and logged.
Lawyer: found in Boyle (2000) who cites Pritchard (1991) for European countries and Ahmad-Taylor (1994) for
other countries. Data are lawyers per 1,000 population, with added constant to eliminate zeros, and logged.
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TABLE 3.1 (continued.): Descriptive statistics for social and economic variables

Country
Gini
GDP
UE
Union HDI
Left
Intervention
Common law regime
Australia
35.2
29000
5.10
37.53 .9011 .745
.0944
Canada
31.5
29800
7.00
33.83 .9203 -1.578 -1.67
Ireland
35.9
29600
4.30
53.99 .8733 -1.342 .7096
New Zealand
37.0
21600
4.20
41.77 .8859 .6750 -.7482
United Kingdom 36.8
27700
4.80
39.06 .8929 .1406 -1.67
United States
45.0
37800
5.50
15.97 .9150 -2.25
-1.67
Average:
36.92
29250
5.15
37.03 .8980 -.601
-.827
Romano-Germanic regime
Austria
31.0
30000
4.40
45.48 .8951 .9364 .1002
Belgium
28.7
29100
12.00 52.96 .9025 -.0224 1.4050
France
32.7
27600
10.10 11.36 .9023 .8160 -.2158
Germany
30.0
27600
10.60 30.98 .8899 .4984 .0459
Italy
27.3
26700
8.60
39.86 .8886 .0929 .2160
Netherlands
32.6
28600
6.00
26.12 .9130 -.0106 .5962
Regime average: 30.38
28267
8.61
34.46 .8985 .385
.357
Nordic regime
Denmark
24.7
31100
6.20
76.61 .9017 .5267 .5469
Finland
25.6
27400
8.90
74.07 .8995 .4954 .7277
Norway
25.8
37800
4.30
56.86 .9162 .6262 .8417
Sweden
25.0
26800
5.60
82.15 .9098 1.096 .2679
Japan
24.9
28200
4.70
25.78 .9118 -.5818 -.1940
Average:
25.2
30260
5.94
63.09 .9070 .432
.438
Gini: CIA World Fact Book.
GDP: in US dollars, Heston, I., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2006).
UE: Visser, J. (2009). Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions,
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between1960 and 2007 (2.1). Amsterdam Institute
for Advanced labour Studies.
Union: Visser, J. (2009). Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions,
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between1960 and 2007 (2.1). Amsterdam Institute
for Advanced labour Studies.
HDI: Human Development Index (2008). Human development index 2007/2008 statistical report. United Nations.
Left: Swank, D. (2006). Codebook for 21-nation pooled time-series data set: Political strength of political parties by
ideological group in capitalist democracies.
Intervention: Visser, J. (2009). Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions,
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between1960 and 2007 (2.1). Amsterdam Institute
for Advanced labour Studies.
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Cross-Sectional Correlations: Punishment Regimes and Welfare State Regimes
The correlations between incarceration rates, welfare state variables, and
punishment regimes are reported in Table 3.2. The incarceration and welfare state
regime relationships are in the hypothesized directions. For example, the Nordic
punishment regime variable is positively correlated with decommodifcation and the
social democratic welfare state. The Nordic regime is negatively correlated with the
liberal welfare state, and although not reaching significance the Nordic regime has
negative coefficients with the common and Romano-Germanic punishment regimes, and
incarceration rates.
Table 3.2 demonstrates that the common law punishment regime is correlated
negatively with the Romano-Germanic punishment regime, the conservative welfare state
regime, and the decommodification measure. There are negative coefficients between
decommodification and the liberal welfare state and incarceration rates, and positive
coefficient with the social democratic welfare state. The liberal welfare state and the
social democratic welfare state have an inverse relationship. The social democratic
welfare state and the incarceration measure are also negative. These findings suggest that
the punishment regime variables measure three distinct regimes.
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Table 3.2: Cross Sectional Correlation Coefficients: Punishment regimes and Welfare State
Regimes
Nordic Comm RG
Deco
Liberal
Conserv
SocDem
Nordic -------Comm- .360 ------RG
-.078 -.703** -----Deco .659** -.759**.483* ----Liberal -.517* .498* -.188 -.483*
---Conserv-.181 -.631**.738** .294
-.286
--SocDem.783**-.272 .026 .569*
-.501*
-.252
-lnPrison -.429 .628** -.379 -.515*
.458
-.416
-.502*
* < p= .05, **< p =.01
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Cross Sectional Correlations with Incarceration Rates: Criminal justice, Economic, and
Literacy
Table 3.3 reports the cross sectional correlations for the political, economic,
criminal justice, crime, punishment regime, and incarceration rate variables. Left party
power is significantly related to one variable, negatively with homicide rates. Although
not reaching significance, the punishment regime variables are in the hypothesized
direction with left party power. Union density presents some interesting relationships.
This variable is negatively related to incarceration rates and the Gini score, and is
positively related to the Nordic punishment regime. The economic intervention variable
has a negative relationship with incarceration rates, the common law punishment regime,
violent crime rates, and the rate of probation officers and lawyers. GDP-PPP has weak
coefficients with all of the variables except crime rates, which GDP-PPP has a robust
positive relationship with the total crime rate variable. Similarly, the Gini coefficient has
a strong positive relationship with the rate of probation officers and the rate of lawyers as
well as with the common law regime and incarceration rates. Higher HDI measures are
associated with fewer police officers. The rate of probation officers has several
extremely high coefficients including the rate of lawyers, the common law regime, and
incarceration rates. The rate of lawyers also has several large coefficients with
incarceration rates, homicide rates, and the common law regime. Incarceration rates and
homicide rates are positively related. And, although all of the coefficients are in the
expected directions, only the common law regime is significantly correlated with
incarceration rates.

33

Table 3.3: Cross Sectional Correlations with Incarceration Rates: Criminal justice,
Economic, and Literacy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Politics
1. Left -----------2. Union.177 ----------3. Inter .026 .454 ---------Economy
4. GDP -.018 -.140 -.146 --------5. Gini -.178 -.681**-.427 -.347 -------6. HDI -.202 .264
.038 .086 -.296 ------Criminal Justice
7. Prob -.446 -.442 -.597* -.253 .848** -.129 -----8. Law -.358 -.405 -.713**-.271 .660** -.022 .683**----9. Pol -.034 -.365 .290 -.280 .155 -.552* -.141 -.215 --Crime
10. Viol .395 -.103 -.597* -.046 .214 .162
.246 .464 -.437 --11. Crim .386 .047 -.266 .824**-.414 .179 -.392 -.249 -.444 .355 -12. Hom-.666** -.141 -.365 -.197 .439 .192
.795** .628**-.263 .081 -.284
Punishment Regime
13. Nordic.181 .865** .275 -.065 -.624** .419 -.368 -.346 -.553 -.103 .112
14. Comm-.268 -.313 -.524* -.242 .685**-.123 .727** .901**-.224 .513* -.256
15. RG
-.030 .011 .371 -.043 -.424 .055 -.505 -.515 .462 -.390 -.036
Incarceration
16. lnPrison-.389-.514*-.588*-.307 .839** -.078 .959**.731** .038 .244 -.355
*< p = .05, **< p =.01
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OLS Regression: Incarceration rates and Punishment regimes
Table 3.4 reports eight OLS regression models using the cross sectional data to
test the plausibility of the punishment regimes. Model 1 reports the control variables, and
shows that economic intervention policies have a significant and negative coefficient.
Judicial elections are a significant predictor of more incarceration. Models 1-4
incorporate the punishment regime variables one at a time. The findings are nearly
identical in all three of these models with the regime variable not approaching
significance, but in the hypothesized direction, and the judicial election variable is highly
significant in all the models. Although the judicial election variable is not entered into
the time-series models due to a lack of between country variability over time, the crosssectional models suggest that the election of the judiciary is a significant driver of larger
incarceration rates in the US. Judicial elections are not hypothesized to explain
incarceration rate changes within countries as much as to identify a relatively unique US
practice that potentially explains the vast difference between the US the rest of the
countries in the analysis. Model 5 includes the Nordic regime and the Romano-Germanic
regime variables, with only slight reductions in coefficients compared to the models these
variables are in separately.
Although it is common to explain the use of incarceration with crime indicators,
the homicide rate is consistently weak and never approaches significance, but does
remain positive throughout the eight models reported in table 3.4. When testing the
cumulative effects of the regimes, the Romano-Germanic variable did change signs and
became positive, but this variable never reached significance. The R-squared coefficients
never dipped below explaining 92 percent of the variance, and judicial election is a
powerful predictor of incarceration for the models in which it was able to run. It appears
that there is a long-term political effect explaining incarceration for the Nordic and
Romano-Germanic regime.
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Table 3.4: OLS regressions of Natural Log Incarceration rates and punishment regimes, 17
countries
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Nordic
Common

-.070
(-.475)

RG
Union

.037
(.499)
HDI
-.103
(-1.53)
Left
.027
(.343)
Intervention -.175
(-2.23)*
Judge Election .790
(5.68)***
Homicide
.188
(1.48)
Constant
1171.39
(1.55)
R squared
.964
Adj. R squared.942

.095
(.656)
-.079
(-.904)
.045
(.491)
-.175
(-2.14)*
.803
(5.45) ***
.189
(1.43)
884.44
(.893)
.965
.937

* < p= .05, **< p =.01, ***< p =.001

.070
(.693)
.026
(.331)
-.087
(-1.18)
.057
(.614)
-.141
(-1.49)
.821
(5.49) ***
.155
(1.11)
988.81
(1.21)
.966
.939
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-.046
(-.286)
-.034
-.027
(-.398)
(-.332)
.089
.025
(.579)
(.292)
-.063
-.093
(-.626)
(-1.22)
.047
.028
(.496)
(.331)
-.161
-.164
(-1.73)
(-1.85)
.798
.784
(5.13) *** (5.34)***
.182
.182
(1.30)
(1.36)
717.65
1072.84
(.670)
(1.27)
.965
.964
.931
.937

Table 3.4 (continued): OLS regressions of Natural Log Incarceration rates and punishment
regimes, 17 countries
Model 6
Model 7
Model8
Nordic
Common
RG
Union

-.081
(-.511)
.061
(.553)

.065
(.406)
HDI
-.073
(-.797)
Left
.064
(.636)
Intervention -.145
(-1.44)
Judge Election .826
(5.20)***
Homicide
.160
(1.08)
Constant
824.45
(.795)
R squared
.966
Adj. R squared.932

.086
(.596)
.020
(.170)
.032
(.354)
-.090
(-1.12)
.063
(.601)
-.141
(-1.41)
.833
(4.82) ***
.157
(1.01)
1016.24
(1.15)
.966
.931

* < p= .05, **< p =.01, ***< p =.001

-.043
(-.217)
.065
(.357)
.004
(.030)
.064
(.362)
-.074
(-.670)
.065
(.578)
-.141
(-1.34)
.828
(4.46) ***
.158
(.975)
841.12
(.680)
.966
.922
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Time-series cross-sectional correlations
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report correlation coefficients for several variables for the 17
countries-23 years and 15 countries-43 years data sets, respectively. While correlations
do not provide conclusive evidence for the hypotheses, they do show interesting
relationships. The punishment regime variables measure distinct qualities. The Nordic
regime is negatively correlated with the common law regime, and has a non-significant
negative relationship with the Romano-Germanic regime. Homicide rates, GDP, and
incarceration rates are negatively correlated with the Nordic punishment regime. Union
density, economic intervention, left party power, and GDP change are positively
correlated with the Nordic regime.
The common law punishment regime has negative and significant relationships
with the Romano-Germanic regime, union density, GDP, left party power, and economic
intervention. Homicide rates and incarceration rates are significantly correlated with the
common law punishment regime. The Romano-Germanic regime has positive and
significant relationships with economic interventionism, left party power, and GDP.
Similar to the Nordic regime, the Romano-Germanic regime has strong negative
correlations with homicide rates, and incarceration rates.
These correlations suggest that certain combinations of criminal justice
institutions and political structures are related to higher or lower incarceration rates are
more common in different punishment regimes. The common law regime variable has a
robust relationship with incarceration rates, and it has strong relationships with the
characteristics most related to incarceration—homicides and weak unions and left parties.
The Nordic regime and the Romano-Germanic regime have strong unions and left parties
and little homicide.
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Table 3.5: 17 countries over 23 years Correlation Coefficients: Incarceration regimes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1. Nordic
----------2. Common - .148+ ---------3. RG
-. 074 -.757† --------4. ElectY
-.003 .049 -.045 -------5. Union
.560† -.250† .008 -.032 ------6. GDP-PPP -.134+ -.261† .232† -.012 -.065 -----7. GChange .097* .100* -.095 .001 -.012 -.023 ----8. HDI
.016 -.069 -.019 -.018 -.226† -.118* .061 ---9. Left
.135+ -.427† .422† -.054 .329† -.005 -.036 -.056 --10. Interv
.337† -.554† .471† -.022 .449† .062 .050 -.133+ .387† -11. Homicide -.227† .420† -.336† .063 -.236† -.035 -.061 .128* -.594† -.457†
12. lnPrison -.307† .530† -.297† .058 -.383† -.124 .012 .224† -.375† -.571†
* < p= .05, + < p =.01, † < p =.001
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11.
-----------.720†

Table 3.6: 15 countries over 43 years Correlation Coefficients: Incarceration regimes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1. Nordic
--------2.Common
- .382† --------3.RG
-. 043 -.867† -------4.ElectY
-.005 .056 -.057 ------5.Union
.644† -.334† -.024 -.023 -----6.GDP-PPP -.129+ -.217† .251† -.019 -.055 ----7. Left
.337† -.425† .298† -.065 .472† -.016 ---8.Intervention .394† -.545† .398† -.040 .462† .001 .503† --9.Homicide -.168† .357† -.311† .090 -.371† -.035 -.620† -.367† -10. lnPrison -.257† .493† -.445† .062 -.339† -.091* -.434† -.490† .672†
* < p= .05, + < p =.01, † < p =.001
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Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis
Table 3.7 reports the findings from the time-series cross section regression
analysis for the 17 countries over 23 years. The incarceration regimes coefficients
support the hypotheses. Specifically, the Nordic and Romano-Germanic regime variables
are negative and significant, and the Common law regime variable is significant and
positive. The first three models in table 3.7 report random effects (GLS estimation)
models with panel corrected standard errors and the remaining models report results with
FEVD estimation. The Nordic and Romano-Germanic regime variables are significant
and negative, and the Common law regime variable is significant and positive. Left party
power and union density have a dampening effect on incarceration, but these effects do
not consistently reach significant levels. The amount of homicide does not have much
effect on incarceration over this time period, as the coefficients are insignificant and
several are negative. This is not to refute the importance of levels of homicide on
criminal justice policies, but rather to use a stringent control of the amount of violence in
each country. No doubt, homicide is not a perfect measure of violence or crime, but is it
the most accurate available, and the regime variables have strong effects net of the rate of
homicides. ix
Table 3.8 provides mixed support for the hypotheses. Similar to the analysis in
table 7, the first three models used a GLS estimator with panel corrected standard errors.
These models supported our general hypothesis regarding the effects of the incarceration
regimes, judicial elections. Left party power remained negative, but was only significant
in model 2 when ran with the Nordic regime. However, union density has a strong
negative effect on incarceration rates over the 43 year timeframe. All seven models
support the incarceration regime hypotheses. Homicide maintains its insignificant and
mostly negative influence on incarceration rates. GDP-PPP and election year continue to
have negligible effects, but they remain consistent throughout all seven models. The Rsquared coefficients are large for all the models with models 1-3 ranging between 97 and
98, and the FEVD models much lower, 61 to 62. These coefficients indicate that
underlying legal approaches are highly influential on the incarceration rate, net of
political, economic, and crime effects.
The political variables—union density, left party power and interventionism—
receive mixed support throughout the analysis, with union density emerging as a
significant negative predictor of incarceration. This suggests that countries in which
workers have greater protections from markets there is less government reliance on
incarceration. Previous research has found that left party power, union density, and neocorporatist measures have been found to be significantly related to lower incarceration
rates (Sutton, 2004). The punishment regimes are supported in all the models.
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Table 3.7: Time-Series Cross Section: 17 countries 23 years regressed on Incarceration rates
GLS
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Nordic
-.113
(-3.86)***
Common
.076
(4.29)***
RG
-.120
(-2.50)*
Homicide

Left power

GDP-PPP

.016

.008

.007

(1.04)

(.62)

(.51)

.002

-.025

-.019

(.16)

(-1.76)

(-1.31)

-.000

-.000

-.000

(-.19)

(-1.08)

(-.35)

-.001

-.001

(-.20)
-.001
(-1.63)
1.36
(2.30)*
-.004
(-.40)
3.18
(5.92)***
.974
45.01

(-.28)
-.005
(-5.77)***
1.07
(1.81)
-.006
(-.58)
3.71
(6.68)***
.975
45.51

ElectionYear -.001
Union
HDI
Intervention
cons
R-squared
Wald/AdjR

(-.18)
-.004
(-5.16)***
1.66
(2.74)**
-.011
(-1.02)
2.84
(5.10)***
.969
73.14

* < p= .05, **< p =.01, ***< p =.001
Models 1-3 use a Prais-Winsten regression estimator with panel corrected standard errors and autoregressive adjustment (Stata
command xtpcse). Models 4-6 use a fixed-effects vector decomposition model with panel corrected standard errors and
autoregressive adjustment (Stata command xtfevd).Durbin-Watson adjusted statistics ranged between 1.77 and 1.78.
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Table 3.7 (continued): Time-Series Cross Section: 17 countries 23 years regressed on
Incarceration rates
FEVD
Model4
Model5
Model6
Nordic
-.290
(-26.76)***
Common
.162
(27.10)***
RG
-.171
(-19.25)***
Homicide

-.000
(-.04)
Left power
-.023
(-1.70)
GDP-PPP
-.000
(-.81)
ElectionYear -.003
(-.15)
Union
-.000
(-.09)
HDI
1.70
(4.95)***
Intervention .001
(.12)
cons
2.60
(217.60)***
R-squared
.791
Wald/AdjR .786

-.000
(-.04)
-.023
(-1.68)
-.000
(-.79)
-.002
(-.13)
-.000
(-.27)
1.75
(5.09)***
.002
(.17)
2.90
(401.91***
.791
.787

.000
(-.04)
-.023
(-1.65)
-.000
(-.77)
-.002
(-.14)
-.000
(-.01)
1.71
(4.99)
.001
(.15)
3.02
(374.66)***
.790
.787

* < p= .05, **< p =.01, ***< p =.001
Models 1-3 use a Prais-Winsten regression estimator with panel corrected standard errors and autoregressive
adjustment (Stata command xtpcse). Models 4-6 use a fixed-effects vector decomposition model with panel corrected
standard errors and autoregressive adjustment (Stata command xtfevd).Durbin-Watson adjusted statistics ranged
between 1.77 and 1.78.
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Table 3.8: Time-Series Cross Section: 15 countries 43 years regressed on Incarceration
rates
GLS
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Nordic
-.053
(-2.47)**
Common
.080
(6.88)***
RG
-.191
(-8.77)***
Homicide
-.022
.005
-.017
(-.74)
(-.15)
(-.57)
Left power
-.020
-.024
-.020
(-1.84)
(-2.15)*
(-1.93)
GDP-PPP
-.000
-.000
-.000
(-.39)
(-1.30)
(-.17)
ElectionYear -.002
-.003
-.002
(-.60)
(-.64)
(-.64)
Union
-.002
-.002
-.005
(-3.32)**
(-3.25)**
(-7.75)***
Intervention .006
.002
.005
(1.02)
(-.31)
(.82)
cons
4.29
4.47
4.74
(78.62)***
(93.71)***
(88.30)***
R-squared
.98
.975
.988
Wald/AdjR 78.83
37.85
137.38

* < p= .05, **< p =.01, ***< p =.001
Models 1-3 use a Prais-Winsten regression estimator with panel corrected standard errors and
autoregressive adjustment (Stata command xtpcse).
Models 4-7 use a fixed-effects vector decomposition model with panel corrected standard errors and
autoregressive adjustment (Stata command xtfevd). All models had Durbin-Watson adjusted statistics in the
2.00 range.
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Table 3.8 (continued): Time-Series Cross Section: 15 countries 43 years regressed on
Incarceration rates
FEVD
Model4
Model 5
Model6
Model7
Nordic
-.227
(-19.50)***
Common
.146
(36.20)***
RG
-.282
(-38.74)***
Homicide
-.008
-.002
-.000
-.004
(-.12)
(-.04)
(-.01)
(-.06)
Left power
-.026
-.026
-.026
-.026
(-1.85)
(-1.83)
(-1.84)
(-1.85)
GDP-PPP
-.000
-.000
-.000
-.000
(-.41)
(-.40)
(-.39)
(-.40)
ElectionYear -.002
-.002
-.002
-.002
(-.12)
(-.13)
(-.13)
(-.13)
Union
-.003
-.003
-.003
-.003
(-3.03)**
(-2.98)**
(-3.03)**
(-2.99)**
Intervention .008
.008
.008
.008
(.78)
(.77)
(.78)
(.77)
cons
4.35
4.67
4.88
4.48
(372.59)***
(257.05)***
(261.04)*** (394.54)***
R-squared
.627
.622
.621
.620
Wald/AdjR .623
.618
.617
.616

* < p= .05, **< p =.01, ***< p =.001
Models 1-3 use a Prais-Winsten regression estimator with panel corrected standard errors and
autoregressive adjustment (Stata command xtpcse).
Models 4-7 use a fixed-effects vector decomposition model with panel corrected standard errors and
autoregressive adjustment (Stata command xtfevd). All models had Durbin-Watson adjusted statistics in the
2.00 range.
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Conclusion
The punishment regimes measure unique groupings according to legal
institutions. The descriptive statistics suggest that specific crime, criminal justice, and
social variables cluster. The common law regime has high incarceration, high levels of
homicide, moderate crime, but high violent crimes. The presence of criminal justice
officials is different across these regimes with the Nordic regime and Japan having the
fewest police, probation officers, or lawyers, and the common law regime has the greatest
proportion of probation officers and lawyers, but the Romano-Germanic regime has the
highest rate of police officers. The cross-section correlations point out that the
punishment regimes correlate with welfare state regime variables in the hypothesized
directions.
The relationship between the state and citizen is central to the amount of reliance
countries place on incarceration. Previous research supports the political variables tested
here. Long-term left party power provides the political structure needed to foster
powerful unions and high involvement in domestic economic policies. Union density had
the most robust findings in the longest time-series suggesting that unions are a powerful
mechanism by which incarceration rates are kept lower in certain countries. It is possible
that countries with long-term patterns of high union involvement seek out alternative
control mechanisms than incarceration. That is, governments have an assortment of
control mechanisms at their disposal, with incarceration being only one, and it could be
that in countries with long-term left party power that economic interventionism occurs to
redistribute wealth to reduce inequalities with union membership essential to organizing
the citizenry.
The regime and political effects are found while controlling for crime measures.
The total crime and violent crime measures potentially suffer from definitional and
measurement problems due to different legal definitions and recording procedures across
these countries. These variables are used only in the cross-section analysis whereas the
homicide rates are available longitudinally allowing for controlling for the effects of
homicide in the time-series regressions. Homicide rates are believed to be the best crime
measure for comparative purposes due to fewer definitional issues and the high rate of
reporting this crime. Interestingly, homicide rates never approached significance in the
regression analyses. That the regime and political variables have statistically significant
relationships while controlling for homicide suggests the plausibility of underlying legal
and political cultures shaping penal outcomes.
This chapter provides descriptive, correlation, and regression analyses that offer
some support for the existence of underlying punishment regimes to contribute to
explanations of the differences in approaches to formal punishment in the West. The
common law regime received the most support for driving incarceration rates upward,
with judicial elections potentially contributing to the exceptionally high incarceration
rates in the US, but measures picking up more cross-country variation are needed. These
findings suggest that there are unique features within common law countries that support
higher relative incarceration rates, whereas the Nordic and Romano-Germanic regimes
rely upon strategies that maintain lower amounts of punishment.
Copyright © Matthew Todd DeMichele 2010
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Chapter Four: The Common Law Punishment Regime: The United States
The common law punishment regime has the most punitive mechanisms to
respond to law violators. This regime is characterized by high prosecutorial discretion,
lay participation in legal processes, complicated trial structures, and strict procedures of
criminal evidence. Much has been said about the US pattern of incarceration as a system
of racial segregation (Wacquant, 2000; Western, 2006), warehousing those not fitting in
(Simon, 1993, 2000), and as a neo-liberal system of control (Cavadino and Dignan,
2006). This chapter reviews the historical trajectory of US incarceration patterns. The
common law system is predicated on lay participation, privatization of law enforcement
and court practices, and disregard for overly pedantic legal views. With that said, the
common law type of thinking, as Weber recognized, is much different from the RomanoGermanic civil law that spread throughout much of Europe and Latin America.
The US is the most punitive incarceration system in the western world (Christie,
2000). In Harsh Justice, James Q. Whitman (2003) compared the French, German, and
US models of incarceration from the 18th century until the present day. His analysis
suggested that the continental systems of punishment have experienced a “leveling up” of
punishments that took place within highly stratified status based societies by which he
argued that punishments reserved for elites replaced the more stigmatizing forms of
punishment used for the lower classes. x This leveling up of punishment did not happen
in the US. Rather, an opposite process took place in which punishment leveled down.
To be sure, while French and German citizens during the late 18th and early 19th centuries
could be certain they would receive punishments similar to the more humane types
inflicted upon the nobility and aristocracy, US prisoners could expect the opposite.
Punishment in the US persisted toward the more severe.
Why does the US incarcerate so many people? The US is free from a feudalist
past, lacks a monarchical history, and is predicated on liberal political-economic views.
It seems strange that the US would have such high levels of punishment. One might
think the US would have the least amount of punishment of all the countries given its
strict reliance on liberal economic and social thinking. However, when peeling back
some of the institutional layers embedded within contemporary crime control practices in
the US, history reveals a common law system that increasingly came to rely on the
lawyer centered trial. The central arguments in this chapter follow those put forth by
comparative legal scholars studying the historical roots of the common law system,
moving from England to the US and other common law countries (Alschuler, 1979;
Beattie, 1991; Cockburn and Green, 1988; Langbein, 1996, 2005; Shapiro, 1991). The
crux of this research is to explain how a system of law that originally sought to limit
formally educated individuals from trial processes came to be wholly dominated by and
shaped by lawyers. Besides explaining the historical path from lawyer free trials
dominated by judges and self-informing juries, this chapter demonstrates the relationship
between the emergence of for-hire lawyers and the extensive rules of criminal evidence
that are unique to the common law.
The US is often referred to as an exceptional case by social scientists (Soskice,
2009). Many political philosophers have commented on the exceptional nature of the US
political and social landscape characterized by libertarian ideals of individual autonomy
and localized political competition (Chase, 2002). This autonomy fostered a preferred
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mode of material exchange and economic performance rooted in individual
responsibility, enterprise, and profiteering. These American ideals were legally ordered
by an inherited version of the English common law system. Lipset (1967, p. 1)
recognized not only the existence of “American exceptionalism” but he went on to
mention that the US, since its inception, is characterized by two prominent values of
“equality and achievement.” Equality can be seen as the diminution of state barriers
between classes to ease “class mobility.” Achievement is something of an outcome of
equality in which moving away from rigid class hierarchy’s commonplace to the
Continent created opportunity structures that fostered individual achievement. Lipset’s
(1967, p. 7-8) approach followed Weber’s attention to the deterministic importance of
social values by stating that “…historical events establish values and predispositions, and
these in turn determine later events.” This suggests that values become determinants of
the direction of social change, and the common law system experienced a lawyerization
of practices and procedures beginning with the Treason Trials Act of 1696. Langbein
(2005) writes of a time when lawyers were not an institutionalized force within the
common law system. In fact, lawyers were not allowed to speak for defendants, but
rather they emerged as protection for elites during trials for treason, and over time
lawyers pushed for evidentiary rules that moved trials away from focusing on finding the
truth to one in which private entrepreneurs sought to make their case regardless of the
facts of any situation.
This chapter sketches the development of the modern common law system with
an historical case study of the US system of incarceration. Similar to the other case
studies on Germany and Sweden, attention is paid to tracing the historical roots of this
unique type of legal thinking. In the case of the common law, this historical journey is
one in which important differences will become clear between the common and civil law
types of thinking. The presence of jury trials and the inclusion of lawyers in criminal
trials represent a major rupture with previous legal practices. The common law originally
was not based on abstract theories, pedantic rhetoric, or highly involved formal agents.
The common law that exists today demonstrates specific concerns with formal legal
agents, which allowed for private lawyer dominated trials that replaced once active
judges with a judiciary content to act more as a referee among two competing parties.
Following this discussion, contemporary incarceration trends within the US are reviewed.
These trends are situated within social, political, and economic shifts that continue to
shape US incarceration patterns. With that said, the purposes of this chapter are to
demonstrate the importance of certain critical junctures that placed the US (and common
law countries) on a specific path toward increased domination by lawyers, rules of
criminal evidence, jury trials, and passive judges. It is argued that these institutional
differences lay the groundwork making possible an overly punitive type of criminal
justice system. To borrow from Nils Christie (2000), the common law system lacks the
needed breaks to slow US incarceration.
A brief methodological comment is in order before moving to present the case
study. Some may question why the US would be selected as the exemplar for the
common law legal regime. The common law is known to have originated in England, not
the US. A central reason for studying 20th century incarceration differences is to
understand why the US incarcerates so many people, relative to our Western
counterparts. Contemporary crime control policies in the US have focused on adding
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more police to the street, criminalizing more acts, and exacting very long sentences.
Others have followed the US with increased punitiveness, the bulk of these countries
have common law legal systems. Many countries throughout the world mimic US
culture, politics, and crime control. England is the originating country of the common
law system, but it is important to trace the historical path of US punishment. This is a
path that starts in Medieval England before settling the US and the development of a
distinctively American form of punishment.
Early Common Law History
The common law system places distinct divisions separating judicial and
legislative sovereignty. This separation provides judges with discretion when ruling on
cases through the unique principles of stare decisis. To trace the historical path of the
common law, it is necessary to start in England where it was originally developed and
transported to the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries. Early common law started with
Henry II in 1154 as a simple form of law so that those without legal training could
understand and practice it themselves. England, of course, was agrarian and dominated
by landed aristocracy during the 12th and 13th centuries, and the common law system
competed with other types of conflict resolution including canon law and local courts
enforcing local laws (Hogue, 1966).
Central to 13th century legal proceedings were the ordeals. The ordeals were
banned in 1215 by the Catholic Church. Roger Groot (1988, p. 5) identified the original
jury trial in common law around 1220, and claimed that “King Henry ordained, in the
Assize of Clarendon, that twelve lawful men of each hundred, and four of each vill,
should report to the royal justices or sheriffs those persons reputed to have committed
certain serious crimes.” The jury, essentially, replaced the need for the ordeal and
“physical proof” of divine assessment.
Early common law relied upon private prosecution of cases. While prosecutions
often were conducted by the victim or their family, a public prosecutorial system
emerged. England lacked the elite universities that existed in France and Germany to
train a legal workforce needed to translate a complicated form of law. Common law
legally training started in a rather informal manner through the Inns of Court. There is
little detailed history of the Inns, but they were known to function as “hostels, clubs,
chambers as well as schools of legal education” (Hogue, 1966, p. 246). These training
facilities were private corporations that provided a gathering place close to the courthouse
so that as people traveled to court they had a place to stay and prepare for the upcoming
case. The Inns of Court provided legal education by supplying statutory books, counsel
with others learning about the law, and a place to stay. Much of the learning took place
during dinner table discussions arguing points of law, and later more formal processes
involving lectures emerged (Hogue, 1966).
Early common law development relied upon lay participation. A defining feature
of the common law system is the use of a lay jury. The original juries were selfinforming xi as they were preferred to be knowledgeable of the facts of the case. Jurors
were to be witnesses, neighbors, and in general people familiar with what took place.
Being informed with the case or a witness to the events was a common selection criterion
to serve on a jury. Jurors conducted their own private investigations by determining as
best they could the character and habits of both the plaintiff and the defendant. If the jury
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did not feel they received enough information they could get more information “by
consulting informed persons not called into court” (Wigmore, 1940; found in Langbein,
1996, p. 1170). Langbein (1996) reported an interesting situation about the medieval jury
trials, the jury did not come to court to listen to testimony or hear evidence but rather
came to give their “rough verdict” that they formed beforehand through their own
investigations within the community.
Early common law trials involved little precise legal rhetoric or debate, but rather
are described as bickering among parties. These trials were nothing more than an accuser
appearing in court to voice his or her complaint against another person(s). Lawyers were
rarely included. In fact, Langbein (2005) refers to this period of common law trial as the
“accused speaks trial” because the accused individual(s) were expected to talk during
their trial. The argument was that no one else had as much knowledge about what had
happened, and relying on a lawyer was seen as a sign that the accused was guilty. The
accused speaks trials involved the accused, accuser (or prosecutor), jury and judge, and
they were fast and simple. There were few administrative or procedural rules, juries were
self-informing, which limited the need for the presentation of evidence, and trials were
opportunities for each party to present their testimony. The speed and simplicity of
criminal trials allowed juries to rule on several cases in a single day, which
accommodated the judge’s traveling schedule.
Accused individuals could not compel witnesses to appear, nor were they able to
be sworn under oath. This made it more of an uphill battle for the accused to prove his or
her innocence, especially since the accuser was able to call witnesses and be sworn under
oath. The ability to swear to the veracity of one’s testimony was a significant factor for
juries, as this strengthened the believability of the accuser at the expense of the accused.
These restrictions made it difficult for the accused to defend himself or herself, which the
central purpose of the trial was for the jury to determine the facts of the case derived
mostly from the accused.
Treason Trial Act of 1696: From Accused Speaks to Adversary Trial
The accused speaks trials were structured to encourage defendants to speak on
their own behalf in court, and lawyers were prohibited from speaking for those accused
of felonies. Instead, lawyers were seen as experts of law, so they could be helpful in
handling some of the legal issues, but they were not in charge of the facts of the case.
The accused was thought to have the best information regarding his or her innocence or
guilt. Legal counsel was allowed in less serious cases such as misdemeanors but not
felonies because these often carried the potential for a death sentence, which was
believed too important to trust to lawyers. Lawyers were not seen as the best way to
determine if a person was innocent or guilty because lawyers were inherently selfinterested in achieving a certain verdict, not uncovering the truth.
The Treason Trials Act of 1696 allowed those accused of treason to have a lawyer
present during trial and pretrial, and opened the way for those accused of regular felonies
to have legal counsel at pretrial and trial. The Act of 1696 was “a turning point in the
history of Anglo-American criminal procedure. Adversary criminal trial traces to the
1696 Act” (Langbein, 2005, p. 68). This act came at the end of the Glorious Revolution
of 1688-9 in which rules were emerging to foster a lawyer centered trial and the
development of complex rules of evidentiary procedure. There were several treason trials
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between 1678 and 1690 that prompted the Act of 1696 and later legislation that shaped
the lawyer-judge trial relationship. xii
Private citizen participation was central at all levels and phases of the criminal
justice system, with the exception of the judge. This model of criminal justice practice
fits with the liberal political economy noted for common law countries in which there is
high level of government suspicion and reliance on the private sphere. Specifically,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement, and jailers were all private individuals
working for profit, and paid piecemeal (see Rothman, 1971). The more arrests made and
defendants brought to court, the more potential profit, and this self-interestedness is part
of what lead to the suspicion surrounding lawyers.
The Treason Trials Act of 1696 brought about many changes to the common law
trial through the shift in power in favor of lawyers. These changes took place over time
and they came in the form of technical evidentiary rules used to control the untrained
jury. Essentially, as the common law became more complex, it was argued that an
untrained jury member could not be expected to make decisions objectively. For this
reason, defense counsel argued that rules were needed to prevent unfair prosecutions
(e.g., exclusionary rules). Defense lawyers gained power as other legal reforms started to
take place, namely increased judicial independence from the monarchy. Throughout
much of English judicial history, judges were appointed at the behest of the crown.
Judges could be removed by the monarch at his discretion with no verifiable justifications
given. The 1701 Act of Settlement established that judicial appointment and removal
procedures were changed so that judges had to demonstrate “good behavior” to maintain
their position. This legislation did not revolutionize the entire process over night.
Rather, successive regimes would appoint new judges upon taking the thrown, but in
1761 this was changed to provide judges with life tenure (Langbein, 2005, p. 82). Prior
to the Treason Trials Act, the judge acted as the defense counsel, but in reality the judges’
were beholden to the king and were known to shape cases to receive the king’s approval.
The common law judges from at least the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries were
political actors—a fact that was transported to English colonies. They were not the
formally trained legal professionals that emerged in the Roman law influenced countries.
Rather, they served on the front lines of social control for the crown or other political
leaders of the time. The common law system was (and is) a highly political occupation.
Rules of Criminal Evidentiary Procedure
Common law trials are known for their reliance on complex evidentiary rules.
These rules can be traced to shift to a lawyer centered trial and an untrained jury. The
common law that developed in England was designed for an emerging industrial society,
whereas colonial America was characterized as enclaves of small rural communities. For
the most part, early American law was a mixture of rules adopted from England.
Codification began in 1634 (Massachusetts) and 1682 (Pennsylvania), and it is at this
time that the colonies incorporated statute or written law (David, 1972).
Few Americans were trained in the law. In fact, few judges even had any formal
legal training. In 1811, the English legal philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, assisted
President Madison in steering US legal development. During this time, there was
concern about whether the US should remain a common law country or develop a code
law system as existed in France and Germany. The country adopted common law with
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the exception of what became the State of Louisiana in 1812. American law formed after
the Revolution, but continued to take direction from England, and continued to rely on
lawyers trained in England, with the first US law school, William and Mary, opening in
1779 (David, 1972). Legal training in America developed much different from England.
The English Inns of Court were rather informal training environments, whereas American
law schools developed with universities and were dominated by the Langdellian case
method or Socratic approach. xiii
The process or conduct of fact-finding in Anglo-American law differs from
Continental law. Fact-finding in civil law traditions is led by judicial inquiry, with some
assistance from legal counsel. Anglo-American fact-finding process involves three
groups of actors: lawyers, judges, and laypersons as jurors. The courtroom procedures
emphasize strict rules of criminal evidence—each side tries less to refute the actual
evidence but is more concerned to identify weaknesses in how the evidence was obtained
or presented in court (such as hearsay objections, opinion objections, and leading
witnesses). The series of evidentiary objections do not exist in non-common law
countries, and are lawyers’ inventions to steer the jury (Langbein, 2005).
Many of these rules emerged with the lawyer centeredness of the common law
taking off in 18th century England. Objections were focused on the presence of the jury
because a professionally trained jurist could use his or her reason to nullify any subjective
potential of hearsay and other evidentiary issues, but an untrained, lay person could not
be expected to do that. Why did a large body of criminal evidence emerge? Wigmore
places the emergence of common law criminal evidence law as starting to form in the late
18th and early 19th centuries as rules began to be recorded in written form and passed on
in law schools.
A central reason for the exclusion of hearsay is that the person attributed to such
statements is not placed under oath. The person speaking is under oath in court, but he or
she cannot testify to the veracity of the information, but other reasons include the lack of
cross-examination. Hearsay evidence was first only admitted to court if it was
corroborated by others, but this too was changed such that common law forbids hearsay
testimony. The common law trial was an overwhelmingly oral process, with very little
written down. Langbein (1996) tells how judges would often take notes during trials to
write down important pieces of evidence and point to issues that needed addressed before
the jury—which is in direct conflict with the Roman based legal systems reliance on
formal written records.
As the adversary process became more entrenched, the judge became more
passive at trial. Instead, lawyers took over the trial process and the jury became less
influenced by the judge. At one time, the judge and jury worked somewhat in tandem.
The common law judge would talk with the jury, give them instructions (about fact
finding, not matters of law), and even force them to reconsider their verdict before
accepting it. Early American jury decisions often were collaborative products negotiated
with the judge (Langbein, 1996). The judge was viewed as representing the accused by
conducting cross-examination of witnesses—although the lack of written record made it
impossible for the judge to prepare beforehand as in the Continental model. The initial
modern common law was concerned with hearing direct testimony and cross-examination
of witnesses with the oath used as a safeguard against perjury.
Eighteenth century legal changes made further allowances for lawyers during
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regular felonies, and these lawyers pushed for additional evidentiary rules. Defense
lawyers argued that additional evidentiary rules were needed to educate the lay jury.
Jurors were untrained and lawyers argued that this reduced objectivity to rule on the facts
of the case. During late 18th and early 19th centuries there was an increasing complexity
to the common law that was not possible without an emerging reliance on professionally
trained legal professionals.
Permitting defense counsel fostered a series of procedural changes that moved
away from the spontaneity of the altercation process in which the accuser and the accused
argued or bickered in court. In its place emerged methodical adversarial court room
procedures in which the prosecutor and defense counsel challenge each other and
typically do not question the truth of the evidence or facts of the case but rather debate
the legality of how the evidence was collected and presented. The prosecution was
required to disclose evidence to the defense counsel (directed verdict) prior to defense
counsel presenting evidence. No longer was the prosecution able to have the defendant
talk and incriminate himself or herself as protections against self-incrimination emerged
(Helmholz, 1990). The burden of proof was shifted to the government and the beyond
reasonable doubt standard was developed (Shapiro, 1991). The law of criminal evidence
emerged through written reports and treatises. These rule changes altered the role of the
prosecutor as they were forced to improve their cases due to the ferocity of defense
counsel to disprove the case against their client. The judge became a more passive
courtroom participant. The prosecutor was in charge of gathering and presenting the
issues for the accuser, and the defense attorney took over gathering and presenting
evidence for the accused. Courtroom trials were shifting to recognize the need for the
accused to compel witnesses to testify and to have themselves and witnesses sworn under
oath during testimony and cross-examination. The relationship between the judge and
the jury changed. No longer did the judge and the jury engage in a relatively congenial
manner nor could the judge coerce the jury to find a certain way (Langbein, 1994,
p.1068-71).
US Criminal Justice Emerges
The Colonial Period: Privatized Justice
English legal thought serves as the springboard from which American law was
developed. This influence can be seen as institutional mimicry, rejection, and adaptation.
This chapter follows previous American criminal justice historians identifying three eras
from which crime control policies and practices can be understood: the colonial era
(beginning in late 17th century and lasting until around 1820); the modern era (1820 to
1920); and the contemporary era (starting in the 1920 till today) (Walker, 1998).
The colonial era was ruled by private justice and informal social control through
the church, family, and neighbor to reprimand inappropriate behavior. Initial crime
control strategies took on a unique American style that was “informal, often rough, and
highly democratic” (Walker, 1998, p. 15). Whereas the Germanic law traditions were
based on abstract and scientific principles, colonial rule was highly localized and based
on community norms, not general principles. It should be pointed out that during this
time, English legal procedures were typically used to lead courtroom processes. Initially,
there were only small enclaves of people living in colonial America, with many seeking
religious freedom. Colonial crime control used day and night watchman, groups of men
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that observed the town to protect against fire, riot, and crime. In southern parts of the
US, slave patrols developed to control slaves, locate runaway slaves, and provide order
maintenance. Prisons had yet to emerge and jails were used as places to detain
individuals waiting to see a judge or execution.
Colonial Americans did not view crime as a “basic flaw in community structure
or expect to eliminate it” (Rothman, 1971, p.15). Eighteenth century Americans did not
consider incarceration as a form of punishment. Punishment came in the form of a fine
or it was physical or some combination of both; jails were reserved for those “caught up
in the process of judgment, not those who had completed it” (Rothman, 1971, p. 48).
Many of the punishments were designed to shame offenders through branding, pillory,
the stocks, and other punishments that ridiculed someone, which was especially
important in such small and interdependent communities. Colonial perceptions of crime
and criminals were much different from 19th century views that designed policies to
eliminate crime from society. Colonials saw crime, and other forms of deviancy (e.g.,
poverty, insanity) as natural parts of social organization that needed to be controlled,
deterred, and contained, but never thought it would be eliminated (Rothman, 1971).
Criminal justice officials did not receive any special training. Instead, justice
officials either volunteered or were elected, with few judges having any formal legal
training, which resulted in a system reliant on local elites. At one point, appointments
were determined by the King of England, which eventually fell to the Governor, and
finally shifted to local county officials. Similar to England, prosecutions were handled
by private individuals—victims or kin of the victim--through the mid-19th century, with
colonial punishment remaining a highly public event that relied on shaming and scorn.
Not only was colonial America reliant on informal social control, but it should be noted
that there is little record of what would today be considered predatory crimes—rape,
robbery, and murder. The typical recorded crimes for this era involved blasphemy,
cursing, fornication, adultery, and drunkenness (Walker, 1998). A modern US society
grew out of these small communities, with the emergence of industrial development and
urbanization, new forms of criminality, narrowed social networks, and limited social trust
coalesced to foster formal types of social control.
Religious influences were important to colonial punishment. The Puritans
condemned Quakers, forced them to convert, or exiled them from certain areas. Where
the Quakers were strong, most notably in Pennsylvania, they opened the Walnut Street
Jail in 1790. Early American jails and prisons were predicated on hard labor, shaming,
disgrace, and stigmatization. However, colonial sentiment shifted regarding the death
penalty, with many seeking to curb its use for all crimes except murder, marking a
significant break with its broad use in England. An enduring element of American
punishment is the centrality of shaming and humiliation. No doubt there is talk of
rehabilitation and proportionality, but the crux of punishment was to cure laziness,
enforce capitalist modes of production, support community norms, and deter future
crimes through fear of public humiliation (Walker, 1998).
While the English legal and criminal justice system provided many opportunities
of mimicry for American colonists looking to control the citizenry, it also provided a
point of departure. The early colonists were in America typically due to some
dissatisfaction with English rule. Therefore, colonists were keen on protecting against
many of the abuses of the English law, which fostered protections against searches, cruel
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punishments, need for speedy trials, and due process, and limiting the use of the death
penalty. American crime control relied on an informal network of surveillance,
apprehension, and enforcement. The American colonists adapted English common law
procedures to fit small rural communities in which crime and other forms of deviancy
were to be dealt with locally by the family, the church, and neighbors.
Modern Criminal Justice Control: Responding to Rapid Social Changes
Social changes contributed to replacing communal forms of control with more
formal practices to respond to mob violence, distrust, and growing heterogeneity in
ethnicity, race, and religion. The inevitable and accepted role of crime within the
colonial world shifted to become a problem facing a changing social landscape in which
there was a growing lack of norm agreement. As modern society was growing out of the
small communities, new theories and explanations for crime and social problems
surfaced. In Rothman’s (1971) historical treatise, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social
Order and Disorder in the New Republic, he explained the shift from accepting crime,
poverty, and insanity as natural elements of the community to the emergence of scientific
understandings and interpretations of these as social problems that demanded a social
response to protect society. What is most interesting about his account is that these
individual issues became defined nearly simultaneously as social problems that required
large scale formal responses. No longer were neighbors to be responsible for orphans,
the family to care for the insane, churches and charities to provide for the poor, or private
criminal justice mechanisms to control crime. Instead, Rothman (1971) recognized that
the prison, asylum, and orphanages were places to separate social outcasts and force
individuals not willing to work—policies meant to exclude certain social groups.
Crime, insanity, and poverty were not perceived as social failings during colonial
America. This perspective changed during the 19th century as crime and poverty became
viewed as reflecting community disorganization in the face of growing distrust and
individualization. The prison, orphanage, and asylum were to cure individuals and return
them to society as functioning members “…to promote the stability of the society at a
moment when traditional ideas and practices appeared outmoded, constricted, and
ineffective” (Rothman, 1971, p. xviii). For Rothman (1971) it was not so interesting that
these various ways of controlling deviancy and delinquency emerged. Rather, his
research uncovered why Americans in the Jacksonian (c. 1828-1850) era suddenly began
to construct and support institutions for deviant and dependent members of the
community. This was a crucial time for American crime control development, namely in
that formal mechanisms of control gained legitimacy in their ability to define certain
conditions and behaviors as deviant and institute ways for controlling that deviance.
The prison and the formal police force were adapted from previous control
mechanisms (e.g., night watchmen, jails). The initial mechanisms to control and punish
became outdated as industrial production fostered urbanization and industrialization,
which lead Walker (1998, p.82) to posit that: “Imprisonment was not invented or
discovered in the 1820s. Instead, the prison was an expansion of earlier practices and the
result of a series of experiments” (Walker, 1998, p.82). Walker (1998) referred to the
houses of corrections and almshouses and used hard labor to break criminals that existed
in England and colonial America, but these institutions were different from the control
mechanisms that emerged later.
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The first US prisons were located in New York and Pennsylvania. In New York,
the Auburn prison mandated complete silence and was opened in 1819. Prisons opened
in 1826 and 1829 in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, respectively, and they enforced strict
inmate separation (Rothman, 1971). The prison model spread to other states quickly.
The prisons became popular tourist attractions. xiv The central concern among prison
developers was which model to follow—Auburn or Pennsylvania. The Auburn system
was known as the congregate or silent system in which inmates slept in individual cells,
but worked together during the day in silence. The Pennsylvanian prisons were more
concerned with separation and introspection, including inmates never seeing other
inmates. Inmates worked in solitude in their cells and only spoke with guards and
chaplains. xv Crime was the result of poor upbringing and inmates lacked disciple.
Prisons were to instill in inmates the needed discipline that their childhoods’ lacked. The
silence of these early prisons is remarkable when considering the extreme noise and
congestion which marks contemporary prisons. Rothman (1971, p. 97) quotes
Tocqueville and Beaumont after their visit in 1831: “Everything passes in the most
profound silence, and nothing is heard in the whole prison but the steps of those who
march, or sounds proceeding from the workshops…We felt as if we traversed catacombs;
there were a thousand living beings, and yet it was a desert solitude.”
The police were created through a consolidation of functions from the day and
night watchmen, sheriffs, and constables. The modern police were developed along the
lines of the English Bobbies, named after Sir Robert Peel, the person responsible for
designing the London Metropolitan police force. A significant difference between the
London police model and that which emerged in 19th century America is the former was
administered through a centralized national system, whereas the latter was locally
controlled. As is well-known about 19th century American political development, most
jobs were predicated upon political connections and patronage through the ward system.
This resulted in urban police forces known for their corruption and ineptness as peace
keepers, but instead they were used for order maintenance such as strike breaking and
enforcing norms (Harring, 1983; Walker, 1998). The American police force reflected the
unique political culture of the time, and allowed police much leeway in how they
conducted themselves when on duty. The London Bobbies were agents of the national
government and centrally administered, which protected them from local politics and
greater level of professionalism. This is contrasted with early American police forces
that were known for their corruption and graft as they operated with little direct
oversight. American police were a product of the dominant political party and economic
interests of the time (Harring, 1983).
Contemporary Criminal Justice Development
Social theorists suggest that crime control practices reflect dominant sociocultural values (Garland, 1990). Just as colonial America was organized in small,
interdependent communities reliant on informal control mechanisms and the Jacksonian
era shifted towards more urban and heterogeneous societies, the early 20th century bought
with it new issues to be controlled. Race riots, labor strikes, political oppression, fear of
communism, crime waves, and gangs were problems facing America during the first half
of the 20th century (Walker, 1998). Crime control began to take on a new scientific focus
through the development of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This era fostered a
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professional and bureaucratic form of crime control to reduce the corruption and overt
violence common during previous eras.
Unique to America was the widespread media attention given to crime, the
potential for crime, and the need for crime fighters. That is, J. Edgar Hoover was adept at
using the media to shape a perception of crime that benefitted him and the FBI, which did
not always fit with empirical realities. For instance, during Hoover’s control of the FBI,
he promoted the idea that crime was increasing throughout the country and that the FBI
was needed to respond. However, criminal justice historians have suggested that crime
actually remained stable during this time and did not increase until the early and mid1960s.
The desire for a more professional criminal justice system brought new attitudes
toward training, education, and regulation of officials. No longer were police and
correctional guards able to operate in complete autonomy from oversight, something that
often fostered corruption. Instead, there were several congressional commissions (e.g.,
Wicksham, Kefauver) that investigated the national crime picture and responses to crime
throughout the country. Walker (1993) explained the modern criminal justice system as
evolved through a series of decisions about discretionary power of criminal justice
officials. He posited that discretion was a relatively under thought of concept for pre1950s America that emerged as a response to racial and economic unrest. There were
questions of the constitutionality of common criminal justice practices.
The American Bar Foundation (ABF) investigated how criminal justice officials
carried out their jobs on a daily basis. How did police officers spend their time? How
did correctional guards maintain order? There was little knowledge about what criminal
justice actors were doing on a regular basis, which resulted in a comprehensive field
survey, in 1956, in which the ABF asserted that “the administration of criminal justice
can be characterized as a series of important decisions from the time a crime is
committed until the offender is finally released from supervision” (Walker, 1993, p. 6).
Although this finding is not surprising to contemporary criminal justice scholars, this was
an insightful and somewhat surprising finding during the 1950s, as it demonstrated the
importance of official discretion in determining criminal justice outcomes. The ABF also
highlighted the influence of overt corruption, political ineptness, and untrained and
unqualified criminal justice officials.
During the early 1960s, civil liberty issues and law enforcement and correction
practices were changed to incorporate due process, including search and seizure and
interrogation rules (Walker, 1993). There were also important court rulings, namely
Mapp vs. Ohio that set limits on the exclusionary rule, Miranda vs. Arizona that placed
limits on police arrest practices, and Garner vs. Tennessee that altered the use of deadly
force. These court rulings instituted new views on bail, plea bargaining, sentencing,
prisoner rights, and police practices.
The federal government and nearly every state made significant adjustments to
their sentencing rules (Walker, 1993). In few places in the American criminal justice
system was discretion as central as with sentencing. The American prison model was
founded on the notion of indeterminate sentencing, placing a range of years that a person
was to be incarcerated. These minimum and maximum terms allowed prison and parole
officials to determine when an individual was ready for release. In theory this system
worked to maximize the behavior changing features of prison to encourage pro-social
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performance upon release. While some may argue that indeterminate sentencing was a
break from 19th century procedures, Walker (1993, p.116) pointed out that American
justice has always involved a large amount of discretion. This discretion may not always
have been sanctioned officially, but was nonetheless present, and indeterminate
sentencing policies merely institutionalized practices that were common place.
Throughout the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing was replaced by determinate
sentencing. xvi Determinate sentencing limits discretion for prison and parole officials to
make determinations regarding when a prisoner is prepared for release. This means that
when a judge sets a prison term an inmate must serve the entire term (or nearly the entire
term). Mandatory sentencing also hit most states during the latter 1970s. Conservative
views spread through American academic and policy environments. Many officials, in
the late 1970s and 1980s, were feeling the sting from the exposure of ineffective
correctional policies, rising crime in the 1960s, and influx of Republican Party power.
Therefore, the bulk of crime control policies, during this time, focused on longer
sentences, stricter prison environments, and faster revocation from community sanctions.
US Incarceration Trends
Has the US always incarcerated such a large proportion of its citizenry? Since
1973, the US incarceration rate has grown by nearly fivefold. To put it another way, the
US has about five percent of the world’s entire population, but incarcerates about 25
percent of all prisoners (Gottschalk, 2006). Of course, the 2.2 million adults in jails and
prisons across the country only tell part of the formal social control story. That is, there
are another five million adults on some form of community supervision. This resulted in
about 3 percent of the adult population in the US is under correctional supervision.
One would expect that such a shift in punishment would be the result of an
increase in crime. This is not the case, however. In fact, criminological research
routinely finds that incarceration has little to do with crime commission. Vanessa Barker
(2009), points out that crime and incarceration rates are as related as homelessness and
the availability of homes. The question still remains: why do we incarcerate so many
people in the US? Caplow and Simon (1999) argued that the criminal justice system is
being used to handle a broader range of social problems and that crime control policies
have become overly politicized which prevents objective decision making. Nils Christie
(2000) suggested that crime control is growing in the US to incapacitate marginal classes.
David Garland (2001) argued that as crime rates—in the US and the UK--rose during the
1960s, the public shifted its expectations of governmental solutions away from welfare
and demanded harsher punishments. Others found that political expectations,
demographic and economic shifts, and limited power of minority groups explain why
incarceration rates have skyrocketed over the past three decades—not crime rates (Jacobs
and Helms, 2001; Western, 2006; Yates and Fording, 2005).
Some suggest the 1960s crime spike offers an explanation for increasing
incarceration rates (Garland, 2001). However, the greatest increase in crime was in the
1960s; simultaneous to a significant downturn in the incarceration rate. Crime rates
continued to grow in the 1970s before receding in the early 1980s. As the drug war
ramped up, in the latter 1980s, crime rates also grew, but decreased in the 1990s and into
the early 2000s. Despite these fluctuations in crime rates, the US incarceration rate
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moved in only one direction. From the mid-1970s, the US incarceration rate has
maintained a steady line of growth, which is not to say that crime and incarceration are
not related at all, but rather to highlight that incarceration is an independent social
phenomenon resulting from a myriad of macro-sociological factors (Gottschalk, 2006).
Other evidence refuting the crime-incarceration link comes from the variability
within the US. There, of course, are states that have high crime and incarceration rates,
but there are also many examples in which this correlation is inverse. xvii The Dakotas
serve as an interesting example. North and South Dakota are similar in many ways, but
South Dakota has an incarceration rate about two times that of North Dakota, despite
similar geographical, economic, demographic, and crime rates (Barker, 2009; Gottschalk,
2006).
Gottschalk builds upon the work of Beckett (1997) and Caplow and Simon (1999)
by recognizing the emergence of a more conservative political tone around social control
strategies. But she asks “why didn’t political elites face more countervailing pressures
and opposition?” Why was it so easy for elites in the US to move forward with the prison
build-up of the past 30 years? There was a lack of opposition that exists in institutional
and popular form in the other case studies (e.g., left political parties, strong unions).
It is argued that the US lost confidence in state mechanisms to deliver social
control. The public welfare system was a failure and with the release of Martinson’s
(1974) study that “nothing works” in correctional rehabilitation the policy environment
was prime for a conservative turn. Garland (1985) argued that the penal welfare model
shaped penal policies to transform inmates into productive citizens. However, this model
was overturned in the face of growing neo-liberal shifts within the US and UK emerging.
Conclusion: Mechanisms of a Punitive System
Common law countries have the most punitive criminal justice systems in the
west. This chapter identifies historical patterns demonstrating how the common law
became dominated by lawyers, especially defense lawyers. This lawyerization of the trial
transformed a system of law that had little need for legal science, but rather was
concerned with discovering the truth through direct and simple adversarial processes.
There are three unique and interrelated characteristics of the common law regime
contributing to the high incarceration rates—defense attorney power, prosecutorial
discretion, and juries. A fourth characteristic is unique to the US and provides some
explanation for the US being an incarceration outlier—judicial elections. The
transformation to a lawyer centered trial within common law countries paved the way for
shifts in power among courtroom actors that allowed for numerous evidentiary rules and
procedures that strengthened defense attorneys’ place in the courtroom.
Why is the lawyerization of the common law important to incarceration rates?
The shift in power among courtroom actors appears to significantly affect penal
outcomes. The common law, unlike Roman law principles, is rooted in allowing peers to
make legal decisions through juries. Originally, this system worked by having the
defendant and the plaintiff come to court to lay out their arguments in what Langbein
referred to as “bickering.” These early trials were characterized as being legally
unsophisticated and relying on facts. Juries were selected based upon their level of
knowledge about the case before trial and juries were to conduct their own informal
investigations. Then, however, a shift began during the 18th century that served to
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strengthen defense attorneys and weaken the judiciary. These changes started with the
Treason Trial Act in England, and took some time to become institutionalized in the
common law. By the 19th century, defense attorneys were strong criminal justice actors
that were successful at shaping trial and evidentiary rules. These rules were argued to
protect juries from making overly subjective decisions as they were not trained legal
professionals.
Originally the adversarial nature of the common law required the judiciary to be a
prosecutorial restraint in the courtroom. If a defendant relied upon the voice of an
attorney during a trial it was considered a sign of guilt. An innocent person should be
able to reasonably discuss the events surrounding an accusation to demonstrate his or her
innocence. Therefore, most defendants of serious felonies did not use attorneys—until
the 19th century—instead they relied upon the judge to assist them during the trial by
questioning witnesses and providing legal direction.
First, defense attorneys utilize criminal evidentiary rules to free their clients. The
trial has become a competition or a sport for attorneys. Defense attorneys are pitted
against prosecutors in a legal arena, not to demonstrate the truth or veracity of witness
statements, defendant alibis, or the connection of evidence to the defendant. Rather, the
trial is a game in which attorneys typical argue on legal grounds, not factual ones. There
is little pursuit of truth or justice in the trial. Instead, common law trials have become
bogged down by what are typically called “technicalities” or simply legal rules that
prevent the use of certain pieces of evidence or witness statements due to violations of
specific legal rules. A most famous case in the US involved the former professional
football player, O.J. Simpson, who was accused of killing his ex-wife and her boyfriend
before leading police on a highly televised chase. This trial ended with one of Simpson’s
lawyers arguing that if a glove believed to be worn by the killer “did not fit, then the jury
must acquit.” Johnny Cochrane was the lawyer that made this famous statement in court
and eventually helped win Simpson his freedom in the double murder case. This sort of
legal maneuvering enrages the public by demonstrating that trials are really little more
that fancy legal shenanigans.
Second, juries became seen as overly emotional, subjective, and needing to be
restrained due to their lack of legal knowledge. For common law countries, juries are to
ensure that behavior meshes with social norms. When serious crimes occur the public
becomes enraged and wants punishment. Essentially, there is a social need to see certain
wrongdoers receive punishment. Consider the importance of public executions which, no
doubt, satisfied a governmental need to appear strong, but also allowed the public to seek
revenge against those that were believed to have violated norms. More recently, the
media is quick to pick up on horrendous crimes and beam images of violated children,
attacked elderly, and other crimes involving weak victims. These crimes feed public
images of definitions of what a criminal looks like, how they behave and the potential for
growing victimization if a harsh response is not handed down. One need only recall how
Michael Dukakis’ presidential election bid, in 1988, was devastated by the perception
that he allowed a convicted rapist—Willie Horton--to be released from prison on
furlough, and while on furlough Horton committed another rape and murder. Dukakis’
opponent used images of the Willie Horton case to demonstrate that Dukakis was weak
on crime and unfit to be president. Media generated images and discourse on crime
typically follows the old journalism adage of “if it bleeds, it leads.” That is, sensational
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crimes are picked up by media outlets and suggest to the public that criminals are violent,
predatory, and random, which is not supported by official statistics of crime that
demonstrate that most criminal acts occur among people knowing one another
beforehand. The jury has become a contemporary corollary to the medieval executioner.
As the executioner was to rid society of evilness with a single blow across the neck or a
“mercy blow” to the heart, so too is the jury to protect society from criminals by ensuring
that criminals do not go free.
Third, common law prosecutors are given broad discretion in the collection of
evidence, interrogation of witnesses, and cross-examination during trials. Prosecutors,
however, are also tied to public opinion by their need to maintain high conviction rates
and a perception of ensuring that criminals are punished. The courtroom drama or game
requires prosecutors to seek long punishments for offenders that catch the public’s eye
through media coverage. A prime example of this is a local prosecutor for Lexington,
Kentucky, Ray Larson, who is notorious for pushing for long prison sentences and
promoting harsh justice for offenders. Larson maintains a webpage that includes
photographs and descriptions of the offenders tried in his district as well as conducting
radio and television shows in which he argues for longer sentences. Larsson is not alone
in his use of the media to disseminate his punitive message, and, in fact, he uses these
mediums as a way to demonstrate to the public that he is doing what he believes needs to
be done to protect society. He argues that his job is to battle defense attorneys that use
legal technicalities to allow offenders to go free and soft judges that are unwilling to hold
offenders accountable. While this may or may not be the case, the point here is that
Larson and other prosecutors in the common law regime participate in an extra-legal
battle that incorporates the media into framing crime as an “us vs. them” or good vs. evil
situation. This broad discretion for prosecutors results in an organizational structure in
which there is little internal oversight of prosecutors. Instead, prosecutors are evaluated
by external forces, namely the public, which encourages them to utilize various media
sources to promote their effectiveness at protecting society.
Fourth, a unique characteristic of the US criminal justice system is that many
judges are not appointed or enter through special training. Rather, judges are elected by
the public. During election cycles it is common to see television commercials, radio
advertisements, and bumper stickers attesting to the punitiveness of a judge up for
election, and the softness of other judges running. Voting for judges runs counter to
reliance on legal science and abstract notions of legal principles. The US form of
common law, however, blurs the judicial role by allowing them to act as both judge and
politician. And, it is the judge’s political role that forces them to satisfy the public’s
desire for punishment.
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Chapter Five: The Romano-Germanic Incarceration Regime: Germany
This chapter presents the characteristics of a Romano-Germanic type of legal
thinking. It is argued that this type of legal thinking is instrumental in shaping a
Romano-Germanic criminal justice regime. This regime is one in which (1) prosecutorial
discretion is minimized, (2) lay participation is limited, (3) plea bargaining is nonexistent, (4) the use of fines and charitable punishments are commonplace, and (5) the
legal actors operate in highly regulated bureaucratic frameworks. These legal and
criminal justice institutions are rooted in reinforcing historical patterns that have longlasting effects upon the purpose, organization, and function of the Romano-Germanic
punishment regime (Arthur, 1994; David, 1985, 2007; Stone Sweet, 2002).
Romano-Germanic legal thought and practice are at the center of legal history for
much of continental Europe and Latin America (David, 1972; de Cruz, 1999; Jolowicz,
2003; Merryman, 1985; Strauss, 1986; Whitman, 1990). This chapter analyzes the
characteristics that shape legal thought and practice in a group of countries that have legal
traditions based on Roman law. First, a brief historical account of the influence of
Roman law in Europe is presented. Next, there is a discussion of the Napoleonic Code,
as the legal code emerging out of the French Revolution, influencing the dissemination
and development of civil legal systems. The drafters of the Germanic Code of 1900 were
aware of this “enlightened” document, but were more interested in developing a formalrational legal system (Weber, 1967). This history is used to demonstrate the plausibility
of a Romano-Germanic legal and criminal justice regime that contributes to
understanding the use of incarceration in similar countries.
Romano-Germanic legal thinking is used to reference that type of legal thinking
that emerged in much of Europe starting sometime around the 11th and 12th centuries with
the Second Renaissance or Revival of Roman Civil Law—referred to as the Bologna
School—and continued to develop through the French Revolution (Napoleonic Codes of
1804) and culminating with the German Historical and Pandectist Schools (de Cruz,
1999; Merryman, 1985; Zweigert and Kotz, 1998).
In some respects, fleshing out the Romano-Germanic criminal justice regime type
is the most difficult of the three offered in this dissertation. This is the case because the
common law countries are easily identified through a particular legal history rooted in
English case law that has resulted in rather consistent policy development throughout
much of the common law world (with Canada remaining on the less punitive end, and
the US on the more punitive end of this regime). Nordic legal thinking is embedded in
the Nordic criminal justice regime through intense cross-country collaboration, and
close geographic, linguistic, and cultural affinities among those countries. The RomanoGermanic regime type includes slightly more within group variance due to the influence
of French legal thinking, the recent exception of the Netherlands’ increasing prison
population, and important cultural differences among these countries.
Romano-Germanic legal thinking is not concerned with extra-legal reasoning or
issues. Instead, the formal-rational law designed a “gapless” system that provides legal
actors with specific rules defining the appropriate operating logic or organizational
patterns for legal decision making and action. These institutions provide judges,
lawyers, and citizens with foreknowledge of legal rules—predictability and calculability
to use Weber’s words-- that will shape individual expectations about legal decision
making (Stone Sweet, 2002).
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This chapter seeks to answer two essential questions relevant for understanding
the use of incarceration throughout the West. One question is what are the unique legal
and criminal justice institutions of the Romano-Germanic regime? The second question
is what are the causal effects between unique—and historically embedded--regime
characteristics and contemporary crime control policies? Each type of legal thinking has
a particular approach to define roles of central legal actors, but also lay participation,
law enforcement practices, and forms of punishment. These legal actors operate in a
highly interconnected network in which the flow of arrests, convictions, and sentences is
determined through an asymmetrical distribution of discretionary power among
individual legal actors (e.g., police, prosecutors), with the judge sitting at the top, not
beholden to an electorate, but rather the most powerful of all legal bureaucrats.
Particular types of legal thinking foster specific expectations for legal actors, as well as
the general citizen that would have preconceived notions about what it means to file a
charge, come forward as a witness, or participate with formal criminal justice actors in
other ways.
The Romano-Germanic type of legal thinking differs from the common law
regime’s substantively-rational type of legal thinking. The former type of legal thinking
is best characterized as a highly bureaucratic form of legal decision making that Weber
referred to as the ultimate form of formal-rational legal development. The common law
type of legal thinking sees the law as a mechanism to promote further capitalist
development and conservative politics. The Nordic type of legal thinking is also
concerned with extralegal issues, but in a much different way. Nordic law is known for
shaping policies that are intended to ameliorate capitalist inequalities, with one resulting
policy being the creation of the most generous welfare states in the Western world
(Esping-Anderson, 1990). The Romano-Germanic type of legal thinking is the least
concerned with social, political, or ethical considerations when developing the law. This
type of legal thinking is argued to produce a highly bureaucratized organizational
structure in which legal actors are trained how to think and base their decisions upon a
rigid code of legal decision making.
Roman Legal Thought
This dissertation is an exercise in comparative-historical sociology, which seeks
to improve upon explanations of the variation among the incarceration rates of 17
advanced capitalist countries. While the primary focus of this research concentrates on
the post-WWII era, there is a need to explore a bit deeper into the historical foundation of
the Romano-Germanic type of legal thinking. This discussion is not meant to uncover all
of the nuances involved in Romano-Germanic law, but instead it is to consider how the
influence of previous legal decisions affects contemporary legal thinking (Stone Sweet,
2002), and how these types of legal thought effect criminal justice policy outcomes.
Roman legal history is traced to the Twelve Tables of the fifth century B.C. This
document built upon Greek law, which, at that time, was essentially a collection of rules
of behavior. These ancient legal foundations were influential in determining the course
of Western law for many centuries to come. For the purposes here Roman legal
development will be seen in two relatively distinct phases separated by nearly 600 years
(de Cruz, 1999). The first phase of Roman law is credited to the Byzantine Emperor
Justinian during the sixth century, and the second phase was during what is referred to as
the Revival of Roman law beginning in the latter 11th century in the emerging Italian
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university system (Jolowicz, 2003).
The first phase of Roman legal development produced law rooted in authority, not
principle, morality, or natural rights (de Cruz, 1999, p. 50; Dubber, 2005). Early Roman
law was used as a class-based demonstration of sovereignty, formal power and social
ordering. Roman law began with two central legal actors, the praetor and the iudex, of
which all members were lay citizens, as formal legal training had yet to emerge. The
praetor acted similar to modern prosecutors, and the iudex performed roles similar to
modern judges. Added to these legal actors were a group of self-appointed legal scholars,
jurists, that were also laymen, but they attained intellectual mastery over legal rules and
resources. The jurists were consulted by legal professionals and laymen on legal matters.
Who occupied these roles? Fitting with Weber’s elite perspective of legal development,
ancient Rome built a legal system dominated by the upper classes, and it would follow
that these groups sought to develop legal structures and institutions that strengthened
their power. The elitist roots of Roman law fostered laws that resemble Greek thought
and culture because the Roman intelligentsia was rooted in Greek philosophy and logic
(de Cruz, 1999).
Justinian came to power in the 6th century and planted the seeds for the
rationalization of society through a complex legal system. His goal was to “enact or
reenact a comprehensive compilation, systemization, and consolidation of all the existing
law, from every source” (de Cruz, 1999, p. 53). What does this mean for social ordering?
This suggests that the Romans were in need of more consistent, predictable, and
calculable forms of legal reasoning. To achieve this, Justinian commissioned the
development of the Corpus Juris Civilis or the Corpus Juris, which contained four books:
(1) Digest (or Pandect), (2) Institutes, (3) Code, and (4) Novel. The Institutes were the
elementary textbook for first year law students. The Digest (or Pandect, Greek for “to
take in everything”) (Strauss, 1986, p. 61) were classical juristic writings arranged
according to heading from the classical period (spanning from around 120 A.D. to about
235 A.D) (Glendon et al., 1982). The Code were imperial enactments “dating from
Hadrian, arranged chronologically within each title, so that it is possible to trace the legal
evolution of a concept, as the facts in a case were distinguished from apparently similar
facts in earlier cases” (de Cruz, 1999, p. 53, emphasis added). The Novels were imperial
legislation from Justinian’s time, but these were never officially released (see de Cruz,
1999; Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe, 1982; Jolowicz, 2003; Merryman, 1985; Whitman,
1990).
The Roman laws are a complex and systematic statement of legal rights,
obligations, and procedures. Prior to the emergence of the Corpus Juris, the Western
Roman Empire was losing much of its hold over Europe—a slow process of defeat
beginning during the third century. It is important to consider that the Western Roman
Empire was stretched thin and began to crack, most obviously with the fall of Rome
around the year 410. xviii The Eastern Roman Empire was dissolved after “the Lombard,
Slav and Arab invasions that followed the reign of Justinian, the Corpus Juris Civilis fell
into disuse for centuries” (Glendon et al., 1982, p.17). Up to this point there was little
systematization of the law and the Roman Empire was giving way to more localized
rulers, raiders, settlers, and a lack of powerful centralized state administrative
mechanisms (Glendon et al., 1982; Whitman, 1990; Zweigert and Kotz, 1998).
Before moving to the revival of Roman law, it is important to consider that this
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break in the use of Roman law was not as absolute for the people inhabiting portions of
the former Roman Empire. Much of Europe was “Romanized,” which is to say that
Roman thought and culture was spread throughout this region for several centuries in
such a way that the new rulers (and the ruled) were normalized to Roman law and
culture. This is merely to point out that Roman legal thinking never completely
disappeared from Europe as it existed in several forms throughout the 10th century
(Glendon et al., 1982, p. 18). Romano-Germanic legal thinking changed incrementally
through customary borrowings and infusion of local traditions until some of the original
Roman texts reemerged in Italy several centuries later.
Europe slowly experienced changing political, economic and social shifts that
necessitated the use of a more rationalized form of legal procedure than was emerging
from the “barbarized Roman law” xix of the Germanic conquerors. Justinian’s legal
system emerged in the 11th and 12th centuries to form the second phase of Roman law—a
Revival. Some of the original classes taught at the newly built Italian universities were
on Roman law. These schools quickly became the best institutions in the world to
receive legal training, and students came from outside of Italy to be trained in the
“learned law.” Once educated in Roman legal traditions, these students returned to their
native lands to slowly institutionalize Roman legal thinking and procedures throughout
much of Western Europe, no doubt, with numerous customary differences from the
original Juris Corpus.
These ancient Roman texts referenced many issues that were unfamiliar or
outdated to the emerging body of law students. There were two groups of legal scholars
that provided contemporary understanding of these Roman legal texts. The first of these
groups were known as Glossators because they would “gloss” a legal document and
provide brief commentary or raise important questions. Later the Commentators became
the leaders of the Corpus Juris by arranging it in a more systematic fashion and
synthesizing legal doctrines (de Cruz, 1999; Glendon et al., 1982). The Revival of
Roman law was, essentially, part of a revolution in legal, administrative, and educational
structures that spread—although slowly—throughout much of Europe. These changes
were academic, scientific, and bureaucratic.
The Revival of Roman Law: Public Peace in Germany
The revival of Roman law was part of broader changes taking place within
Europe. Europe, during the Middle Ages, was undergoing numerous shifts in social,
political, and economic institutional arrangements that required a more predictable
system of conflict resolution and ordering. In Germany, for instance, the Middle Ages
were a time of regular warring and marauding knightly conquests throughout the
territory. This was a violent and unpredictable time. The “use of learned law was at odds
with European views of the legal world” in which Europeans “generally thought of [law]
as local or personal law, embodying local or personal rights” (Whitman, 1990, p. 7).
What became known as the ius commune (European law or common law) allowed for
applying a hierarchical arrangement to deciding legal matters that ranged from local
customs on one end to Roman-Canon law, on the other, with the latter gaining supremacy
throughout the Middle Ages and replacing customary law, for the most part, during the
middle and latter 16th century (Glendon et al., 1982; Merryman, 1985; Whitman, 1990).
The German people were searching for a systematic, yet fair, way to handle legal
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matters. Violence was a pressing area of concern during this time. To stem this violence,
a Public Peace (Landfriede) movement emerged to support a learned law system in which
government became rationalized with “new courts of justice, staffed by jurists trained in
Roman law…[that] served the need for some elaborately formed legal system that could
provide the basis of government” (Whitman, 1990, p. 12). In 1495, under Emperor
Maximilian I, the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht) was created to enforce
the “perpetual public peace” (Landfriede). Essentially, then, Roman law was promoted
by both jurists and governmental entities, and laid the foundation for a formal-rational
legal system within Germany.
The German legal system was rooted in elitist class biases from the beginning as
the jurists and the bulk of legal actors were aristocrats that instituted legal actions that fit
their political and economic goals. Gerald Strauss (1986), in fact, identified the dislike
for much of this learned legal class emerging during the Reformation. On the opening
page of his Law, Resistance, and the State, Strauss recites a common 16th century joke
that asks if God were in litigation against Satan, who would win? The answer is: the
devil would win because “he has all the lawyers on his side” (Strauss, 1986, p. 1).
Although this may be only a small piece of 16th century humor, Strauss (1986) uncovers a
deeper social meaning of the time regarding “alienation from the drift of political life” for
a traditional society that saw the creeping Roman law with its emerging class of legal
experts as challenging their “stability,” “survival,” and “familiar social patterns.” The
sixteenth century is characterized by immense social change that concerned the more
traditionalist classes, especially with “the transmutation of jurists into powerfully placed
bureaucrats, and the evident linkage between bureaucracy and the would-be autocratic
state” (Ertman, 1997; Strauss, 1986, p. 29).
The Revival of Roman law, therefore, cannot be understood only as a legal
transformation. This movement is part of a broader historical process of bureaucratic
development, nation-state formation, new religious beliefs, and a rationalization of social
processes that took several centuries to come to fruition. These legal changes unraveled
centuries of patterns of social life at all levels of society. The acceptance of Roman law
in Germany during the sixteenth century was, for the most part, solidified with the
Peasant War of 1524-25. This conflict pitted the peasantry against a growing elitist class
promoting Romanized legal institutions.
The sixteenth century was a critical time for the initial development of the
bureaucratic German state as well as Lutheranism (see Ertman, 1997), in which Luther
“fearful of a civil war that would require more strength than [the Lutherans] had, turned
back to the old idea of the ius commune that had been linked with the Public Peace
[Landfriede] for two-and-a-half centuries” (Whitman, 1990, p. 23). Luther, indeed,
changed his mind regarding the usefulness of a learned written law and the learned men
of the law. With Luther’s acceptance of Roman legal procedures and rules, Germany was
prepared to combine the secular and canon law. It is not clear why Luther changed his
mind on the “godlessness” of Roman law, but it appears that he felt his Lutheran
movement slipping away in the face of knightly conquest, violence, and a general lack of
order. The German law that emerged was an amalgamation of Roman and canon law that
sought to order society. Therefore, the law was used to provide predictable exchange
among citizens even if this early modern legal thinking worked to institutionalize the
values, beliefs, and attitudes of the elite segments of society. Legal education was
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reserved for elite class of individuals. These individuals needed finances to afford the
lengthy training in Roman and Germanic legal thought—a combined ten years of training
before one could sit for the doctorate of law—something that prevented commoners from
acquiring the legal knowledge.
The French Revolution and Romano-Germanic Law
Throughout the 18th century, enlightenment thinking fostered humanist and liberal
trends in France (and other parts of Europe) that competed with notions of absolutist rule
in much of the Germanic speaking territories (e.g., Austria, Germany, Prussia) (Ertman,
1997). Once the Ancient Regime was toppled, and Napoleon was firmly in place as
“leader” of the Republic, he commissioned four legal scholars to construct what is
commonly referred to as the Napoleonic Code, but was originally known as the Code
civil des francais (the civil code of the French people).
One thing that sets the French code of 1804 apart from that of the Germanic code
of 1900 is its plain language; it was designed for an intelligent (bourgeois) citizen to be
familiar with the law. Natural law influences—such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and
Montesquieu—shifted the framing of man into “a rational and responsible creature who
acquires at birth an inalienable right to freedom of conscience, belief, and economic
activity” (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998, p. 80-81). Napoleon, a soldier, not a lawyer,
demanded that the Code be made available so that everyone could have some idea of
their legal rights and duties. The drafters of the Code civil did not write this document
for uneducated laborers, but rather it was written for the enlightened bourgeoisie as the
emerging propertied class (Elliott and Vernon, 2000; Glendon, et al., 1982; Zweigert and
Kotz, 1998, p. 93). The code of 1804 consisted of three books: Book One is titled of
Persons, Book Two of Property and Different Kinds of Ownership, and Book Three of
the Different Ways of Acquiring Property.
Cumulatively, these codes had three foci—(1) protect private property, (2)
enforce contracts, and (3) support the patriarchal family. While these areas were not
completely absent from Roman law, the Code was acting within a newly created
institutional arena that wanted to reduce the power of the landed elite, and support
democratic, constitutional, state formation, with the patriarchal family supporting this
system in private, and rationalizing economic transactions. The Napoleonic Code was
not the only legal code to emerge during this time in Europe (e.g., Prussia, 1794 and
Austria, 1811). These codes were influenced to varying degrees by rational
Enlightenment thinking, but neither went as far as the French code to shape a rationally
ordered society that promoted liberal commerce. There were also central ideological
differences between the Code civil of 1804 and that of the Prussian and Austrian codes,
as the latter two were put in place to maintain elite class structures and support an
autocratic rule. The French Revolution and the Code were movements led by an
emerging bourgeois class in which property and freedom of contract were paramount.
These differences produced a specific attention to the separation of powers that
fostered a desire to keep politics and law making separate. The courts of the Ancient
Regime were inquisitorial as the judge not only controlled the courtroom, but was also in
charge of the investigatory phase, an institutional arrangement that led to much judicial
corruption. The legislature is to have exclusive rights over making law, and the judge
should be restrained in his power to interpret the law. The Code civil was drafted at a
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time when suspicion of the role that legal actors, namely judges, played during the
l’ancient droit (the ancient law), and therefore created a legal document that sought to
reduce monarchical domination through a humanist (or natural law) based rationalization
of legal rules, procedures, and roles.
Germanic Legal Science: From the Historical to Pandectist School
Germany lacked the organization to establish a unified national legal code during
the early 19th century. Instead, they were embroiled in intense conflicts that delayed the
onset of a formal rationalization of the law in 1896. The French Revolution sparked a
movement toward ordered state development through liberal, natural law based systems.
Germany did not, however, completely accept the French Code, as it was rooted more in
natural law than legal science.
Simultaneous to the rise of the “unscientific” natural law in France, German
scholars were dedicated to a more systematic and calculated view of the law. This was
led by Gustav von Hugo and Friedrich Carl von Savigny as leaders of the Historical
School of jurisprudence in Germany. The Historical School diverged from
Enlightenment thinking by understanding the law as a more natural, dynamic product
worked out over the course of time through cultural infiltration. “All true law”,
according to the German Historical School, “is customary law, developed, handed down,
and captured in usage and manners; the law-bearers are the people and, as the people’s
representatives, the lawyers” (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998, p. 139).
Germany lacked well-written records of customary law formation leaving the
Historical School jurists to review the ancient Roman texts. This was done with a
complete study of the Digest, which is why the Historical School became known as the
Pandectist School. It was with Bismarck’s unification of the German Empire in 1871 that
work began to construct a national legal code. Zweigert and Kotz (1998) characterize
Bismarck’s Germany as a grande bourgeoisie that was intermingled with conceptions of
authoritarianism typical of Prussian thinking at the time. These legal historians
contextualize Bismarck’s time by saying that “it was the day of a marked liberalism in
economics, of the belief that the general good would spontaneously ensue from the
interplay of economic forces provided that the state did not interfere” (Zweigert and
Kotz, 1998, p. 144). Any social movements or drives during this time in Germany were
rooted in a paternalistic state and private life. The industrial revolution uprooted
traditional rural lifestyles for a more urban industrial production, resulting in legal
institutional gaps for which new policies, regulations, and laws were created to address.
What does this mean for the social and legal context in which German law was
formed? Social changes fostered the development of a legal system that supported
market relationships through, as Weber pointed out, the purposive contract and other
legal rules. This brings us to why and how Weber saw the German legal system as
epitomizing the formal-rational type of legal thinking because it was established--quite
different from the French Code civil--for the professional lawyer, not the learned
“enlightened” man. Rather, the German code is a highly dense, technical, and detailed
system of legal thinking (Dubber, 2005). Interestingly, this legal thinking emphasizes
minimal lay participation that characterizes the Nordic regime, and, in fact, RomanoGermanic legal thinking can be characterized as limiting all human decision making
outside of the legislative branch. Legal decision making in Germany is based on a
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rational (cognitive) process using a rationally designed system of legal rules that serve to
both construct and circumscribe the individual legal bureaucrat, which reaffirms the
institutionalized legal form. Legal scholars describe the German code typically with such
phrases as a calculating machine, as a logical-mathematical application of reason,
scientific, and technical.
The first German Civil Code was instituted on January 1, 1900. It was originally
completed in 1896, but was not formally instituted until the first day of the 20th century.
There are five primary codes in Germany, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure,
the German Commercial Code, the Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany, and
the German Code of Criminal Procedure. The German code of 1900 was, of course,
altered significantly following WWII, which resulted in the German Code of 1949, the
Grundgesetz or the Basic Law.
German Criminal Justice System
The Romano-Germanic criminal justice regime is characterized by high levels of
bureaucratic control and formal legalism that promotes sentencing policies that limit
incarceration (Frase, 2001). These characteristics foster specific legal and criminal
justice institutions that maintain relatively stable incarcerated populations in post-WWII
Germany (Tonry, 2004b). The German constitution of 1949 (Grundgesetz) established
the code law for West Germany, and served in a modified version as the chief legal
document for unified Germany beginning in 1990. It is argued that these arrangements
create specific organizational structures as well as specific cognitive frameworks for legal
actors. These cognitive structures are formed through extensive legal education, and later
on-the-job socialization that cumulatively serve to shape how legal actors think and act.
Prosecutors and judges are not elected positions in Germany, as in the US. These legal
actors are appointed (by other bureaucrats) to implement and manage criminal justice
policies and practices that reflect the legal rationality contained in the Grundgesetz. This
rational, cool, and calculated legal actor is able—theoretically, at least—to move past any
personal, social, and political biases to objectively—according to formal legal criteria-determine the guilt or innocence of individuals.
This rational bureaucratic approach to legal decision making is structured by the
German Constitution of 1949. The Basic Law centralized human rights and dignity by
placing several individual protections in the first 19 articles, with the first titled human
dignity. That such an emphasis was placed on human dignity and the protection of the
individual from the state moved beyond previous constitutions (e.g., North German
League of 1867 and German imperial constitution of 1871) and incorporated influences
from the US Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, as well as a
need to construct a pragmatic legal order (Spevack, 1997).
The Basic Law, as with many governmental documents, is the product of political
maneuvering, acquiescence, and intense debate. A Parliamentary Council met several
times to negotiate the terms of the Basic Law with external forces following WWII. It
was obvious that the German empire, as it once existed, was ending, and the
unconditional surrender rendered many German political thinkers without “the authority
to reform the Reich” (Spevack, 1997, p. 416).
Savelsberg and King (2007, 2005) demonstrated that collective memory is
important when considering how and why laws are constructed. They define collective
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memory as “knowledge about the past that is shared, mutually acknowledged, and
reinforced by collectivities such as small informal groups, formal organizations, or nation
states and global communities” (Savelsberg and King, 2007, p. 190). These authors point
out that collective memories are expressed through legislation and “legal decision
making.” Giesen (2004) wrote about the ‘trauma’ felt by the German population during
the immediate post-war period. In order to cope with this trauma, the public needed to
“decouple” themselves (as a collective) from the “perpetrators” of the Nazi atrocities, and
the “law court was the institutional arena in which the demarcation of individual guilt
was staged, ritually reconstructed, and reaffirmed” (Giesen, 2004, p. 121; as quoted by
Savelsberg and King, 2007, p. 194). Assigning guilt to certain individuals served several
purposes that include allowing individuals to feel “cleansed of the collaboration of many”
and paved the way for focusing on the reconstruction effort. Some legal scholars were
incorporating past knowledge of the social world to solve the problem of developing a
modern legal code.
Indigenous German legal principles were not the only perspectives involved in the
construction of the Basic Law. Western influences are seen throughout the Code of 1949.
The development of the Basic Law was the outcome of intense political wrangling and
debate. The German framers had to work within the confines of post-war defeat, as well
as accept Anglo-American conceptions of liberalism expressed in individual rights (over
social rights). This created a situation in which leaders from the Christian Democratic
Party (CDU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Communist Party (KPD) all
battled over inserting their ideological beliefs into the code. xx The KPD was ruled out
early on in the constitutional debates because their ideas “were incompatible with western
democracy and free market capitalism” and the fear of Russian-backed communism
(Spevack, 1997, p. 423). The CDU “supported American ideas about how to formulate
the catalogue of basic rights…[and] would facilitate the growth of a capitalist economy
and avoid socialization of industry” (Spevack, 1997, p. 427). This resulted in an initial
imbalance in political party power that proved to have long-term policy effects, with the
CDU maintaining dominance for most of the post-war era, placing the social democrats
in a secondary role.
Long-term patterns of the partisan composition of government influence policy
over the long-run (Huber and Stephens, 2001). Path dependent processes are often
instigated by small early gains that strengthen individuals, groups, or positions, relative to
competitors, over time (Pierson, 2004). This sort of structural inertia is well known in
political phenomena, and supports the notion of structural limitation. In post-WWII
Germany, the partisan composition has been a unique blend of the rather conservative
and somewhat elitist Christian democratic parties with the more universalist working
class social democratic parties (van Kersbergen, 1995) to produce a welfare state fitting
somewhere between the more restrictive Anglo-American and the more open
Scandinavian welfare regimes (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Huber and Stephens, 2001).
The Basic Law was instituted on a temporary basis as the framers thought that
unification would bring about a new constitution. Unification has taken place without a
completely new constitution, but rather several adjustments have been made to the Code
of 1949. Central to the study at hand is that several countries in Western Europe were in
need of a legal framework, and the 1949 law served as a model. During the 1960s, social
democratic parties became powerful and were able to form a Grand Coalition with the
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CDU that made possible several institutional changes. This coalition only lasted from
1966 to 1969, which was enough time for several changes to the criminal law and
criminal justice procedures. The next section discusses some of the major criminal law
reforms of the 1960s.
German Radicalism: 1960s
WWII fostered a specific German collective memory of a distrustful central state
that blended with previous notions--even if mostly vicariously experienced--of the
patriarchal, bureaucratic state characteristic of the Weimar Republic. These cultural and
other social forces brought about a desire for a reformed legal system from the highly
western influenced Basic Law of 1949. A critical piece of legislation emerged out the
1969 criminal law reforms with the goal of developing a penal system concerned with
retribution and deterrence, what became a sentencing policy known as general positive
prevention. This sort of rational administration of justice would reduce the use of
incarceration as a criminal punishment; instead the German’s started to rely upon day
fines and community service as the primary punitive mechanism.
On July 4, 1969, the Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (The Second
Criminal Law Reform Act) was passed in order to make changes to the General Part of
the German Criminal Code, but it was not fully implemented until 1975 (Weigend, 2001).
Reduced use of incarceration was the motive for the 1969 legislation and penal code
changes, which fit the 1960s rehabilitation ideology in the US. Although German
correctional philosophy is not traditionally rehabilitative or therapeutic, 19th century
German scholars such as Franz von Liszt recognized that “Short term imprisonment is
not only useless. It does more harm to the legal system than the offender’s total impunity
would” (Dubber, 2005, 2006; Weigend, 2001, p. 193). This move away from
incarceration should be seen as a rational policy movement to reduce incarceration and
allow more community sanctions.
Michael Tonry (2004b) pointed out that German incarceration has remained
relatively stable during the post-war era due to specific political features shaping German
crime policy. Most notably, the Christian Democrats have tended to maintain dominance
in the German parliament or they formed a coalition government, usually with the Social
Democratic Party during the latter part of the 20th century. Thomas Weigend (2001,
p.192) provided a thorough description of the reform act of 1969:
“First, prison sentences of less than one month were abolished altogether—fines
were regarded as sufficient reaction to offenses of such low seriousness. Second,
many petty offenses were decriminalized and turned into mere administrative
infractions (Ordnungswidrigkeiten)…decriminalization of many traffic
offenses…[and] a host of public order offenses. Third, the new version of the
Penal Code strongly discouraged the imposition of sentences of less than six
months: paragraph 47, section. 1 PC requires courts to give specific reasons in
writing for imposing short prison sentences, and courts must provide additional
justification if they refrain from suspending a sentence of less than one year.”
The coalitional government made possible several needed compromises in
criminal law (Eser, 1995). Gustav Heinemann, a Social Democrat, became the Minister
of Justice, and later the Federal President. In the post-war period, Germany was working
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to reshape German criminal law in the aftermath of the Nazi party. The Grand Criminal
Law Commission, worked through the mid and late 1950s, to develop numerous drafts of
criminal law reforms. The Commission managed to produce a Draft Penal Code in 1962
that was not accepted by parliament. An Alternative Draft Penal Code was established
by 14 German and Swiss law professors in 1966 with “its primary concern…to adjust the
sanction system to reflect the notion of rehabilitation and to restrict the criminal law to
socially harmful conduct” (Eser, 1995, p. 32). These criminal law reforms were part of
the general trend toward a more liberal penal model in Germany, and they were attached
to the Criminal Reform Acts instituted in 1969 (The First Criminal Reform Act) and The
Second Criminal Reform Act implemented in 1975.
The Reform of 1969 instituted several criminal justice practices that contributed
to the declining incarcerated population despite rising crime throughout the 1960s and
1990s. Germany has exhibited relatively stable penal trends, if not slightly smaller
during the latter part of the 20th century. German penal policies have not fit Garland’s
notion of “elsewhere”, but rather the criminal law reforms reduced the prison population
by curtailing judges’ ability to impose sentences of less than six months (Tonry, 2004b).
These reforms also brought a move away from the legality principle requiring German
prosecutors to take any case in which there is enough evidence to warrant a conviction.
This reform brought about shifts in the composition of power among criminal justice
actors.
Garland’s notion of elsewhere neglects the importance of country-specific
institutional and structural differences that shape policy outcomes (Savelsberg, 1994,
2008; Sutton, 2004, 2004; Tonry, 2004b). The notion of Germany fitting with AngloAmerican type countries in criminal justice policy outcomes neglects to consider the
reality for many European countries, and Germany has maintained a relatively stable
level of incarceration for the past thirty years (Albrecht, 2001). Savelsberg (1994, p. 936)
suggested that comparative research needs to consider the “factors that caused the
country-specific construction of political knowledge” that shape different criminal justice
systems in Germany and the US.
Crime and Punishment Theories: General Positive Prevention
A criminal justice system characterized by highly rational and bureaucratic
processes operates under specific theories about crime and punishment. What is
punishment? How should people be punished? Why should they be punished? There
are numerous theoretical stances one can take regarding the (non-sociological) purpose of
punishment. Most introductory criminology textbooks inform students that the goals of
formal punishment are: (1) incapacitation through incarceration, (2) rehabilitation
through specific behavior changing interventions, (3) deterrence by encouraging the
apprehended to become law abiding (specific) or encouraging others witnessing the
punishment (general) to avoid criminality, and (4) retribution through harsh policies.
Dubber (2006, p.2) referred to the first of these goals as consequentialist because related
policies “advocate punishment for the sake of some beneficial consequence, such as
crime reduction.” He suggested that retribution is punishment for its own sake, no doubt
proportional to the offense committed, but nonetheless related policies satisfy a Kantian
(i.e., retributive) notion of punishment for German legal science.
German legal science found deterrence models to use offenders unjustly as
“examples” or as Hegel argued to treat people as “animals…to be scared, and beaten, into
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submission” (Dubber, 2006, p. 18), something standing at odds with classical criminal
thinking that supported overtly deterrent models for legal reform (e.g., Bentham).
In Germany, policies aimed at strengthening existing law abiding social norms at
the community and social levels, not the individual offender. Dubber (2006, p.15)
described the debate in German legal circles between the consequentialists and the
retributivists, what is referred to as the Schulenstreit (clash of the schools), in which
Franz von Liszt, the founder of German criminology, is pitted against Karl Binding, the
founder of German criminal law norm theory, representing the classical school. This was
really a battle between modernist notions of policy utility. Liszt asserted punishment
should serve some social good, whereas Binding adhered to a more Roman view of the
“right to punishment” as “nothing but the right to obedience of the law which has been
transformed by the offender’s disobedience.” What is needed is “the inmate’s
subjugation under the power of law for the sake of maintaining the authority of the laws
violated” (Binding, 1915, p. 84; found in Dubber, 2006, p. 16-17). Liszt and his
colleagues pushed for legislation to encourage a more individualistic, treatment focused
criminal law. This perspective should not be seen as purely benevolent, but rather as
serving a means to an end. The end is that of norm reinforcement through “public
reprobation and imposition of punishment” as the criminal law is “the public
reaffirmation of the validity of basic social norms that have been called into question” by
the law violation (Weigend, 2001, p. 209). This fits with Durkheimian notions of the
ritualistic nature of punishment to convey the specific message of rule compliance. Norm
reinforcement did not require purely incapacitative methods or purely deterrent methods,
but rather individual approaches to determine what combination of practices were
needed. Liszt and the progressives were sidelined by WWII when the Nazis took over in
1933, but their thoughts influenced the 1960s criminal reforms (Dubber, 2006).
German punishment theory took an alternative path from that of the US by
responding to the failure of specific prevention models by shifting the “objects of
prevention” and arguing that “perhaps [punishment] could stiffen the resolve of nonoffenders not to become (unrehabilitatable) offenders…[essentially] reinforce the general
legal consciousness” (Dubber, 2006, p.18). Huber and Stephens (2001) demonstrated
that German social policies were shaped by a unique blend of social and Christian
democratic parties and coalitions that were consequential for welfare policy outcomes.
These coalitions emerged out of political power shifts among political associations in
which early advantages of the Christian democratic parties placed Germany on a more
restrictive policy path than that found in the heavily social democratic Nordic countries’
universalistic approach. The essential principle here is that of “subsidiarity…the
principle that the smallest social unit capable of taking care of its members should do so
(family, congregation, local community, and the state only as a last resort for social
programs)” (Huber and Stephens, 2001, p. 19). Positive general prevention fits with the
principle of using incarceration as the last option for serious offenses. Huber and
Stephens (2001) showed that post-war Germany lacked an organized and centralized left
movement focused on wage restraint and universalistic policies found in Sweden with the
Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO). This placed the Christian democratic parties on an
advantageous initial path that developed into long-run political party effects on social
policy outcomes in Germany. The principle of subsidiarity lends itself to penal policies
that seek to limit incarceration, and prefer for more community oriented punishments,
whereas the more universalist approach found in Sweden may be attached with the strong
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working class base of the labor movement compared to the influence of middle- and upperclass German unions.

Conclusion: Mechanisms of Bureaucratic Punishment
The Romano-Germanic regime differs from the common law regime in several
ways. Interestingly, Roman law was originally created by and for lawyers in order to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In this legal system, however, lawyers
have always held something of a secondary role to judges. Judges are highly trained
legal professionals at the top of the civil service hierarchy, and they work with
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lay judges in much different ways than common law
judges. The absence of judicial elections frees judges from the condemnation of an
irrational public demanding harsh punishment. German, French, or Italian judges are
concerned with how the public perceives their decisions or courtroom behavior. Instead,
these judges are more concerned with ensuring that they meet the organizational
requirements of following rather rigid legal rules and internal evaluations by other
judges. In many continental systems, trials are not considered complete until after
appellate review of the trial of first instance. That is, there is an automatic review of
judicial and prosecutorial decisions to ensure that legal rules were followed, which is to
say that subjective or emotional decision making is eliminated from the trial. One could
argue that this highly bureaucratic legal system shields courtroom actors from public
scrutiny with a blanket of rationality.
First, the Romano-Germanic regime has little need for defense attorneys. This
regime does not rely on an adversarial process in which the state and the defendant
compete to convince juries of one’s innocence or acquit individuals based upon legal
technicalities. There are few technicalities that defense attorneys use to free accused
individuals as these systems do not have exclusionary rules regarding physical evidence
or testimony. Instead, defense attorneys are used to instruct defendants on legal
procedures and expectations as they work with prosecutors to discover the truth of the
alleged event. Why are defense attorney so weak in this regime? Part of the reason for
this weakness has to do with the lack of a jury. Recall that defense attorneys in the
common law regime argued that juries are untrained and prone to subjective decision
making, which requires complex evidentiary rules. The Romano-Germanic regime, on
the other hand, suggests that judges are such highly trained legal professionals that they
can put aside their emotions to make legal decisions in a context of complete objectivity.
Therefore, it is not inappropriate for evidence that is gathered with questionable police
tactics or hearsay testimony that lends plausibility to one’s guilt or innocence to be
included in trials because the professional judge is a legal scientist able to separate his or
her subjectivity when making legal rulings.
Second, prosecutorial discretion is nearly eliminated in the Romano-Germanic
regime. Similar to judges, prosecutors must meet strict bureaucratic rules when making
decisions to charge or dismiss individuals as well as their investigatory and courtroom
practices. This lack of discretion contributes to the power of the judiciary and the
weakness of defense attorneys relative to the common law regime. That is, with judges
appointed through a tight bureaucratic process, and overseeing the investigatory phase
and leading the courtroom trial, prosecutors are placed in a secondary role to judges.
Prosecutors are not independent legal actors striving to inflict punishment upon
74

wrongdoers as much as they are bureaucrats trained to follow legal procedures to
discover the guilt or innocence of an accused person.
Third, some may argue that the Romano-Germanic regime may become tainted
with emotional rulings through the use of lay judges. Upon first glance this may appear
to be the case, but it is important to understand the lay judges are not held in high regard,
they possess little power, and often their decisions are shaped by professional judges.
Lay judges sit with and are to debate points of fact and law with professional judges,
which is akin to placing a professional boxer in the ring with a professor. The result is an
unfair fight. Research was presented in this chapter to demonstrate that rarely do lay
judges disagree with professional judges and more often than not lay judges simply
follow the lead of their trained counterpart.
Fourth, one of the fundamental differentiating principles between this regime and
the common law regime revolves around the application of scientific principles to legal
decision making. That is, the Romano-Germanic regime is founded on and continues to
move from a perspective of hyper-rationality in bureaucratic form and courtroom
decisions. This system is academic, bureaucratic, and hierarchical, which has the effect
of diminishing public opinion to an afterthought. Judges and prosecutors are not
concerned with elections. Lay judges are not perceived as an extension of the public’s
desire for pain. Rather, the opposite exists in which judges and prosecutors are there to
restrain such desire for punishment, and replace this emotionalism with rationality.
Reason rules the Romano-Germanic regime and offers the accused protection from a
potentially hyper-punitive public. In this case, prosecutors do not need web pages,
commercials, or radio spots to demonstrate their effectiveness. Judges do not appear on
television arguing that they are more punitive than their counterparts. Instead,
prosecutors and judges are reined in with reliance upon objective decision making that is
supported by legal rules, not how such incidents will play out in the public arena.
The four courtroom actors identified are defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges,
and lay representation that exist in all three regimes. These courtroom actors compete for
discretionary power in the investigatory and trial phases. The common law regime is one
that relies upon the adversarial battle between defense attorneys and prosecutors in which
the judge acts as the referee, whereas the Romano-Germanic regime places defense
attorneys and lay participation at the bottom of the discretionary power grid. There is
little need for defense attorneys in this regime because legal wrangling and technicalities
do not exist to the extent they are present in the common law. Public opinion is muted
through bureaucratic organizational structures that ensure that prosecutors and judges
follow legal rules over the public’s desire for punishment.
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Chapter Six: Nordic Incarceration Regime: The Case of Sweden
The Nordic type of legal thinking is predicated on ameliorating social inequalities
with minimal criminal justice intervention. Just as Soskice and Hall (2001) and others
identified “varieties of capitalism” this dissertation borrows from Weber’s types of legal
thinking and argues that these types of legal thinking foster different types of criminal
justice institutions. These institutions, in turn, shape criminal justice actors’ thoughts and
behaviors regarding the appropriate actions—punishments, interventions—necessary in
response to law violation. The central question guiding this research is: Why do
relatively similar modern nation-states have such disparities in penal populations? This
chapter demonstrates that a Nordic type of legal thinking exists to foster a Nordic
criminal justice regime characterized by (1) strong lay participation, (2) strong penal
abolitionist grassroots movement, (3) lack of faith in harsh punishment, and (4) inclusive
criminal justice system.
Comparative legal scholars routinely discuss common and civil law families, with
little attention to the unique legal thinking in the Nordic countries (e.g., Zweigert and
Kotz, 1998). It is commonly accepted that continental Europe received its legal
foundation from Roman legal traditions (Merryman, 1985). The Roman legal system
provided the basis for ‘formal-rational legal thinking’ that promoted highly rationalized
institutional arrangements throughout society (Weber, 1967). Roman legal thinking
established rational legal and administrative structures for economic, social, and political
life in much of continental Europe.
Pierson’s (2004) research on path dependency allows for combining important
cultural elements with the historical path or trajectory by which these elements were
developed to demonstrate (1) policy ratchet effects, (2) structural limitations, and (3)
regime legacies (Huber and Stephens, 2001). This institutionalist view emphasizes the
importance of legal and criminal justice institutions that are rooted in historical processes,
and recognizes the importance of how individual social actors engage in and with the
criminal justice policy field (which is further embedded in larger fields) to develop
unique policies (Brubaker, 1985; Bourdieu, 1977; DiMaggio, 1979).
First, a brief discussion is provided to explain what is meant by Nordic legal
thinking. Second, incarceration rates are reviewed to demonstrate trends in penal policies
in Sweden. Any explanation of penal trends would be remiss without consideration of
criminal behaviors, as some may suggest a democracy-at-work thesis in which the public
reacts against rising crime thereby encouraging legislators to increase penalties (Beckett
and Sasson, 2002). Next, political variables are presented to highlight important
legislation on crime and justice issues and other political interventions potentially
effecting incarceration trends. Moving away from such a structural discussion, the
Swedish social landscape is sketched to contextualize Swedish punishment.
Laying the Foundation for a Nordic Type of Legal Thinking
In Weber’s (1967) Sociology of Law there is little mention of the legal systems of
the Nordic countries. Why did Weber glance over Nordic law? It is difficult to say for
sure, but it is worth mentioning that during Weber’s research, the Nordic region looked
much different than it does today, and these countries lacked an emphasis on the rational
legal form that Weber concentrated on. The Nordic countries were powerful seafaring
colonizers, throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, in which Denmark and Sweden were
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the more powerful empire builders, with Norway gaining its independence much later.
Finland, although geographically connected, lacks some of the cultural similarities with
the rest of the Nordic (e.g., language), and has strong cultural leanings with Eastern
Europe. These countries, nonetheless, lacked the early emergence of industrial capitalism
that Weber witnessed in England and Germany. It is commonly known that the Nordic
countries lacked the class structures found elsewhere to support early modern capitalist
enterprises—namely, a class of powerful landed elite (Rothstein, 2001).
The Nordic region is known for its attention to social cohesion, universalism and
solidarity that is reflected in social policies (Esping-Anderson, 1990, p. 67-69). The
German code law is characterized as rigid, abstract, and gapless, and, the other type is
flexible, empirical, and concrete. These perspectives brought about different court rules,
legal training, and emphases in the law, but Weber did not include Nordic countries in his
Sociology of Law. The essence of the Germanic civil law approach was to base legal
decisions upon science through the systematic revision of Roman legal documents to
produce the German Civil Code of 1896 (Merryman, 1985, p. 62). The law is not to be
harsh, but rather the German legal scientists, referred to as the Pandectists, were
interested in the scientific construction of a formal, pure, concept driven code law
(Merryman, 1985). As was detailed earlier, the common law was developed later through
a very unscientific process predicated on trial by jury and judicial precedents (Hogue,
1966).
The Nordic legal regime, unlike that which exists in the common law world, is
characterized by a mixture of substantive and formal legal thinking. Recall that
substantive legal types are concerned with non-legal issues such as social engineering,
achieving political desires, and ethical norms, whereas formal-rational legal thinking is
rule bound and provides clear directives on how judicial decision makers are to
proceed—as ‘bureaucratic automatons’ they are merely to apply a code to an act. This,
however, is not to say that these types exist in their pure form in reality, but rather they
offer a heuristic tool to understand western law (Rheinstein, 1967). These types do not
go far enough to explain Nordic legal thinking, which is composed of unique cognitive,
cultural, and organizational perspectives (Pihlajamaki, 2004). Weber recognized that the
common law is substantive-rational law, but he said little about the Nordic law type. The
typological model developed by Weber operates upon two axes in which pure types are
claimed to exhibit either substantive or formal characteristics and either rational or
irrational law making and law finding processes. While these pure types may exist in the
abstract, they do not necessarily correspond to empirical reality perfectly. The entire
sample possesses variable ranges of each of these qualities, with some showing a clear
preference for specific characteristics, such as the German law imbued with scientific
legal thinking, the Nordic law emphasizes working-class concerns, and common law
thinking promotes and supports elitist market conditions.
An underlying assumption of Weber’s analysis is that western legal systems
created rules that worked to benefit certain groups—capitalists—through the calculability
brought about with the purposive contract and other economic-legal institutions
(Kronman, 1983; Trubek, 1985). This asymmetry fosters class inequalities between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat to which additional laws and procedures are created to
continually block the working classes from gaining complete access to the political,
economic, and legal spheres in any civilization. This inequality motivates several
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substantivizing reforms: (1) strengthening of bureaucratic welfare states, (2) growing
social democratic political power, and (3) changing legal perspectives among legal
professionals (Ewing, 1987, p. 507; Savelsberg, 1992).
The law performs several non-legal social functions one of which revolves around
the distribution of power, and Weber recognized the inequality brought about by modern
legal systems. This inequality potentially fosters a backlash to provide safety
mechanisms to prop up the individuals not fitting into modern capitalism. Formal
rational legal thinking is weakened by movements directed at bringing about legal
changes to balance the scales of inequality. The “substantive rationalization of law
results on the one hand in an intrusion of the state into society and, on the other hand, in
an opening of state decision making to social (“extralegal”) criteria” (Savelsberg, 1992,
p. 1348).
There is no doubt that both English common law and German legal science have
contributed to shaping Nordic law (Pihlajamaki, 2004). There are, however, specific
elements that characterize this legal regime as a specific type of legal thinking predicated
on minimal criminal justice intervention. These differences are measured and tested
against competing perspectives to offer an explanation of contemporary punishment
outcomes. Why do relatively similar modern nation-states have such disparities in penal
populations?
A Nordic legal type underpins decisions by criminal justice policymakers to
implement various practices and policies that exhibit a Nordic type of legal thinking that
is embedded in a Nordic type of criminal justice system. This type of criminal justice
system is predicated on a relationship between individuals and the state in which formal
interventions are intended to improve (or at least maintain) the material and social
wellbeing of citizens. The criminal justice system is one organizational form used by
democratic states to legitimately coerce citizens to accept social roles aligned with
dominant material and cultural norms. Individual failure to successfully perform one’s
role-bound expectations could result in formal governments using mechanisms from
other governance spheres--the mental health, welfare, and labor market institutions to
enforce social order (Beckett and Western, 2001; Liska, 1997; Western and Beckett,
1999). A Nordic criminal justice regime type is characterized by perceiving individual
criminality as a problem beyond the individual. Individuals are seen as rational human
beings (von Hofer and Tham, 1980), and criminality is the result of weak social bonds
(Gotfredson and Hirschi, 1990) and failed social learning (Akers, 1998), not, as in the
common law regime type, the result of weak genetic structure, single parenthood, low
ambition and moral depravity (Wilson, 1985; Wilson and Hernstein, 1985). Ironically
enough, it is this more treatment minded focus that eventually led to major crime policy
reforms in several of the Nordic criminal justice systems, and, in 1977, The National
Swedish Council for Crime Prevention published the report A New Penal System: Ideas
and Proposals that had dramatic effects on crime policy.
Nordic law is recognized for its attention toward social justice and using the law
as a tool to ameliorate class inequalities (Tham, 1995). The Nordic legal system relies on
written law, but in a much less formalistic fashion than the Germans or French. What
sets Nordic legal thinking apart is its reliance upon seeing the law’s purpose as a
mechanism to fix social problems (Husa, et al., 2007; Pihlajamäki, 2004). Christie
(2000) mentioned that the US criminal justice system is an out of control machine-like
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force that has no checks in place to slow its growth—“to put the brakes on.” The Nordic
legal regime supports criminal justice practices that help to keep prison populations low:
e.g., lay courts, open prisons, prison waiting lists, and no death penalty.
It is important to remember the closeness among the Nordic countries, not only
geographically but also in their social, economic, and political structures. These
connections are not accidental, but rather created through intentional design. Some of
this closeness is the byproduct of war and conquest, such as Finland’s place within the
Swedish Empire for nearly five centuries (ending in 1809). Moving toward the west,
Norway was part of the Danish empire for hundreds of years as well as being
incorporated as a Swedish territory, not gaining independence until 1905. These more
coercive relationships were replaced by more cooperative interactions taking off during
the 19th century and continuing today. One such example is the 1872 congress of
Scandinavian jurists “convened in Copenhagen with the express purpose of advancing
legal unification in Scandinavia” (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998, p. 280).
Tapio Lappi-Seppala (2007) provides a thorough review of how, beginning
shortly after WWII, the Scandinavian countries turned to one another to modernize their
criminal justice systems. In 1952, for instance, the Nordic Council was created to
increase similarities in legislative issues and from 1960 to the mid-1980s the Nordic
Criminal Law Committee sought to “harmonize” criminal justice practices (von Hofer,
2004; Takala, 2004). Beyond these connections, the Nordic countries are said to form a
distinct legal family (see Zweigert and Kotz, 1998).
Swedish Prison: Brief History
The Swedish penal system emerged, for the most part, out of latter-19th century
industrialization (Nilsson, 2003; von Hofer, 2003b). Sweden changed from a
predominantly agricultural based economy to one that was, although much slower than
other parts of the West, developing an industrialized production force. Modern capitalist
structures necessitate that material resources are distributed unevenly, along a continuum,
but with differences between the lower and upper ends. The Swedish view of this
situation was one concerned with utilizing legal interventions to provide mechanisms to
reduce the impact of class conflict with policies characterized as solidaristic, universalist,
and de-commodifying (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Tham, 1995, p. 113). Consider how
different of a perspective this is from the path taken by the ideal-typical case of the
common law regime with American socio-legal perspectives rooted in protection of
economic structures and neo-liberal responsibilization (Garland, 1997).
The substantivizing orientation toward legal development sought to produce
inclusive criminal justice practices (Pihlajamäki, 2004). Despite contemporary views of
prisons as filthy, horrible places, during their initial development, the prison was seen as
an enlightened way to go about social ordering (Nilsson, 2003). It is important to
consider what a relief it was for individuals living during the 19th century (especially
criminals) as the use of corporeal and capital punishment was exchanged for punitive
techniques rooted in isolation. One Swedish criminologist, Roddy Nilsson (2003),
provides a thorough review of the historical establishment of the Swedish penal system
emerging out of the 19th century, and points to how it was modeled after the AngloAmerican Philadelphia prison system. As was discussed the US developed two general
prison models: Philadelphia and Auburn. The first was rooted in solitary confinement,
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whereas the second was a silent system in which inmates worked together but were not
able to speak to one another. Each of these systems focused on work, religion, and
introspection.
Before describing more recent 20th century penal trends, it is important to mention
that prior to the 19th century in Sweden, Holland, Germany, and other parts of Europe
bridewells and workhouses existed in the latter 16th and 17th centuries (Ignatieff, 1978;
Rothman, 1971; Spierenburg, 1984). In 1840, the Swedish Parliament directed money to
build “45 nearly identical regional institutions of the Philadelphia model. To this should
be added five central prisons in which a large number of the cells were intended for
prisoners in solitary confinement” (Nilsson, 2003: 6). These prisons were to replace the
inefficient and archaic punishment systems that were characterized as abusive
workhouses. The workhouses were common places for violence, riots, and overcrowding
(Nilsson, 2003: 5).
Sweden is typically thought of as an idyllic welfare state with relatively lenient,
humanistic, treatment oriented practices. Tham (1995, 2001, p. 410) points out past
experimentation with forced sterilization and forced treatment of alcohol abusers. With a
tradition of Social Democratic power, during the latter 1960s and through the mid-1970s,
there was a general radical political mood infusing much of the Nordic. This was
attached with a strong tradition of anti-authoritarianism that ran so deep that many began
calling for the forced treatment to stop. The notion of mandating treatment stimulated a
great deal of frustration across political cleavages, with the most vocal of these groups
coming from the far-left. The National Organization for Penal Reform (KRUM), a
Swedish prisoner based reformist group that “demanded equality under the law,
humanization of the correctional system, and more effective aftercare for released
prisoners” (Tham, 1995, p. 92). These movements fostered the decriminalization of
certain laws and depenalizations for certain offences, which resulted in significant
reductions in the prison populations. The 1970s were a period in Swedish crime policy in
which the leading commentary was focused on less state intervention, fewer inmates, and
rational policies that meet Swedish cultural norms. Swedish crime policy, more recently,
has shifted direction from these abolitionist undertones.
Swedish Incarceration in the Post-WWII Era
The Swedish prison population, between 1950 and 2000, has remained within the
range of around 2,500 to 5,400 prisoners. This results in a prison population rate of
between 36 and 70 per 100,000 of the population. These figures reflect a typical position
for the Nordic regime. Looking at the Swedish prison figures more closely, one can see
that in the years shortly after WWII there was a steady and steep increase in prison
populations that continued until the latter 1960s. This growth resulted in prison
populations slightly above 5,000 total inmates, and began to recede during the 1970s—
the era of radical reforms--and remained relatively stable until the early 1990s—when
more conservative forces entered the policy arena. During the 1990s, incarceration
populations increased until peaking around 1998.
These prison population figures in Sweden contrast slightly with two Nordic
countries, Denmark and Finland. Finland’s incarceration trend is rather unique. Finland
was known for having a large prison population following WWII with around 7,500
inmates producing a rate of nearly 190 per 100,000 of the population. This rate is more
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on par with current common law countries than Nordic countries, and Finland engaged in
a strong effort to reduce their prison population. In fact, mass amnesties were used to
free many political prisoners, and by 1975, their prison population was much closer to
5,000 prisoners, and with their incarceration rate now close to 55 inmates per 100,000
(Lappi-Seppala, 2001).
What caused these prison population shifts? Do crime indicators present an
explanation for these fluctuations? There is no doubt that reported crime has increased
significantly throughout all countries that do a better job of recording crimes.
Criminologists routinely find that crime rate variation does a poor job of explaining
incarceration rate shifts (Blumstein and Beck, 1995). There are, of course, broad
structural factors bringing about the incarceration rate in Sweden. Before discussing
potential policy and political explanations of the Nordic criminal justice regime, specific
criminal justice institutions characteristic of a Nordic criminal justice system are
discussed below.
Courts and Legal System
A central aspect of any criminal justice system is the “courts.” Swedish courts are
arranged along two separate tracks, one of which handles all criminal and civil cases and
another that handles all administrative issues (Swedish Ministry of Justice, 2007, p. 10).
Within the general courts three levels or tiers exist: district courts, courts of appeal, and
the Supreme Court. The administrative courts are similarly arranged into three tiers:
county administrative courts, administrative courts of appeal and the Supreme
Administrative Court. There is also the possibility of establishing special courts or
tribunals to hear exceptional cases.
The court of first instance is the district court, with 53 such courts in Sweden. If
unsatisfied, a litigant can request that his or her case goes to the second level in one of the
six courts of appeal. The court of last resort is the Supreme Court that “consists of a
minimum of 14 judges, entitled Justice of the Supreme Court” (Swedish Ministry of
Justice, 2007, p. 11). The Supreme Court is charged with hearing cases of significance to
establishing precedent—developing law—with accepted cases usually heard by five
justices. The general courts handle both criminal and civil cases, in the former a
prosecutor initiates the proceeding and the latter two civil parties bring forth a
disagreement in need of legal remedy.
Lay Judge: More and Individual vote?
Lay participation is an essential feature of Swedish law. Christian Diesen (2001,
p. 313) identified the durability of this legal institution by stating that “for more than a
thousand years, lay judges, elected by the people, have been members of the local
courts.” He goes on to recognize that this has changed over the centuries, but
nevertheless the Swedish legal system has maintained lay judge participation. This
system, Diesen (2001) argued, grew out of the Viking ting in which local courts were
structured such that the king appointed a judge, and 12 community members were elected
as a system of lay judges, later referred to as the namnd (Ginsburg, 1963, 1965). The
“Swedish namnd does not operate as a common law jury, nor as a board of experts”
(Ginsburg, 1965, p. 340).
The lay judges add some level of democratic assurance and legitimacy to the
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court process (Diesen, 2001). The structure of the namnd, obviously, changed much
since its early 13th century beginnings, and in the National Law Code of 1734 legal
changes were made to stipulate that lay judges had to vote together in order to overrule
the professional judge’s decision. At various points in the 19th century there were
discussions of adopting a jury system more akin to that found in common law countries.
The results of such efforts was a jury that could sit only in cases related to the freedom of
the press (as still exists today; Norwegian defendants may sit before a jury in certain
cases carrying at least a six year prison term). The original number of 12 lay judges was
reduced incrementally over time—institutional change often happens slowly—such that
lay judge participation was reduced from 12 to 9, in 1948, from 9 to 7, in 1971, from 7 to
5, in 1983, and from 5 to 3, in 1997 (Diesen, 2001). One of the more significant
institutional changes, and something differentiating the Swedish model from other forms
of lay judges, is that in 1983 lay judges were granted the ability to vote independently,
meaning they no longer had to vote together to overrule a professional judge. This raised
the status and power of lay judges (Diesen, 2001); especially relative to their Germanic
counterparts that are often forgotten about during court cases (see Dubber, 1997).
Certain scholars argue that Nordic forms of lay participation are actually the
origins of the jury system, not the English jury or the Romano-Germanic scabini system,
which Diesen (2001, p. 355) refers to as merely “the emperor’s local investigators of
crime.” Lay judges exist in “every district court, court of appeal, county administrative
court and administrative court of appeal” (Swedish Ministry of Justice, 2007, p. 11). Lay
judges are appointed in each of their local areas in which they serve four years, and they
each have a vote in matters of adjudication and legal issues, and are often elected for
more than one term. The appointment of a lay judge is handled through the “political
parties in proportion to the votes for the county council.
Most criminal cases are tried by one professional and three lay judges at the
district court level. When moving to the court of appeals, cases are usually tried by three
professional judges and two lay judges. Immediacy is important to the Swedish criminal
trial as cases are to be resolved “immediately”, and if a defendant is in custody “the court
is to pronounce its judgment no later than one week after completion of the hearing”
(Swedish Ministry of Justice, 2007, p. 12).
The intention here is not to become involved in the long debate between
proponents and opponents of either a jury or lay judge system (Dubber, 1997; Langbein,
1979, 1981, 2005). It is not that one is more or less able to deliver “justice”, but rather to
point out potentially seemingly small institutional differences. Why is it that Sweden
operates with this type of lay judge system? The Germans can use a lay judge for crimes
that carry a prison sentence of two years or more (vergehen) (Dubber, 1997, p. 557).
This is slightly different from the Swedish case in which criminal cases involving the
possibility of a fine or six months imprisonment will include one professional judge and
three lay judges (Swedish Ministry of Justice, 1998, p. 11). The German mixed court
system is more reluctant to support a lay majority. Although the second level of trial
court, the Amtsgericht, can hear cases that carry up to four years imprisonment with a
professional to lay judge ratio of 1 to 2. It is the third trial court level that is most
different from the Swedish case, these courts are known as Landgericht and they involve
the more serious criminal cases. The Landgericht maintain a professional judge majority
with either a court structure of either two professional and two lay judges, or three
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professional and three lay judges. The German courts of appeals, Oberlandesgericht, do
not have any lay participation (Dubber, 1997).
The Swedish lay judge system is one that seriously incorporates intelligent lay
perspective into the court process. There is no doubt that lay judges are often seen,
especially by their professional judge counterparts, as lacking true legal training and
therefore occupying a lower status. This is especially clear in the more typical RomanoGermanic mixed court system, but the Swedish system provides a couple of unique
features—especially individual vote to overrule the professional judge, greater
professional acceptance, potential to serve long terms—that demonstrate underlying legal
attention to lay perspectives that should have an ameliorating effect on prison
populations.
Closed and Open Prisons
Sweden is known for its rather lenient and rehabilitative orientation toward the
treatment of offenders. US prisons, in contrast to Swedish institutions, are known for
their stench, loud music, overcrowded conditions, and in general, discomfort, distrust,
and violence. Prisons in the US do more than merely incapacitate individuals; they are,
to borrow the words of Nils Christie (2000), to deliver “pain.” Sweden, on the other
hand, perceives prisons in a different way, and they have created both closed and open
prisons.
Most visitors familiar with an American prison would recognize Swedish closed
prisons upon first sight, with their tall fences, barbed-wire, electronic surveillance
systems, and other typical fortress-like features. But upon entering even a closed prison,
it might surprise Anglo-American visitors to see the respect for “personal space and
relative comfort of most prisoners” (Pratt, 2008a, p. 121). Even in Sweden there are
maximum security prisons that are reserved for recidivists and violent criminals, with the
other closed prisons lacking many of the additional discomforts typical of AngloAmerican prisons. John Pratt, a New Zealand criminologist, recently completed
ethnographic research into Scandinavian penal systems, which he detailed his
experiences in a two-part series in the British Journal of Criminology. He juxtaposes
Anglo-American prisons with closed prisons in Scandinavia in the following excerpt:
“There is no prison smell in Scandinavia—the combined aroma of poor personal
hygiene, slopping out practices, food preparation and cigarette fumes. Doublebunking is quite uncommon. Prisoners have televisions in their cells, usually
state-provided. Most cells have internal sanitation…Most prisoners work or
receive full-time education well beyond remedial level…select inmates
are
entirely self-catering…Most prisons (high-security especially) provide
accommodation where partners and children can stay free of charge for
weekends—usually at monthly intervals—with the prisoners on an unsupervised
basis” (Pratt, 2008a, p. 122).
The gist of Pratt’s findings is that punishment is different in Scandinavia, not just
in numbers but also in how inmates are treated. In the prisons he toured, family visits
were encouraged and included some opportunities for small children to stay over for a
weekend.
The truly unique aspect of Swedish punishment is the open prison. These two
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words are nearly inverses of one another—“open” and “prison.” What could be less open
than a prison? No fences, no uniforms, no tall walls with armed guards, but instead a
prison system that recognizes that incarceration can reproduce the criminogenic
behaviors it seeks to deter. This allows inmates to own a car, leave on their own to go to
work, and provide their own food, while following strict rules regarding their daily travel
plans. Just as Foucault (1977) drew upon the symbolic power of the execution of Robert
Francois Damiens for the crowd that gathered to watch the “drawing and quartering,” so
too do open prisons send a symbolic message (on symbolic power, see Loveman, 2005).
Instead of a strong state that rules with an iron fist, or Bourdieu’s “right hand”, it
recognizes the need for graduated or intermediary sanctions (Morris and Tonry, 1991),
which means that formal sanctions range across a continuum from more vs. less
punishment measured in the level of incapacitation over community involvement, similar
to what Pratt (2008a, 2008b) refers to as a penal value.
The willingness to incarcerate individuals in open prisons suggests a more lenient
and trusting perspective between the state and citizen, and a prison without all the
architectural security built in is closer to the community than closed prisons. Given
Sweden’s expansive welfare state, and reliance upon full employment, it is possible
inmates are seen as fewer individuals not working, and yet still dependent upon formal
supports—incarcerated free riders, so to speak. State power, obviously, comes in many
specific forms and activates a variety of mechanisms to maintain sovereignty. Garland
(1996) argues that the US and the UK are challenged as the public comes to recognize the
“limits of state sovereignty” with governments unable to stop crime. He suggests this
fosters two types of reactions; one reinserting the state’s power through pseudomilitaristic responses and the other incorporating the community and non-justice agencies
into the fight against crime. This perspective falls short of an explanation of how open
prisons should be understood in Sweden.
Sweden, and much of the Nordic, does not fit the typical political models
describing state power as predicated on “extraction and coercion cycles” (Tilly, 1992, p.
75) or what Gorski (1999) refered to as the bellicist perspective. In these models the
purpose of the state is to extract taxes efficiently to finance wars and order the population
through overtly coercive mechanisms (see Ertman, 1996). Bourdieu (1999) deviates
from the Weberian notion of the state as the holder of a monopoly over the legitimate use
of physical violence, and instead suggests that states operate through a monopoly of
symbolic violence. Open prisons, however, suggest that the state does not rely upon
violence to order the population. This fits Durkheimian notions of political power in
which governments reliant on overly punitive mechanisms do not demonstrate strength,
but rather weakness. A penal system that maintains open prisons allows inmates to
remain a part of the community—although separated in some ways—conveys a message
of confidence in the peoples’ willingness to order themselves, something Foucault refers
to as technologies of the self (see Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, 1991).
For some US readers, there may be a tendency to believe that open prisons sound
similar to a work release program. This is not the case, though, because work release
typically has groups of workers going to particular jobs usually low level tasks in public
view. These tasks commonly involve ditch digging, picking up trash along the road, and
other assignments used to shame inmates, not keep them attached to the community.
Rather, work release programs typically force inmates to wear striped or bright colored
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uniforms to, as Goffman (1963) recognized, “stigmatize” these law violators to ensure the
public understands that inmates are different and to remind the inmates that they are
“outsiders” (Becker, 1963). Open prisons, therefore, serve several purposes: (1) allow
inmates to return to society by limiting the stigmatizing effects of formal punishment, (2)
minimize the criminogenic influences found in closed prisons, (3) send a clear message
of a confident criminal justice system, and (4)suggest that the state is hesitant to strip
citizens of their freedom.
Penal Waiting Lists
An important characteristic of a Nordic criminal justice regime is the social
inclusion of convicted offenders. Whereas an Anglo-American criminal justice regime
views offenders with individual disdain, a Nordic criminal justice regime is characterized
by a criminological view of offenders as those needing additional social supports. If all
offenders are not relegated to the role of the displaced “other”, then, there is no need to
rush to incarcerate these people. A Nordic regime recognizes the potential problems
related to overcrowding—spread of diseases, institutional predation, and criminogenic
behaviors—and realizes the bulk of offenders do not necessarily present serious physical
danger to the public at large. Such a criminal justice regime would empower criminal
justice actors to make determinations of the risks an offender presents to society. A
Nordic criminal justice regime is cognizant of its level of incarceration, will stem
building more prisons or enlisting private corporations to do so, but instead will use
prison waiting lists as a policy mechanism to prevent overcrowding.
Prisons are believed to be the last resort to order a population. With the abolition
in nearly all advanced industrial societies of the death penalty—the US and Japan are the
only exceptions--incarceration is the highest form of pain delivery by a democratic state.
A Nordic criminal justice regime is characterized by having a penal policy more
concerned with reintegration of the offender with family, community, and society, than
punishment or retribution. The Nordic penal model, similar to the welfare state in this
region, is predicated on instituting the least stigmatizing forms of punishment (Swedish
Ministry of Justice, 1997). James Whitman (2003) provides an excellent account of how
formal punishment is used as a form of stigmatization that is differentiated according to
class, with the more humiliating punishments reserved for the lower classes, whereas
other punishments are used only with elite classes. Allowing convicted offenders to
remain in the community, with minimal supervision, demonstrates a unique institutional
practice that has existed in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.
That the law and its enforcement mechanisms carry with them additional social
meanings is an obvious matter. Many social scientists have discussed the deeper
sociological meaning of the prison as an emblematic power of the formal modern state.
Prisons were once placed in the open, for all to see, this served as a reminder of what
could happen to those not behaving. And, actually, during the initial days of the prison
system, say in the 19th century, there were few formal, efficient criminal justice
organizations to support the prison. That is to say that the police, courts, and judges
were, at best, inefficient, and, at worst, corrupt, and overcrowded.
A point of clarification is needed here to ensure that penal waiting lists are not
confused with pretrial or presentence release options in the US. These options do allow
some defendants that have yet to be convicted in the former instance, and in the latter
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have not received a sentence if they were found guilty. Penal waiting lists include
individuals that have been tried, convicted, and sentenced, but there is not enough room
in an institution, so they can wait in the community. No doubt, these individuals have
various sorts of conditions they must follow, such as meeting with a probation officer.
What is important for this analysis is not so much the specifics of how penal waiting lists
operate, but rather that they exist in the Nordic regime because there are structural
limitations that make such a practice in the US impossible. The US criminal justice
system is locked-in a path in which less punitive policy statements and proposals are seen
as failures, not innovation or mechanisms for reintegration. Instead, US political
structures have established a push towards more punishment, especially non-utilitarian
punishment that seeks mostly to inflict discomfort and pain, not a social goal.
Penal waiting lists and open prisons suggest that the Nordic criminal justice
system is defined, not by punishment, but rather by innovation in the form of fewer
exclusionary institutions. The Nordic criminal justice regime is the least exclusionary
regime, with the Romano-Germanic regime second, and the Common law regime
noticeable focused on exclusionary tactics. Consider how open prisons fly in the face of
a more recent trend in the US of what are known as super-max prisons. These are prisons
reserved for the worst of the worst inmates; those posing the greatest threat not only to
society, but to the correctional guards as well. Inmates in super-max prisons are usually
locked in their cells for between 21 and 23 and a half hours each day, only allowed out on
certain days for isolated exercise in a fenced in area or a shower, and they are served their
meals through small cell door tray slots. US prisons have moved away from their
original position of “correcting” individuals—thus the names, Departments of
Corrections and House of Correction—and in a post-corrections era prisons “are first and
foremost about separation, amputation, excision, expurgation, and exclusion…[of those]
unfit to be free agents”( Bauman, 2000, p. 206). Zygmunt Bauman (2000, p. 209)
summarizes an interesting portrayal of one such super-max prison opened in the early
1990s in California, Pelican Bay:
“entirely automated and designed so that inmates have virtually no face-to-face
contact with guards or other inmates. Most of the time the inmates spend in
windowless cells, built of solid blocks of concrete and stainless steel…They don’t
work in prison industries; they don’t have access to recreation; they don’t mingle
with other inmates. Even the guards are locked away in glass-enclosed control
booths and communicate with prisoners through a speaker system, are seldom, if
ever, seen by the prisoners. The sole task left to the guards is to make sure that
prisoners stay locked in their cells—that is, non-seeing and non-seen,
incommunicado. Apart from the fact that the prisoners are still eating and
defecating, their cells could be mistaken for coffins.”
The super-max prison movement sends the opposite cultural messages compared
to the Nordic open prisons and penal waiting lists. US incarceration is moving
increasingly toward ‘factories of exclusion’ and the people inside these prisons are being
defined by a “status of the excluded” (Bauman, 2000, p. 212). Swedish penal institutions
are predicated on the notion that inmates are not such a distant status from the law
abiding, and when possible institutions should work toward inclusion over exclusion.
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Arming the Police
The ability for the state to use lethal force upon its citizens is a central issue.
Egon Bittner (1999), in “The capacity to use force as the core of the police role,” argued
cogently for such a coercive relationship between the citizen and police agents. For
Bittner, the ability to dispense state force, especially lethal force, is a defining feature of
police in modern societies because these are the ‘specifically trained staff prepared to
respond to norm violation.’ Police agents are given the discretion to make street level
decisions of whether to apply lethal force or not. While the ability to use lethal force is
not ruled out in a Nordic criminal justice regime, there are institutional mechanisms in
place that serve to curtail the ability for Nordic police agents to kill citizens.
One such institutional practice of a Nordic criminal justice regime would be
foregoing a widespread or general decree to provide police agents with firearms. To
restrict the public police force’s ability to carry firearms sends a clear message to the
public about the nature of the relationship between citizen and police agent (i.e., the
state). There are few uniforms outside of the military that carry as much symbolic power
as that of the modern police. Indeed, the earliest police reformers in the US, Germany,
and France were quick to institute the use of specific types of uniforms. Uniforms
provide several organizational and sociological functions including planting the seeds of
professionalism within the police force, providing citizens with a clear understanding of
which individuals are police agents, and also serving to create a hierarchical relationship
between the citizen and the police agent as an individual capable of dispensing formal
state punitive mechanisms . The police uniform, especially when there is a firearm
attached, sends an extremely clear message that deadly force is a realistic option. A
Nordic criminal justice regime is characterized by a police force that is not symbolically
tied to the firearm, and while this may seem a small item of difference, it sends a
powerful social-psychological effect upon how police and citizens interact with one
another. This could have some influence on how “street level decisions” are made. The
Swedish police force did not become regularly armed with firearms until the mid-1960s.
Centralization of Police Powers
The Nordic criminal justice regime is characterized by a police system that is
predominantly organized through the national government. This is not to say that
subgovernment, local, canon, and other smaller levels do not exist. Modern governments
are arranged bureaucratically with police structures that function locally but are
controlled at the national level. This is different from the common law type in that the
latter is operated and controlled at many levels, with little direct federal government
oversight. The Romano-Germanic legal type differs as it is national-militaristic, with a
police force that does not overtly recognize a separation between domestic and national
security measures. The Nordic type police organization is one that has oversight and
financial support from the nation-state, but lacks much direct involvement over every day
functions.
In Sweden the National Police Board oversees the entire police service in
Sweden, which includes about 23,000 individuals (National Police Board, 2005). This
bureaucracy is divided into several levels from the local, national, and international.
Nonetheless, the “National Police Board (NPB) is the central administrative and
supervisory authority for the police service…The main duties of the NPB are to supervise
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the police and to ensure co-ordination and the rational use of resources in the police
service” (National Police Board, 2005, p. 4). This national perspective allows for
centralized training as well. The Swedish police are trained in one of three locations: the
National Police Academy at the University of Solna, the University of Vaxjo, and the
University of Umea. Here another important characteristic of the Nordic type of policing
is directly related to higher education. The Nordic criminal justice regime differs from
more federalist government structures, and most obviously from the common law regime
in which local police positions are often decided through popular vote, not academic
training and professional accreditation.
Nordic Exceptionalism: Welfare and Civic Inclusion
The model of a Nordic legal and criminal justice regime is related to similar
arguments made in the welfare state literature (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Huber and
Stephens, 2004). The welfare system is known as a comprehensive system that seeks to
provide supports from “cradle to grave” through state subsidies without means-tests or
other stigmatizing procedures. Pratt (2008, p. 274) suggested that broader “cultures of
equality and welfare state security” foster a specific type of Scandinavian punishment. This
type of punishment results in low levels of incarceration and humane prison treatment. The
Nordic criminal justice regime is characterized by strong welfare states that continue to
support prisoners. It is suggested here that Sweden demonstrates the notion of
universalist social policies that are embedded in deeper institutions of care and solidarity
(Huber and Stephens, 2001; Rothstein, 2001) that move through the legal field into
criminal justice practices, and influence levels of incarceration.
Esping-Anderson (1990) argued that the power of left political parties, namely the
Social Democrats, fostered a specific sort of political effect by holding power in
Scandinavia for nearly six decades. By recognizing the temporal dynamics shaping
Scandinavia through a long-term institutionalizing process, Esping-Anderson (1990) was
able to discern important historical policy legacies and regime development. An
historical legacy can be thought of similar to collective memories that Savelsberg and
King (2005, 2007) used when describing the long-term impact of the Nazi movement and
the Holocaust experience for the German culture as it was produced and reproduced
through rituals, ceremonies, commemorations, and days of signification.
Scandinavian political beliefs fostered a welfare state that did not “tolerate a
dualism between state and market, between working class and middle class, the Social
Democrats pursued a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest
standards, not an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere” (EspingAnderson, 1990: 27). This model attempted to bridge liberal and corporatist regimes by
creating an approach that focused on de-commodification, universal benefits, and full
employment. This relationship between state and individual is also seen with how the
legal and criminal justice systems are predicated on the notion of incorporation and
inclusivity.
A Nordic criminal justice regime would allow inmates to maintain high levels of
civic incorporation. This is meant only to signify the amount of general civic
participation inmates and released inmates are given. In the US, inmates are highly
stigmatized something causing them problems finding employment, difficulty finding
post-release housing and other reentry issues (Reentry Policy Council, 2005; Pager,
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2007). Inmates in a Nordic criminal justice regime would be able to maintain many of
their civic benefits (e.g., welfare, voting) (on the U.S. case, see Manza and Uggen, 2006).
Nordic Regime Politics and Policy Changes
It is common to suggest that a country’s legal system is a reflection of broader social
and cultural sentiments (Friedman, 1975). The Nordic region is characterized by a strong
sense of community, equality, and rationality. The 1960s were a time in which much of
the western world was questioning its central values and mores, with counterculture and
“hippy” movements. These social change movements were powerful in the Nordic
countries, with grassroots prison reform movements spread throughout the Nordic region.
Von Hoffer and Tham (1980) and Tham (1995) provide an excellent account of KRUM
and this group’s involvement in the prison reform movement of the early 1970s.
Mathieson (2000) describes similar groups as in Denmark called KRIM (established in
1967) and Norway called KROM (established in 1968), with mention that a similar group
existed in Finland but no details are provided. In fact, Mathieson remains active in
KROM, the group continues to host meetings and publishes a journal. KROM continues
to be active and maintains a webpage. xxi
The Swedish legal code had stood relatively unchanged from its 1734 version,
until it was revised in 1965. The 1960s brought policy changes that moved away from
the treatment ideology that had taken over during the 1950s. Lappi-Seppala (2007, p.
245) writes that even “during the 1950s there were proposals to abolish the criminal
code.” The mid-1960s were a time of radical movements, with some calling for prison
abolition; others saw the therapeutic approach in Sweden as a form of ‘coercive care
giving’ with treatment forced upon all offenders. These criticisms stemmed more from
liberal interpretations of the prison as a place increasing the likelihood of further criminal
behavior and inhumane treatment. The archetype of this is the grassroots prisoner’s
organization, KRUM, that was part of a larger “grassroots movements [throughout the
Nordic]…managing to convey this message to the political establishment and those
responsible for the administration of justice” (Lappi-Seppala, 2007, p. 245).
Although KRUM is no longer in operation, a similar prisoner’s organization is
active in Norway, the Norwegian Association for Penal Reform (KROM). KROM is “a
non-governmental political organization and pressure group in the area of penal policy”
(Mathieson, 2000). During the 1970s, KRUM and KROM were instrumental in
organizing massive prisoner hunger strikes so inmates could receive additional rights.
KROM orchestrates a three-day meeting in a mountain resort in January each year,
known as a Synnseter Conference. What makes these meetings so special is who
attends—prisoners, academics, social workers, lawyers, social scientists, members of
organizations, as well as representatives from the Ministry of Justice. Norwegian
officials initially “refused to participate, a point which was severely criticized in the
newspapers. Today [Ministry officials] come as a matter of course…The debates are hot,
and are meant to be hot. The mix of people and professions, and the meeting and clash
between top and bottom in the prison system, make the conferences unique” (Mathieson,
2000, p. 7-8). KROM also arranges for public forums to give seminars or what they call
“teach-ins” about alternative penal approaches, and they produce a journal.
These grassroots penal abolition organizations should not be confused with the
small and ineffective organizations that may emerge in the US. That is, given the state of
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mass incarceration that exists in the US, there have been various groups that seek to end
the death penalty, stop the drug war, and reduce disenfranchisement of felons, but these
groups lack any real political power. They do not put on meetings that are publicized
broadly in the news media, much less taken seriously by the public and politicians, and
Gottschalk (2006) demonstrated that conservative groups are effective in shaping
criminal justice policies in the US. The Nordic incarceration regime is characterized by
policy decisions that favor working-class politics over elitist politics or objective
scientific legal decisions found in the other incarceration regimes. Max Weber’s
sociology is known as an interpretative sociology because he moved away from purely
descriptive or morality based explanations of social phenomenon. In an attempt to follow
this approach, grassroots penal abolition organizations should be understood in their
broader social structural position. Simply, these organizations fit nicely within the social
and cultural landscape of the Nordic region as one composed of leftist politics,
universalist social policies, and inclusive penal institutions. These grassroots
organizations have been consequential in shaping penal outcomes, unlike their US or
German counterparts.
These prison reform organizations exemplify the general mood of the Nordic
criminal justice regime as one in which individual human integrity and social inclusion
were paramount. There were 46 separate crime control related legislative acts passed in
Sweden with 22 acts related to increased incarceration, 23 acts related to reduced
incarceration, and one that was unidentified (Lappi-Seppala, 2007, , p. 246-247). That
Sweden penal policies, for the most part, sought to reduce punishments for the bulk of
crimes, with the general exceptions being drug crime, sex offenses, and violence. These
adjustments fit with the notion of a Nordic regime as modern governments are to provide
security to the citizenry, and with the exception of drug crimes, sex offenses and violent
predation involve acts that unfairly rob others of their freedom, and the state is to step in
and balance the scales of justice in such instance. In 1977, a three-volume legislative
report titled “the master plan” was released with the hopes of (1) reducing the amount of
incarceration, (2) shifting short incarcerations into community supervision, and (3)
emphasizing the need for a “sentencing system that appreciated the principles of justice
and humanity” (Lappi-Seppala, 2007, p . 246; Tham, 2001).
Conclusion: Mechanisms of a Collectivist form of Punishment
Comparative legal scholars routinely discuss common and civil law families, with
little attention to the unique legal thinking in the Nordic countries (for exception, see
Zweigert and Kotz, 1998). It is commonly accepted that continental Europe received its
legal foundation from Roman legal traditions (Merryman, 1985). The Nordic legal
regime is characterized by a mixture of substantive and formal legal thinking. These
types do not go far enough to explain Nordic legal thinking, which is composed of unique
cognitive, cultural, and organizational perspectives (Pihlajamaki, 2004). Weber
recognized that the common law is substantive-rational law, but he said little about the
Nordic law type. The Nordic law emphasizes working-class concerns, and common law
thinking promotes and supports elitist market conditions. The Nordic type of legal
thinking is predicated on ameliorating social inequalities with minimal criminal justice
intervention. Nordic type of legal thinking exists to foster a Nordic criminal justice
regime characterized by (1) strong lay participation, (2) open prisons, and (3) strong anti90

prison grassroots organizations.
An underlying assumption of Weber’s analysis is that western legal systems
created rules that worked to the benefit of certain groups—capitalists—through the
calculability brought about with the purposive contract and other economic-legal
institutions (Kronman, 1983; Trubek, 1985). It is this inequality that motivates several
substantivizing reforms: (1) strengthening of bureaucratic welfare states, (2) growing
social democratic political power, and (3) changing legal perspectives among legal
professionals (Ewing, 1987, p. 507; Savelsberg, 1992).
There is no doubt that both English common law and German legal science have
contributed to shaping Nordic law (Pihlajamaki, 2004). There are, however, specific
elements that characterize this legal regime as a specific type of legal thinking predicated
on minimal criminal justice intervention. This type of criminal justice system is
predicated on a relationship between individuals and the state in which formal
interventions are intended to improve (or at least maintain) the material and social
wellbeing of citizens. Individual failure to successfully perform one’s role-bound
expectations could result in formal governments using mechanisms from other
governance spheres--the mental health, welfare, and labor market institutions to enforce
social order (Beckett and Western, 2001; Liska, 1997; Western and Beckett, 1999). A
Nordic criminal justice regime type is characterized by perceiving individual criminality
as a problem beyond the individual. Individuals are seen as rational human beings (von
Hofer and Tham, 1980), and criminality is the result of weak social bonds and failed
socialization, not, as in the common law regime type, the result of weak genetic structure,
single parenthood, low ambition and moral depravity. Ironically enough, it is this more
treatment minded focus that eventually led to major crime policy reforms in several of the
Nordic criminal justice systems, and, in 1977, The National Swedish Council for Crime
Prevention published the report A New Penal System: Ideas and Proposals that had
dramatic effects on crime policy (Husa, 2000; Pihlajamaki, 2004; Esping-Anderson,
1990, p. 67-69).
Comparative legal scholarship points the way toward several institutional
differences among legal systems related to differences the nature of the relationship
between the state and the individual. The criminal trial embodies the coercive power of a
modern state, and the procedural, evidentiary, and organizational rules of this process
have some causal implications on penal outcomes. The common law is well known for
its emphasis on jury trials, and the US Sixth Amendment provides this as a central right
for citizens. The typical forms of lay participation are lay judge panels and juries. These
different systems of lay participation come with different perspectives, beliefs, and
values. That is, lay judges are typically elected to multi-year appointments to serve
alongside professional judges. Lay judges are non-legally trained adults that are either
elected or appointed by their political party. This allows for socialization to legal norms
for lay judges, whereas juries hear only a single case which prevents juries from gaining
little legal knowledge. This is not to exaggerate the amount of legal knowledge that lay
judges acquire because sociological research suggests that lay judges have little impact
on trial outcomes. Common law jury trials, on the other hand, do not allow for
deliberation with the judge during the trial, asking direct questions of the witnesses, but
juries are able to deliberate independent of a professional judge to make decisions of fact
and guilt.
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Another version of jury trials involve have a mixed court option, but also have a
jury that works with the judge to determine guilt, but not sentence. Denmark is an
interesting case because the jury was introduced in the 1848 Constitution, but was never
put into practice until Article 65 added a provision for lay participation (Garde, 2001, p,.
113). In 1984, a shift in political context fostered a change to the criteria for using a jury
from an 8 year penalty to a four year prison sentence. This did not alter the actual use of
the jury in Denmark. The point here is not to talk about the amount of the juries use but
rather to demonstrate some common lay influences within the Nordic regime (Garde,
2001). The jury and judge interaction is limited throughout the trial, but the jury is able
to pose direct questions to the judge or judge panel. These juries often operate with three
judges, and there Romano-Germanic influences are obvious.
The power of the judge is different here from German model because the courts
are not given the written record before the trial. This information could prejudice the
judges’ decision, which are grounds for an appeal in Norway (Stranbakken (2001). In the
more serious cases, it is possible for the judge to request the written record from the
prosecution before the trial, and in which case the defense attorney also receives a copy.
Lay judges can challenge professional judge in court. They can question whether he or
she followed procedural requirements. While this rarely happens, Stranbakken (2001,
p.231) used this to demonstrate the power of lay participation in Norwegian trials. The
lay judges can directly question witnesses and defendants. While Norway has a unified
trial process, when juries are used the jury is only to make decisions regarding guilt or
innocence and mixed court will decide on sentence. There are 10 members to a jury and
they can pose questions to witnesses and defendants through the elected foreperson.
The Nordic regime is composed of elements of both common and Roman legal
principles. That this regime is an amalgamation of the other two legal regimes
necessitates demonstrating the differences that set it apart from these other systems. It
should be obvious that all three regimes include the four central courtroom actors of
defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and lay participation, but each of these regimes
distributes discretionary power differently.
First, individual privacy and a commitment to using the law as a way to balance
social inequalities are essential to the Nordic regime. In Sweden, for instance, the names
of accused criminals are not released to the media, only the names of convicted offenders
are able to be in the media. Consider how different this is to the common law regime in
which the media is a central element of the criminal trial as prosecutors and defense
attorneys try to sway public opinion by demonstrating the need for certain individuals to
receive harsh punishments or prosecutors maintaining web pages dedicated to their
conviction ratios. How does the lack of media generated crime stories contribute to
perceptions of crime, criminals, and crime control? The media is essential to creating
cognitive frames of the definitions of crime and punishment in the US, but in the Nordic
regime the media is restrained and crime is a non-issue. Public opinion is molded
through media generated images and rhetoric about criminality that typically suggests
that crime occurs among people not knowing one another in some random fashion, and
that criminals are deranged, dangerous, and unpredictable. The reality, however, could
not be further from the truth as crimes more often than not occur among people knowing
each other, with most crimes being rather simple forms of illegality. It is plausible that
the Nordic regimes emphasis on personal privacy contributes to notions of rehabilitation
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and social welfare for criminals.
Second, in the Nordic regime, prosecutorial discretion fits somewhere between
the hyper-discretion afforded them in the common law regime and the limited discretion
given to prosecutors in the Romano-Germanic regime. While there is attention given to
legal scientific principles in this regime, it is at a lower level than found in the RomanoGermanic regime, but yet more so than in the common law regime. This modicum of
prosecutorial discretion results in a system that maintains weak defense attorneys. That
is, similar to the Romano-Germanic regime limiting prosecutorial discretion and lay
participation, the Nordic regime places little reliance on defense attorneys to locate or
even create legal technicalities to free defendants, namely because such technicalities do
not exist. Third, the Nordic regime also possesses lay judges, but these lay judges have
more power than those found in the Romano-Germanic system as they are able to vote
independent of the other lay judges, they are instituted by their political party, and they
are less influenced by professional judges.
Fourth, the Nordic regime’s punishment patterns cannot be understood without
considering the well-documented effects of cumulative left party power. This political
orientation results in a more collectivist orientation with a strong welfare state and
reliance on active labor market policies. Recall that the quantitative findings from
chapter three indicated highly significant negative coefficients for union density. That is,
one of the essential features of the Nordic regime is the reliance and power of unions,
especially relative to the other countries in this analysis. How is it that strong unions can
stem incarceration? Incarcerated populations are typically drawn from the working
classes, and countries with strong unions demonstrate reliance upon protecting workers
from the inherent inequalities and precarious nature of capitalist production. High union
density provides workers with protections from policies that would negatively affect
laborers, as well as indicating a cultural precondition that supports alternatives to
incarceration and more rehabilitative crime control practices. It should be pointed out
that the legal and criminal justice systems are formal ways in which the state controls the
citizenry, and punishment is a reflection of the type of relationship between the state and
citizen. In fact, what defines the notion of citizenship more than the legal system? The
legal system tells citizens what they can and cannot do, what is required of citizens, and
numerous other necessities of being a citizen.
Fifth, the relationship between the state and citizen produce two unique criminal
justice institutions in the Nordic regime. The use of open prisons and penal waiting lists
are special to the Nordic regime. Upon first glance, some may suggest that open prisons
exist in other places as low-level security institutions or that waiting lists are merely an
extended form of presentence procedures. However, these institutions go further that.
Open prisons in the Nordic regime allow the spouses and young children of inmates to
stay in the prison with them if so desired. Inmates can leave the prison to go to work, to
shop, and to carry out other parts of normal life. The idea with these prisons goes further
than US notions of reintegration because inmates are never completely severed from the
community. Instead, prisoners are seen as part of the community, and they need to work,
they must remain responsible parents, and they should be able to contribute to society.
Similarly, the prison waiting lists say something fundamentally different than presentence
release as individuals on waiting lists have already been convicted and sentenced, which
also highlights some differences between the dual trial structure in the common law
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regime in which guilt and sentence are determined separately. Waiting lists suggest that
criminals are perceived as citizens that need to be further incorporated into society, not
some expendable or surplus population in need of separation, incapacitation, or
extermination.
Sixth, the Nordic regime is, therefore, characterized as one in which crime control
is perceived as an extension of the welfare state and active labor market policies. That is,
the criminal justice system and the application of formal punishment cannot be separated
from how societies treat the poor, underprivileged, sick, and the mentally ill. Rather,
these forms of governance are intimately linked to one another as Bourdieu pointed out as
the left and right hands of the state. Consider how this works in the common law regime
in which these countries are known for having highly stigmatizing welfare and criminal
justice practices or the Romano-Germanic regimes reliance on conservative hierarchical
welfare state and crime control approaches. The point here is that it is not so unique that
the Nordic regimes approach to crime control reflects some similarity with their approach
to managing the disadvantaged as these systems operate according to preexisting cultural
conditions that define appropriate ways for dealing with those not fitting into
contemporary society.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Why is there so much variation among similar countries’ approach to formal
punishment? Common law countries incarcerate more people than all other countries.
The US is the most aggressive punisher, with between seven to ten times the proportion
of incarcerated adults than other nations. This research utilized comparative-historical
methods and theories to suggest that there are three ‘varieties of incarceration’ in the
West. The approach here incorporated theories from several social science disciplines:
political sociology, historical institutional theories, Weberian sociology of law, and
comparative legal scholarship. Previous political sociological research demonstrated that
“punishment is fundamentally linked to the ways in which states exercise power in order
to maintain legitimacy” (see Barker, 2009, p. 6). This body of scholarship argued that
long-term legal and criminal justice institutional arrangements (e.g., judicial-prosecutor
relationships, lay participation, trial structures, and adversarial vs. inquisitorial models)
play out differently within particular countries at particular times. Each country has
specific institutional frameworks that shape how the formal law is defined and enforced,
and these institutions effect legal and criminal justice decision makers and outcomes
depending on the political structure, relationship between the state and citizen, and
alternative conflict resolution outlets. It was argued that more empirical research is
needed to understand how different socio-political structures shape and are shaped by
underlying legal frameworks.
In Weber’s sociology of law he provided a typological schema to differentiate the
world’s legal systems. Weber’s (1967) types of “legal thinking” argued that the English
common law and the German Roman law approaches formed ideal types of substantive
rational and formally rational law, respectively. The theory presented here incorporates
comparative legal scholarship to compliment Weber’s typology by suggesting that a
Nordic type of legal thinking also exists (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998). These underlying
types of legal thinking shape criminal justice institutions in each country at different
times.
Comparative legal scholarship demonstrates the differences in legal processes
among countries. For instance, countries within the Romano-Germanic incarceration
regime have unitary trials that are heavily influenced by written investigative reports (a
dossier) by the prosecution that are given to the judge before the trial. A similar situation
exists in the Nordic regime, with the exception that judges are not always allowed to see
the written report before the trial, and the prosecutor’s office and the court are separate
(i.e., adversarial trial). The common law trial is known for its two-part approach of
separately determining guilt and sentence. Another fundamental difference among these
legal systems is in the incorporation of lay participation in which some countries rely on
a strong professional judge to lead several lay judges (non-legally trained) typical of the
Romano-Germanic approach. This is in contrast to the Nordic incorporation of some jury
trials depending on the amount of prison time possible in a case (e.g., Sweden, Norway)
or when cases are brought on appeal (Denmark) (Diesen, 2001; Garde, 2001;
Strandbakken, 2001).
The theoretical approach incorporates dynamic institutional variables (Janoski, et
al., 1998) that are composed of several key institutions shaping punishment outcomes in
each country from 1960 to 2002. Each of the hypothesized regime types has an
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institutional variable that is measured for each year. These variables are measured in
such a way that they are predictive of each regime type. These variables are slowly
changing institutional practices used to test the plausibility of each type of incarceration
regime.
Advanced capitalist societies rely upon the criminal justice and legal systems to
carry out domestic control with police forces apprehending suspected offenders, courts
sentencing those deemed guilty and correctional facilities and services carrying out
punishments, all in the name of enforcing the rule of law. Central to the arguments here
is that the differences among common law countries’, Continental countries’, and Nordic
countries’ legal principles foster different investigation processes, charging practices,
adjudication devices, rules of criminal evidence, judicial power, and trial structures. One
socio-political axiom is that laws and the criminal justice system vacillate much over
time and space as the publics’ and elites’ perceptions of allowable behaviors and
legitimate enforcement mechanisms shift. Following Savelsberg (2008, p. 28), it was
argued that a theory explaining cross-national differences in incarceration rates “must be
conceived as a multi-factorial, historically and institutionally grounded theory” to
produce nation-specific explanations over time and space.
The criminal justice and legal systems in any society are the manifestation of
dominant institutional practices rooted in traditions, values, and conventions (Garland,
2001). Certain institutional arrangements bring about policy adjustments and procedural
changes that have long lasting effects on the number of individuals apprehended,
sentenced, and incarcerated. The arguments offered here use long-term institutionalist
and political theories to trace the framing and imprinting of state based punishment
processes. These institutional arrangements shape and are shaped by cognitive-cultural
schemas that define the legitimate relationship between the state and citizen (e.g., neocorporate wage bargaining vs. single issue lobbyist groups) (Field, 2002; Sewell, 1992;
Swidler, 1986). The incarceration regime types used in this analysis do not imply that all
countries within a regime type will be identical, rather countries tend to cluster on their
legal principles that support criminal justice policies, and these practices, in turn, tend to
produce similar penal outcome patterns within each regime. Regime type research uses
patterns discerned from combinations of social characteristics of each country-year case
to identify and group causes of major social phenomenon (Esping-Andersen 1990).
The current analysis suggests that each incarceration regime has different
procedures and measures because of the different ways in which the law is perceived and
enacted across regimes. Following this logic, it is suggested that an historical legacy
rooted in common law nations’ lawyer-centered trials weakens judicial oversight and
results in more incarceration in these countries. The Romano-Germanic incarceration
regime countries are expected to produce relatively moderate levels of incarceration due
to a more patriarchal relationship (i.e., written-code law, inquisitorial model, restrained
criminal justice actors) between the state, as embodied by the judge, and the individual
that is tempered by bureaucratic controls that do not exist in the common law world
(Savelsberg, 1994). The Nordic incarceration regime has more of what Nils Christie
(2000) referred to as the breaks needed to control formal punishment, and they have the
least amount of incarceration.
The Romano-Germanic type of legal thinking is characterized as a bureaucratic
form of legal decision making that Weber referred to as the ultimate form of formal96

rational legal development. The common law type of legal thinking sees the law as a
mechanism to promote further capitalist development and elite politics. The Nordic type
of legal thinking is also concerned with extralegal issues, but in a much different way.
Nordic law is known for shaping policies that are intended to ameliorate capitalist
inequalities, with one resulting policy being the creation of the most generous welfare
states in the Western world (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Rothstein, 2001). The RomanoGermanic type of legal thinking is argued to produce a highly bureaucratized
organizational structure in which legal actors—an example of micro level self-reinforcing
effects—are trained how to think and base their decisions upon a rigid code of legal
decision making (see de Cruz, 1999; Dubber, 1997; Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe,
1982; Jolowicz, 2003; Merryman, 1985; Whitman, 1990, 2003).
Substantive conclusion
The historical and quantitative analyses support the plausibility of the existence of
three punishment regimes. The punishment regimes are composed of long standing legal
features particular to each regime. These legal features tended to involve the amount of
and kind of lay participation, the balance of power among criminal justice actors, and the
relationship between the state and citizen. The three punishment regimes all include law
participants in the legal process, but how this lay participation takes place varies across
regimes. No doubt, the starkest differences involve the common law’s use of jury trials
and the lay judge panels within the Romano-Germanic and Nordic regimes. What does it
say about a country that has these different types of lay participation? The RomanoGermanic punishment regime constrains lay participation more than the other regimes.
This is the most bureaucratic and technical of the punishment regimes with adjudication
relying heavily on written testimony and abstract application of legal principles. Jury
trials suggest that lay citizens have input in legal decision making. Granting this power
to citizens suggests that legal decision making requires more than technical knowledge,
but rather that lay participants are needed to ensure that legal decisions reflect dominant
social values and norms.
As the US case study makes evident, the common law trial evolved from an antilawyer system to one dominated by lawyers. The common law trial was originally to be
a forum for participants of a legal complaint to articulate their cases in front of a judge
with little interference from outside parties. In fact, lawyers were originally perceived
with discontent in both the Romano-Germanic and common law punishment regimes.
Whereas the Nordic and Romano-Germanic regimes incorporate lawyers within the trial
process, the common law courtroom is controlled by lawyers. The lawyerization of the
common law brought about major shifts in power balances between lawyers (defense and
prosecution) and judges. As the common law trial began to incorporate lawyers there
was a push for more trial rules to protect the accused from the unknown decision making
abilities of lay participants, which resulted in exclusionary rules, reasonable doubt
standards, and a large body of criminal evidentiary rules. These changes resulted in
lawyers taking control of the courtroom trial and have fostered prosecutors with broad
discretionary control. This sort of discretion is unheard of with the Nordic and RomanoGermanic regimes in which the judge holds more power. Lay participation is quieted in
each of these latter regimes through the judiciary. Lawyers are controlled by strict
hierarchical administration in the non-common law regimes.
There are several mechanisms needed to maintain social order. Incarceration is
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only one mechanism used to order the citizenry. Societies make choices regarding how
much incarceration to use based upon non-crime factors. Simply, the amount or type of
crime has little to do with macro level trends in incarceration, and the non-significant and
often negative regression coefficients for homicide rates support this argument. This
suggests that the political structure influences governments’ crime control decisions.
Mechanisms Embedded in the Substantive Conclusions
Each of the four courtroom actors identified compete for different levels of
discretionary power. Common law regime is the most punitive criminal justice system,
the Nordic regime is the least punitive, and the Romano-Germanic regime fits in between
these two. This dissertation provides a theoretical explanation for this variation in
approaches to punishment. It is argued that the common law regime was originally to be
a lawyer free system in which individual citizens were able to present facts before an
impartial judge and self-informed jury. The Romano-Germanic regime, on the other
hand, is based upon Roman and German legal principles that favor lawyers. Lawyers
have always been at the center of Roman legal principles as a way to rid subjective and
overly emotional legal decision making. The Nordic regime is an amalgamation of these
two legal approaches. This amalgamation, however, provides blocks to the more recent
lawyerization of the common law, and the overly pedantic manner of Germanic law by
allowing more lay participation.
Contemporary crime control policies do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, crime
control is tied to other social processes and is both a cultural product and producer of
cultural meanings. Essential to this is the use of the media to disseminate images and
rhetoric related to crime, criminals, and crime control. It is argued that different
approaches to media displays of crime and justice related information shape public
perspectives about what it means to be a criminal, what a crime is, and what is
appropriate punishment. For instance, Christie (2000) discussed a classroom exercise he
uses with undergraduate students in which he asks them to close their eyes and imagine a
criminal, imagine a typical crime, and imagine the appropriate punishment for that crime
and criminal. He argued that for many students in the US this criminal is usually a
minority, urban, young, male, and preying upon random unknown victims. He went
further to demonstrate how that these perceptions have little to do with reality, but rather
are shaped by misleading, sensationalist, and hyperbolic media representations of
criminality. These perceptions, as W.I. Thomas pointed out nearly 80 years, become
reality for those distanced from crime issues.
These three regimes take different orientations toward media depictions of crime
and justice issues. The Nordic regime is dedicated to a privacy system in which the
accused are protected from arbitrary media discussion until proven guilty, the RomanoGermanic system is such a tightly bound bureaucratic approach to justice that crime
stories are unable to break through hyper-rational organization control of criminal justice
actors, and the common law system, however, allows for relatively open media coverage
of crime and criminals that results in the public wanting harsher sentences. Take the
Willie Horton incident in which an African-American criminal on furlough commits a
heinous crime and the public is bombarded with images and rhetoric to suggest that there
are no answers more appropriate than a long-term incarceration. This is not so much a
comment on Horton’s case specifically, but rather suggests that the media creates
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situation in the common law regime in which sensation crimes become superimposed
onto all crimes such that when one thinks of crime they do not think of petty thefts,
simple assaults, or domestic violence. Instead, images of hardened and dangerous
criminals attacking strangers is what pops into to the public’s minds.
These perceptions are supported through the courtroom actors. Common law
juries are to be the contemporary executioner protecting society by ridding it of heinous
killers and rapists. This is interesting because originally the common law jury was seen
to accomplish the opposite of harsh justice. In fact, the jury was perceived as a shield
from arbitrary judicial decision making. The jury system is contrasted by two slightly
different forms of lay judgeship in the Nordic and the Romano-Germanic regimes. Lay
judges can be differentiated in these two regimes by the level of importance in scientific,
hyper-rational legalistic approaches. That is, in the German, French, and Italian legal
systems there is little that is more important to judges than ensuring that abstract legal
principles are properly applied. Judges are not only the highest civil servant in these
countries, but they are also legal scientists. That judges are perceived as scientists
suggests that they have the ability to turn off their subjective and emotional orientations
to only evaluate cases according to their legal merits. No doubt legal science is important
to the Nordic regime, but in a far less rigid manner. The Nordic regime prioritizes
collectivist orientations to legal decisions by searching for what is most appropriate for
society at large and how to best incorporate offenders into society, not stigmatize and ban
them.
Prosecutorial discretion is also shaped by these differing legal orientations. That
is, the common law prosecutors have broad discretion when making decisions of who to
prosecute, to take to trial, and what sentences to seek out. Common law prosecutors are
also tied to the media generated system of crime control by taking their cases to the
public through television, radio, and internet sources to broadcast a need for longer
sentences and punitive approaches. Again, however, these forms of punishment are
block by the chilling effect of hyper-rationality in the Romano-Germanic regime, and the
collectivist orientation of the Nordic regime.
A third courtroom actor is the defense attorney. Defense attorneys must compete
for power in these various regimes. It was demonstrated through the historical trajectory
of the Romano-Germanic regime that lawyers were given a special place, but this place is
much different than in the common law regime. That is, lawyers were favored in the
former system because they were seen as learned individuals in legal science, and this
training should allow them to make objective legal decisions devoid of emotion. The
common law regime, interestingly, eschewed lawyers preferring trials to be a place for
common people to argue the merits of any case and allow for the jury, as a body of
untrained citizens, to decide what is most appropriate for the community. This regime
lacks overarching legal principles or abstract notions of law to allow for localized
definitions of legal and illegal to take hold with tremendous flexibility. There is some
irony in the fact that common law originally prohibited defense attorneys in serious
felony cases because they were seen as subverting facts for legal wrangling. However,
lawyers successfully argued that relying on untrained juries to make such decisions
necessitates a complex system of evidentiary rules and procedures.
The US system of judicial elections was identified as a unique institution offering
some explanation for such high levels of incarceration in the US. That judges are part
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judiciary and party politician suggests that they are at the whim of public opinion. Judges
cannot make decisions without considering how certain judgments will affect their reelection bids. This does not exist in the other countries included in this analysis, and
further highlights the populist nature of US punishment practices. In the other regimes
judges are seen as highly trained legal professionals that decide cases legal merits, with
consideration given in the Nordic regime to reducing social inequalities through the law.
The Nordic regime’s cumulative left party power shapes a political orientation
that is collectivist with a strong welfare state and reliance on active labor market policies.
Essential to this regime is the reliance and power of unions, especially relative to the
other countries in this analysis. High union density provides workers with protections
from policies that would negatively affect laborers, as well as indicating a cultural
precondition that supports alternatives to incarceration and more rehabilitative crime
control practices. It should be pointed out that the legal and criminal justice systems are
formal ways in which the state controls the citizenry, and punishment is a reflection of
the type of relationship between the state and citizen. This relationship is demonstrated
by the Nordic regimes use of open prisons and prison waiting lists both of which are used
to ensure that crime control does not severe an individual’s ties to family, work, and
community. Crime control is perceived as an extension of the welfare state and active
labor market policies as crime control cannot be separated from how societies treat the
poor, underprivileged, and the mentally ill. Contemporary approaches to crime control
reflect a regime’s approach to managing the disadvantaged by operating according to
preexisting cultural conditions that define appropriate ways for dealing with those not
fitting into contemporary society.
The four courtroom actors identified are defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges,
and lay representation that exist in all three regimes. These courtroom actors compete for
discretionary power. The common law regime is one that relies upon the adversarial
battle between defense attorneys and prosecutors in which the judge acts as the referee,
whereas the Romano-Germanic regime places defense attorneys and lay participation at
the bottom of the discretionary power grid. The Nordic regime develops criminal justice
institutions that support active labor market policies and collectivist social policies.
Theoretical contributions
Theoretically this dissertation seeks to contribute to comparative understandings
of incarceration rate variation. It is argued that historically embedded legal differences
are consequential for incarceration rates. The 17 countries included in this dissertation
are similar in many ways, but there are also small differences that have large effects on
crime control policies. That is, the presence of judicial elections within the US point
toward a populist system that is more easily swayed toward more punitive responses.
While it is difficult to determine the precise effect of this variable, given that the US is
alone with its reliance on electing judges. However, this creates a situation of potential
role schizophrenia in which judges are not sure if they are to be judicial or political when
dealing with the public. It seems that, in the US at least, judges are rewarded for being
punitive and punished for being lenient during election times. One need only recall how
the Willie Horton debacle affected Michael Dukakis’ presidential bid. The point here is
that when criminal justice officials are dependent on the electoral power of the public
these officials are forced to consider the ramifications of appearing soft on crime. These
scenarios do not exist in the other two regimes because judges are put in to place through
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official appointments and training.
Politics obviously matters to explain the use of incarceration. Although the left
party power variable is significant in only a few of the regression models, it is clear to
that leftist sort of political institutions are consequential in long-term incarceration
patterns. In fact, economic interventionism and union density are two highly significant
explanatory variables. There is little doubt that left party politics provides the path by
which strong unions and certain economic policies are made allowable, as it appears that
union membership is a crucial variable explaining incarceration rate variation over time.
It could be that countries with strong unions and more distributive economic policies
simply do not depend on crime control strategies as much as other countries.
Future research
More research is needed to refine cross-nation theories of incarceration rate
variation. Crime and justice related research and theory has tended to focus on micro
explanation of crime causation, or more recently evaluating the recidivism reducing
properties of correctional programs. However, comparative research has the potential to
tell as much about the US incarceration patterns as well as other countries. Comparative
projects are needed to provide infrastructure to conduct research. Currently, there is
more talk about how crime and violence definitions make it difficult to compare nations
than looking for strategies to conduct comparative research.
Future research will also consider immigrants and minorities in quantitative
models. That is, longitudinal measures of ethnic fractionalization and minority presence
within society and incarcerated has the potential to contribute to explanations of
incarceration rate variation.
Policy recommendations
Criminal justice policy debates need to be reframed to consider emerging research
findings. What would a reframing of the crime control debate consist of? First, there
needs to be a move away from the hyper-moralistic rhetoric that tends to convey that
crime and punishment are new. Instead, there should be recognition that all modern
societies have crime, criminals, and formal punishment mechanisms. Many sociologists
observe that crime and punishment are fundamental parts of society, and that all crime
cannot be eliminated. Second, crime policy should analyze criminal acts as social
processes, not merely individual incidents. This is not to say that individuals are not
responsible for their actions, but effective policies cannot be developed to respond to
every criminal event. Viewing crimes as a social process provides new ways of reacting
to social disorganization and responding to the relationship between neighborhoods and
crime and violence. There is ample criminological evidence suggesting that poorer
neighborhoods tend to lack social efficacy, have limited amounts of social trust and social
capital, and foster criminal attitudes and behaviors. These concerns cannot be resolved
through criminal justice mechanisms alone. Crime control policies cannot emerge in
isolation to other social policies--namely those related to welfare and mental health
problems.
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1

Max Weber routinely wrote about law—normally as lawmaking and law finding—with his most thorough
account not published until after his death in 1925, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der
verstehenden Soziologie. This text was introduced to an English audience, in 1968, edited and translated by
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich as Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Within
this text, it is Chapter VIII that specifically analyzes the relationships between the law and economy in
modern society, and “was given the title the Sociology of Law by Weber’s widow” (Trubek, 1985, p. 919,
footnote #1). The citations used in this dissertation refer to Max Rheinstein’s (1967) edition titled Max
Weber on Law in Economy and Society, in which the bulk of Chapter VIII is translated along with
Rheinstein’s thorough introduction (citations throughout refer to this latter publication).
2
Actually, there was a push to double-up cell occupancy, but the Norwegian prison workers union
successfully protested against it on public health and safety grounds.
3
In order to control for population growth, Weigund also reports the offense rate per 100,000 adults in the
population for these times as 3,588 and 8,125, for 1968 and 1996, respectively.
4
Actually, while working on this dissertation several U.S. states and the federal system are shifting to
counting parolees’ time “on the street” as time served. The reasons for this shift are related to budget
shortages and institutional crowding. Simply, there is less money (and willingness) to spend on
incarceration and not enough beds to continue to incarcerate. Now, if an individual is released onto parole,
with, say, five years left on his or her sentence and they remain trouble free in the community for three
years, they would only have to serve out the remaining two years if returned to prison. Hence, even
definitions of “time-served” change.
5
Garland (2001: 75) refers to these changes as a condition of late modernity witnessed by two sets of
adaptive pressures: 1. changes occurring in social and a economic policies as free market neoliberalist
policies merge with social conservatism, and 2. political realignments and policy initiatives developed in
response to these socio-economic conditions, and unease with welfare state devolution.
6
This should not be seen as an overly functionalist position, but rather as demonstrating that in the social
sciences it is often difficult (maybe impossible) to completely separate such fundamental institutions.
Unlike some of the natural sciences, in which various elements can be either added or subtracted
completely from an experiment, comparative sociology cannot ignore the potential effect each of these
three social structures have on shaping meaning and human conduct.
8
Ireland has exceptionally low incarceration rates, and many Irish are incarcerated in British institutions
due to separatist violence.
9
Japan is a difficult case to place in a regime. It is similar to the Nordic regime in many respects, but is
also heavily influenced by German law.
10
Although not reported here, a series of lags and natural logs of the standardized homicide variables were
used in many equations with little difference from the coefficients reported here.
11
Whitman’s (2003) analysis does not seek to explain why the amount of incarceration varies among
countries. Rather, he is interested in the differences in the type of punishment between France, Germany,
and the US. He reports on the distinctively harsh form of punishment dispensed in the US. This harshness
does not only involve the much longer sentences imposed in the US, but also the kind of treatment that
prisoners are exposed to in each system. US incarceration is characterized as highly stigmatizing and
dehumanizing. French and German prisoners are treated much better than their US counterparts, and are
exposed to the notion of normalization in which prisons are to create normal conditions for inmates. In
Germany, for instance, correctional guards are to knock before entering a cell, and in France, inmates are to
be referred to as “Mr.” or “Ms.”
12
Fisher (1997) argues against the prevalence of self-informing juries. He suggests that few jurors would
have knowledge of the case beforehand, but chosen based on availability.
13
John Langbein (2005) in a series of works traces the emergence and power of lawyers in criminal trials to
the Treason Trials Act of 1696. He provides a detailed history of the Popish Plot, Fitzharris and College,
the Rye house Plot, the Bloody Assizes, and the Seven Bishops. His central argument is that the elite
accused in these trials had the social, political, and economic capitol and networks to slowly change court
procedures and eventually shape legislation. The result of the legislation was to slowly empower criminal
defense lawyers, weaken judges, and shape evidentiary procedural rules.
14
Christopher Columbus Langdell was appointed Dean of Harvard Law School in 1870.
15
These prisons continue to be tourist attractions as they are open for the public to view, especially during
Halloween.
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16

This separation was taken so seriously that as new inmates entered the prison they were to wear hoods
that blinded their peripheral view. Inmates did attention religious sermons together, but here too they were
prevented from viewing each other by wearing hoods and placed in separated enclosures during the
sermon. The separate prison model followed strict procedures to ensure that inmates could not identify one
another upon release and form criminal networks, but also to maintain a highly introspective environment.
17
Demonstrating this bipartisan movement against discriminate sentencing, Kennedy (D-MA) and
Thurmond (R-S.C.) co-sponsored the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act, which placed emphasis on
imprisonment and determinate sentencing (Gottschalk, 2006)
18
This is not to suggest that there is no relationship between crime and incarceration. Spelman (2000), for
instance, found that about 10 percent of the crime decrease between 1993 and 2001 was due to the growth
in state prison populations, which leave 90 percent of the incarceration growth unexplained (see
Gottschalk, 2006).
19
No doubt there is controversy surrounding the exact date of the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The
date here refers to the defeat of Rome to the Visigoths, while others may use the year 476 to refer to the
removal of Romulus Augustus.
20
Many comparative legal scholars point out that the German speaking peoples using Roman legal
procedures and rules would typically change or “barbarize” the more eloquent Roman legal texts by
muddling them with localized Germanic customs.
21
Huber and Stephens (2004, p. 147) suggest that the relative weakness of labor organizations (compared to
the German White Collar Employee’s Union, DAG), and had the left won the 1949 elections “the German
welfare state would have been reformed and given a much more universalistic and solidaristic character.”
22
http://www.krom.no/index.php
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